An IST Projecthttp://www.ist-lobster.org/ 1 Herbert Bos, VU, The Ruler Anonymization Language Kees van Reeuwijk Herbert Bos.

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An IST Projecthttp:// 1 Herbert Bos, VU, The Ruler Anonymization Language Kees van Reeuwijk Herbert Bos Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam herbertb _AT_ cs.vu.nl

An IST Projecthttp:// 2 Herbert Bos, VU, Privacy a shared monitoring infrastructure?  what about privacy?! Before talking about privacy ask the following: would you share information?

An IST Projecthttp:// 3 Herbert Bos, VU, Responses vary… –No, absolutely not. I will not reveal any information I will not reveal even the load of my network –Maybe I can share some general statistics what traffic goes in and out of my network –I am willing to share the headers of the packets IP addresses anonymized, payload stripped just like NLANR does today –I would like to share all information with my local administrators some information with associated researchers anonymized information with the rest of the world –Yes – share everything! information wants to be free! Lobster can provide all of the above

An IST Projecthttp:// 4 Herbert Bos, VU, 2. anonymization policy enforcement making sure parties only get properly anonymized traces determines who gets access to what How does it work? 1.applying anonymisation functions functionality to strip/hash payloads, zero addresses, etc.  library of possible anonymisation functions framework to apply these functions on traffic

An IST Projecthttp:// 5 Herbert Bos, VU, How does it work? 1.applying anonymisation functions functionality to strip/hash payloads, zero addresses, etc.  library of possible anonymisation functions framework to apply these functions on traffic 2. anonymization policy enforcement making sure parties only get properly anonymized traces determines who gets access to what UNCHANGED MAP TO INTEGER MAP ACCORDING TO DISTRIBUTION STRIP RANDOM FILENAME RANDOM HASH PATTERN FILL ZERO REPLACE PREFIX PRESERVING REGEXP CHECKSUM ADJUST SUBFIELD

An IST Projecthttp:// 6 Herbert Bos, VU, How does it work? 1.applying anonymisation functions functionality to strip/hash payloads, zero addresses, etc.  library of possible anonymisation functions framework to apply these functions on traffic 2. anonymization policy enforcement making sure parties only get properly anonymized traces determines who gets access to what Ruler: special-purpose, high-level language for packet rewriting in general and anonymization in particular What is so nice about it? easy to specify needs fast, efficient translates to low-level HW

An IST Projecthttp:// 7 Herbert Bos, VU, different policies different anonymization rules for different users credentials determine what sort of access is allowed

An IST Projecthttp:// 8 Herbert Bos, VU, Ruler a simple rule-based language –Generic sanitization –Efficient (DFA-based) implementation –Strive to make implementation in HW possible –Design to allow for (future) formal reasoning –Understand common network protocols –Extensible

An IST Projecthttp:// 9 Herbert Bos, VU, Ruler Patterns and filters consisting of rules pattern: pattern udpHeader: ( source: byte #2 dest: byte #2 len: byte #2 checksum: byte #2 ) filter: include layouts.rli filter simple eh:Ethernet_header iph:IPv4_header * => eh iph with [src=0, dest=0];

An IST Projecthttp:// 10 Herbert Bos, VU, Matching language Fixed number of bytes, fixed value 42#1 5 0x800#2 “url” Fixed number of bytes, arbitrary value byte#2 byte#1 byte Arbitrary number of bytes and value *

An IST Projecthttp:// 11 Herbert Bos, VU, Matching language: bit patterns Surrounded by {} Fixed number of bits, fixed value 42#7 0 0x800#16 Fixed number of bits, arbitrary value bit#2 bit#1 bit

An IST Projecthttp:// 12 Herbert Bos, VU, Matching language: labels Patterns can be labeled source: byte #6 dest: byte #6 payload: * Patterns can be grouped with brackets ether: (s:byte#6 d:byte#6 p:byte#2) Note the nested labels: ether refers to 14 bytes, ether.s refers to 6 bytes

An IST Projecthttp:// 13 Herbert Bos, VU, Matching language: patterns Patterns can be defined and named separately pattern ether: ( s:byte#6 d:byte#6 p:byte#2 ) Allows re-use of common patterns

An IST Projecthttp:// 14 Herbert Bos, VU, include files Definitions can be included from another file include “layouts.rli” Normally used for pattern definitions, but can be used for filters too layouts.rli defines many common header layouts: ethernet, IP, TCP, UDP, etc.

An IST Projecthttp:// 15 Herbert Bos, VU, use of labels Pattern names can now be used instead of the pattern they stand for ether * "warez" * Can be used in rewrite actions: a:byte#2 b:* => b a The trick is to do it fast

An IST Projecthttp:// 16 Herbert Bos, VU, The with construct The with construct replaces named parts of a pattern with other patterns ether with [p=0x0806#2] Restrictions: replacement pattern may not be longer or shorter than the original. ether with [p=42] // WRONG (1 byte)

An IST Projecthttp:// 17 Herbert Bos, VU, Rule actions Action is one of: –reject –accept, accept 5 –result pattern

An IST Projecthttp:// 18 Herbert Bos, VU, Tagged Deterministic Finite Automata We compile to a Tagged Deterministic Finite Automaton (TDFA) Tagged because we need the position of sub- patterns. States: –stop (we know what action to take) –inspect (look at a byte, branch) –tag (register positions in the input) –jump (skip irrelevant input bytes) –memory inspect (look at previous input)

An IST Projecthttp:// 19 Herbert Bos, VU, applications besides anonymisation we also applied Ruler to intrusion detection developed a snort2ruler compiler –translates majority of Snort rules automatically –some rules need manual help –some rules cannot be translated as is –implemented in parallel on an Intel IXP2400 network processor

An IST Projecthttp:// 20 Herbert Bos, VU, extensibility Ruler is extensible: it may call external functions filter zap_url head:(Ethernet_header IPv4_header * "GET ") url:* tail: (0x0D 0x0A *) => tail ; –allows us to use libraries of previously developed anonymisation functions in Lobster we have integrated Ruler with MAPI –a Ruler program can be applied to packets of arbitrary flows –Ruler may use MAPI’s default anonymisation functions

An IST Projecthttp:// 21 Herbert Bos, VU, Ruler for IDS

An IST Projecthttp:// 22 Herbert Bos, VU, Preliminary results able to keep up with gigabit scanning (only small number of rules tested) large number of rules: –large number of states –long compilation Gigabit rates: even on IXP with real traffic

An IST Projecthttp:// 23 Herbert Bos, VU, ruler – the language conclusions useful efficient multiple application domains state space may be the limiting factor fits in FFPF and Lobster

An IST Projecthttp:// 24 Herbert Bos, VU, EXAMPLES

An IST Projecthttp:// 25 Herbert Bos, VU, SISAL include layouts.rli filter two_rules eh: Ethernet_header iph: IPv4_header payload:(* “/bin/sh” *) => reject ; eh: Ethernet_header iph: IPv4_header payload:* => eh iph with [src=0, dest=0] ; include layouts.rli filter rewrite eh:Ethernet_header iph:IPv4_header with [ proto=17] udph:udpHeader * => iph.src iph.dest udph.source udph.dest udph.len ; 12

An IST Projecthttp:// 26 Herbert Bos, VU, SISAL include layouts.rli filter zap_url head:(Ethernet_header IPv4_header * "GET ") url:* tail: (0x0D 0x0A *) => head "XXX" tail; include layouts.rli filter zap_url head:(Ethernet_header IPv4_header * "GET ") url:* tail: (0x0D 0x0A *) => tail ; 43