Team Dec13_11: Cole Hoven Jared Pixley Derek Reiser Rick Sutton Adviser/Client: Prof. Manimaran Govindarasu Graduate Assistant: Aditya Ashok PowerCyber.

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Presentation transcript:

Team Dec13_11: Cole Hoven Jared Pixley Derek Reiser Rick Sutton Adviser/Client: Prof. Manimaran Govindarasu Graduate Assistant: Aditya Ashok PowerCyber SCADA Test Bed

PowerCyber Test Bed Team DEC13_11 DEC13_11 Derek Reiser Computer Eng. Cole Hoven Computer Eng. Jared Pixley Electrical Eng. Richard Sutton Electrical Eng.

What is a SCADA System? DEC13_11 “Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition” A computer controlled Industrial Control System (ICS) that monitors and controls vital industrial processes includes Power Transmission and Distribution, Oil, Gas, and Water

SCADA System Breakdown DEC13_11 Control Center: Human-Machine Interface (HMI). Lets human operator view and control processed data Supervisory Station: Consists of servers, software and stations Provides communication between the Control Center and RTU’s.

SCADA System Breakdown Cont. DEC13_11 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): Typically connected to physical equipment. Collected by the supervisory station. Sensor: Measures an analog or status value in an element of a process. Collects raw process data used to make decisions.

High Level Current Testbed DEC13_11

Project Overview DEC13_11 The PowerCyber testbed provides realistic electric grid control infrastructure Uses a combination of physical, simulated, and emulated components Provides an accurate smart grid representation

Test Bed Research Capabilities DEC13_11 Cyber vulnerability assessment Attack impact analysis Mitigation strategy evaluations Cyber-physical system studies

Problem Statement DEC13_11 Electric power grid highly automated and complex network Monitors, protects and controls Security of SCADA systems are at risk Security analysis of live systems is not practical Lack of cyber-physical systems research Testbed recently developed

Functional Requirements This Semester DEC13_11 SEL_421 connected to system Understanding MU security analyzer Functioning 9 bus model Implement automatic breaker and power generation control logic

Nonfunctional Requirements DEC13_11 Power system models properly formatted SEL-421 connected directly to RTU More realistic setup than being connected to command center directly

Assumptions DEC13_11 Test equipment will function properly. Industry standard devices Simulated devises function identical to physical devises Test bed is similar to a real-world SCADA system. Systems protocols accurately portray real-world protocols Simulation results will be relevant to industry/research Test bed will be continuously improved upon

Limitations DEC13_11 We have two semesters to complete the project. Only 120V will be used by the relays. Real-world systems exceed more than 230kV. Only 2 physical relays will be used due to physical, financial and time limitations. Other relays will be simulated.

Risks and Mitigation DEC13_11 Risks 1. Causing current system to be non-functional 2. If SEL PMU can be connect to the RTU 3. If testbed software can be started remotely 4. Learning curve Mitigation 1. Test system after adding components 2. Trial and error: Want SEL to connect to RTU 3. Test software early to find limitations and issues 4. Continue working and ask questions

New Components DEC13_11 Several new devices are going to be added to the testbed OPAL-RT Simulator SEL-421 SEL-3378

Opal-RT DEC13_11 OPAL-RT Technologies OP5600 HIL Box Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) Hardware-in-the-loop Advanced monitoring capabilities, scalable I/O and processor power More flexible to meet needs of testbed Easier to create and run new testbed models

SEL-421 (Relay) Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Protection Automation System Circuit breaker automation and control More accurate actions due to High-Accuracy Time Stamping (10 ns) More functionality and control than current Siemens devices

SEL-3378 Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Synchrophasor Vector Processor Control center for all SEL Phasor Modulation Units (PMU’s) Collects data and sends out predefined actions to be carried out by SEL devices

RT-LAB/Simulink Models RT-LAB Runs a specified Simulink model on the OPAL-RT simulator Special “OP-COM” blocks used and allow for monitoring and control of data Simulink Models created using block sets Data transfer over different protocols for compatibility with devices

DEC13_11 Automatic Breaker Control Original Breaker CircuitNew Breaker Circuit With Logic

Current Status DEC13_11 Functioning 9 bus model in Simulink Run test simulation on 9 bus model Continue working on model data transfer through IEC61850 protocol SEL PMU connected to the network -Set communication protocols for SEL -Used security tools on current network

Next Semesters Plan DEC13_11 Transfer of data between model and testbed components Integration of the OPAL-RT Simulator Complete 30 bus model in Simulink Remote access server Connect the SEL processor Run further impact analysis

High Level Future Testbed Plan DEC13_11

Project Milestones and Schedule DEC13_11

Questions? DEC13_11