May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 1  Classification of regional missiles and rockets.

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May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 1  Classification of regional missiles and rockets.  Distinctive features of TBM and SRBT  Design requirements for Short Range Missile Defense  Summary The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense Uzi Rubin and Dan Hazanovsky Based exclusively on pen sources. Copyright Rubincon and Aeordan Ltd. Presentation to the First Annual Israel Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference Airport City Israel May 2010 In Memoriam Dan Hazanovsky

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 2 Man Portable Rockets (ManPR) Relatively light warheads (few Kgs). Ranges: 4 – 12 Km. Salvoes of rounds (Typical). Launched from individual scaffolds. Various homemade Kassam class ManPRs. Janes Defense Weekly Regional Ballistic Missiles Classification

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 3 Ranges: 12 – 50 Km. “Katyusha” Class Military Grade Rockets Light warheads ( c. 15 – 20 Kg). High rate of fire (24 RPM typ.) Launched from mobile multiple launchers. 122 mm Grad Regional Ballistic Missiles Classification

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 4 Medium rockets Ranges: 45 – 120 Km. Medium weight warheads (50 – 150 Kgs). Medium rate of fire (12+ RPM). Fajer 3 Fajer 5 WS-1 Launched from mobile multiple launchers Regional Ballistic Missiles Classification

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 5 Heavy rockets Ranges: 150 – 250 Km. Heavy warheads (250 – 600 Kg). Launched from mobile, single round launchers. Low rate of fire (1-2 per hour). Fatah 110 Nazeat Zilzal Regional Ballistic Missiles Classification

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 6 Regional Ballistic Missiles Classification Battlefield Ballistic Missiles An emerging class of missiles Ranges Km Pinpoint accuracy Medium to heavy warheads ( Kg.) Fired from single or two round mobile launchers Low rate of fire (1-4 per hour)

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 7 Ballistic Missiles Classification Theater Ballistic Missiles Ranges Km Heavy warheads (500 – 1000 Kg.) Fired from fixed and mobile single round launchers Low rate of fire (Less than 1 Round per Hour)

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 8 Range Rate of fire Rate of Fire Vs Range

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 9 Range Rate of fire TBMSRBM Rate of Fire Vs Range 300 Km

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 10 The Fundamental Distinction Between TBM and SRBM The most significant distinction is not range but potential damage Light and Medium Rockets are statistical weapon:  Light warheads, lesser damage per round.  High rate of fire but mediocre accuracy.  Destructive only when fired en masse TBM, Battlefield Missiles and Heavy Rockets are individual weapons:  Heavy (Conventional and WMD) warheads, High/intolerable damage per round  Low rate of fire but potentially pinpoint accuracy (for battlefield missile).  Destructive even when fired individually. Heavy Rockets and Battlefield Missiles are basically TBM Light and medium rockets should be classified as SRBM

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 11 Heavy rocket with 500 Kg warheade Buenos Aires 1985, 300 Kg, 81 dead SS26 Iskander battlefield missile Aircraft destroyed by standoff PGM TBM with WMD warhead Halabje Massacre 1988

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 12 The Key to Effective SRBM Defense: Extremely Low Cost Interceptor. Implications The high potential damage from heavy rockets and battlefield missiles justify the use of “classic” interceptors (e.g. PAC 3 Vs. Zilzal). The high volume of SRBM fire dictates the need for very low cost interceptors. TBMs, Battlefield Missiles and Heavy Rockets come in tens to hundreds; Light and Medium Rockets come in ten thousands. Hence, affordable SRBM interceptors should cost about one hundredth of typical TMD interceptors. This requires a breakthrough in weapon design: Consumer goods rather then aerospace standard of design and manufacturing.

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 13 Extremely Low Cost Interceptor; Local Defense. Sizing Considerations The damage from any individual TBM could be devastating even when impacting in open areas if it carries WMD. There is no way to know that it is not. In contrast, The damage from any individual SRBM is usually very limited when impacting outside of population centers. Hence:  Against TBM, Area defense is mandatory.  Against SRBM, Local defense is acceptable.

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 14 Potential Damage from SRBM Vs TBM SRBM TBM carrying WMD

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 15 Performance Considerations Intuitively, interceptors for ManPRs (Few Km.) should be very different from interceptors for medium rockets (40 – 150 Km.) Intuition is wrong in this case. The velocity requirements for ManPRs interceptors makes them suitable for longer range threats, albeit with limited footprints. Extremely Low Cost Interceptor; Local Defense; “One Size Fits All”.

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 16 Architectural Considerations “Local Defense” does not imply a multitude of batteries but a distributed architecture. Modern networking permits the centralization of sensors and BMC³ in conjunction with distributed launching sites. Extremely Low Cost Interceptor; Local Defense; “One Size Fits All”; Distributed Architecture.

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 17 Is Local Defense Robust Enough? Area defense require faster hence costlier interceptors, but is immune to saturation tactics which could stress local defense. Local defense counter saturation tactics require adequate reserves of interceptors coupled with quick redeployment. Very Inexpensive interceptor; Local Defense; “One Size Fits All”; Distributed Architecture; Quick Redeployment.

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 18 Distributed Fire Distributed Fire Concentrated Fire Is Local Defense Robust Enough?

May 2010 The Principles of Short Range Missile Defense RubinconLtd. Defense Technology Consulting 19 Summary and conclusions From defender’s perspective, the important feature that distinguishes between classes of regional missiles is destructiveness rather than range. Highly destructive threats warrant the expenditure of “Classical”, high cost interceptors to prevent severe consequences. Lesser destructive threats of short range but high rate of fire necessitates a breakthrough in interceptor design and manufacturing.* To be affordable, anti SRBM interceptor design must emulate consumer goods kind of engineering approach. It is recommended that short range missile defense systems will be specified against a wide spread of threat ranges and will be configured as local defense systems with distributed architecture. * In the case of directed energy weapons, the necessary breakthrough is in the energy conversion system.