Introduction to the United States Marine Corps

Our Culture

This is what we stand for. Core Values Honor Courage Commitment Our most important attributes. This is what we stand for.

Mission Make Marines Win Battles Create Quality Citizens Mission accomplishment is the foundation of our reputation Make Marines: “The transformation of becoming a United States Marine is a national treasure that the Marine Corps guards carefully--our standards remain high.” (Strategic Communication Plan, July 2007, pp 5). Win Battles: “We are the Nation's "shock troops, "always ready and always capable of forcible entry… The resourcefulness and versatility of our Marines have enabled our success in combat operations, stability and security operations, and counterinsurgency operations.” (Strategic Communication Plan, July 2007, pp 3). Create Quality Citizens: “The Nation must see that we create quality citizens who are better for their service as a Marine, or she will not entrust us with her sons and daughters.” (Strategic Communication Plan, July 2007, pp 1). This is what we do.

Priority #1 Our Marines and Sailors in combat This is who we are. Our top priority is a reflection of our warrior ethos: “…the stuff of which heroes are made.” “The man who will go where his colors go, without asking, who will fight a phantom foe in the jungle and mountain range, without counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, without complaint, is still what he has always been, from Imperial Rome to sceptered Britain to democratic America. He is the stuff of which legions are made. ... His pride is in his colors and his regiment, his training hard and thorough and coldly realistic, to fit him for what he must face ... and his obedience is to his orders. He has been called United States Marine.” -T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War This is who we are.

This is what we aspire to be. Elite Warriors The Corps and individual Marine strive to be the epitome of military virtue Smart, tough, warriors who gain strength of mind, body, and character through earning a place in an elite and proud organization Whenever our national interests are threatened, the Marine Corps will be there. (Strategic Communication Plan, July 2007, pp 5). Our nation may continue to have high expectations of her Marines - we will deliver. (Strategic Communication Plan, July 2007, pp 5). This is what we aspire to be.

Every Marine a Rifleman All Marines are basic riflemen first, regardless of specialty 25% of enlisted recruit training is dedicated to rifle marksmanship TBS trains officers to be infantry platoon commanders Our history is full of examples of pilots, logisticians, & administrators assigned infantry duties

Naval Character The Marine Corps is fundamentally a naval service “Soldiers of the Sea” Sea provides avenue for projecting power practically anywhere Today the Navy-Marine Corps team has the unique ability to provide forward-deployed expeditionary combat forces in response to crises “The Marine Corps is fundamentally a naval service. Marines are “soldiers of the sea,” trained to operate on the sea but to fight on the land. This distinction is more than just historical or cultural—although it is that also. It is first a matter of practical significance. The sea remains the only viable way to deploy large military forces to distant theaters and to rapidly shift forces between theaters… For a country that possesses naval dominance, the sea becomes an avenue for projecting military power practically anywhere in the world.” (MCDP-3, pp 45). Importance of the sea for transport. Air Force only transports about 5% of the Army’s equipment.

Expeditionary Mindset “Word came on May 27 that another revolution was in full swing at Bluefields, on the east coast of Nicaragua. We received orders to leave at eight thirty in the morning and by eleven thirty were on our way—two hundred and fifty officers and men. Mrs. Butler had [gone] . . . to do some shopping. When she returned at noon, I was gone . . .” — Smedley D. Butler Being expeditionary is a state of mind “Bags packed”… ready to deploy on a moment’s notice Spartan attitude: willingness to endure hardship and austere conditions “The most important element in the Marine Corps’ conduct of expeditionary operations is not a particular organization, family of equipment, or tactic. It is a state of mind. For the Marine Corps, being “expeditionary” is, before anything else, a mindset. The epigraph by Smedley Butler at the beginning of this chapter captures this attitude. Just as every Marine is a rifleman regardless of duties and military specialty, all Marines must also think of themselves as part of a fundamentally expeditionary organization designed and intended to project military force overseas. This expeditionary mindset is epitomized by the phrase “bags packed”—that is, ready and willing to deploy on a moment’s notice, any time, to any place, to perform any mission. All operating forces, rather than selected ready units, must maintain themselves in a high state of deployability and general readiness. The expeditionary mindset implies a Spartan attitude: an expectation and a willingness to endure—in fact, a certain pride in enduring—hardship and austere conditions. (MCDP-3, pp 43-44). Most ready when nation is least ready

Innovative Close Air Support Amphibious Operations Korea, September 1951 Close Air Support Amphibious Operations Naval Gunfire Support Vertical envelopment Maritime Prepositioning “Another enduring innovation – the art of dive bombing in close support of ground forces – had its beginning in the Marines’ Central American “banana war” experience following World War I. The technique, weaponry, and related communications were slowly perfected until World War II found Marine aviators confident of their ability to deliver their ordnance in close proximity to their brothers on the ground, and the ground Marine equally confident that in the air/ground team the Corps had something nobody else enjoyed.” (Krulak, First to Fight, pp 69) “…Other Marine innovations have literally changed the character of war. The precise utilization of naval gunfire in support of landing forces is one example. During the years immediately preceding World War II, under the stimulus of the Marines, the naval gun came into its own as a substitute for landing force artillery until those weapons were ashore.” (Krulak, First to Fight, pp 68) In November 1948, Marine Corps Schools’ “Employment of Helicopters (Tentative) – PHIB-31” was released in the “Amphibious Operations” series (Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp 523). “The Marines’ combatant function was and is unique. Nobody has ever been interested in providing the necessary operating techniques of hardware for them, so they have had to do it themselves.” - LtGen Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight

Warfighting Philosophy

Doctrine MCDP-1 Warfighting Cornerstone doctrinal publication The nature and theory of warfare, how to prepare for it, and how to conduct it Read by all ranks Gives Marines - from Private to General - a common understanding of warfare with a shared lexicon. Only 96 pages; fits in a cargo pocket.

Warfighting Philosophy Maneuver Warfare “… a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.” (MCDP-1) Aims to shatter enemy system rather than completely destroy his forces Maneuver in space (positional) and time (temporal) “Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-consuming.” (MCDP-1, pp 73).

Warfighting Philosophy Key Ingredients of Maneuver Warfare Speed Establish pace the enemy can’t maintain Focus Against enemy’s critical vulnerabilities Ruthless Opportunism Seek out weakness Surprise Strike at unexpected time and place “Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late—until eventually he is overcome by events. Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order to maximize effect. In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as a source of disruption. We concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and in ways in which it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy’s ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness against which we will direct all available combat power. When the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion. An important weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy, we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape the enemy’s expectations. Then we will exploit those expectations by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer numerous courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose. Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.” (MCDP-1, pp 74-76).

Warfighting Philosophy Maneuver Warfare requires leaders with a flexibility and independence of mind Initiative and judgment crucial at all levels USMC is the youngest military service About 2/3 are 25 or younger Officer to Enlisted Ratios Air Force 1:4 Army 1:5 Navy 1:6 Marines 1:8.5

Warfighting Philosophy Philosophy of Command Must be decentralized Not just equipment and procedures Human element of command is critical Boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, imagination Lead from the front Where you can best influence the action Show willingness to share danger and privation “It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point of decision will naturally better appreciate the true situation than a senior commander some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance. The principal means by which we implement decentralized command and control is through the use of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail later. Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Communications equipment and command and staff procedures can enhance our ability to command, but they must not be used to lessen the human element of command. Our philosophy must not only accommodate but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination.” (MCDP-1, pp 77-78).

Warfighting Philosophy Mission Tactics Subordinates tasked to accomplish a mission without specifying “how” Small unit leaders expected to adapt to changing situations rather than wait for seniors’ permission Freedom for initiative permits high tempo ops “One key way we put maneuver warfare into practice is through the use of mission tactics. Mission tactics is just as the name implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accomplished. We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing the freedom—and establishing the duty—for the subordinate to take whatever steps deemed necessary based on the situation. Mission tactics relies on a subordinate's exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding. Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination. The senior intervenes in a subordinate’s execution only by exception. It is this freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that we desire. Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their actions to the changing situation. They inform the commander of what they have done, but they do not wait for permission.” (MCDP-1, pp 87).

Warfighting Philosophy Combined Arms The full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another Takes advantage of complimentary characteristics of different types of units Pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma — a no-win situation “In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation. We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making him a vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If he moves to escape the impact of the grenades, we engage him with the automatic weapon. We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault support aircraft to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements that move to contain the penetration. Targets which cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to the supporting arms. If he seeks cover from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against him. In order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with his reserve. However, in order to avoid our deep air support, he must stay off the roads, which means he can only move slowly. If he moves slowly, he cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put him in a dilemma.” (MCDP-1, pp 94).

Organization

Marine Air Ground Task Force MAGTF is a balanced, air-ground combined arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander, structured to accomplish a specific mission. What does that mean? Ground Marines, aircraft, and support Put them all under a single Headquarters Element They fight together for one common mission.

MAGTF Basic Organization Basic structure never varies, but number, type, and size of units in each of the four elements will be mission-dependent.

Command Element (CE) Headquarters integrates the ACE, GCE, and LCE together to accomplish a mission Command and Control (C2) functions

Ground Combat Element (GCE) Ground combat power May include: Infantry Artillery Tanks Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) Light Armored Recon (LAR) Combat Engineers Reconnaissance

Air Combat Element (ACE) Air and lift capabilities May include: Fixed & rotary wing Attack Assault Marine air control Air Traffic Control (ATC) Air defense Aviation logistics and support

Logistics Combat Element (LCE) Logistical sustainment Functions include: Transportation Supply (food, fuel, ammo) Maintenance General engineering Health services (medical/dental) General Services

MAGTF Strengths Leverages strengths of different units + weapon systems to achieve combined arms effect MAGTF commander has a “joint” type force Scalable Task-organized based on mission Flexible Wide range of capabilities and weapon systems In a JTF, Marine aviation assets remain under control of MAGTF commander vice JFACC

Some MAGTF Capabilities Forcible entry (Amphibious Assault) Deterrence Demonstrations Amphibious Raids Limited Objective attacks 3-Block Warfare Seizure of terrain, bases, territory Disaster Relief Non-Combatant Evacuation Op (NEO) Stability/Peace keeping TRAP Humanitarian Visit, Board, Search & Seizure (VBSS) Mass Casualty

Four Types of MAGTFs Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – large Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) – medium Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) – small Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) – varies

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) The largest and principal MAGTF 35,000-55,000 Marines + Sailors 60 days sustainment Only standing MAGTF Commanded by: Lt General

MEF Headquarters II MEF III MEF I MEF Camp Lejeune, NC Okinawa, Japan Camp Pendleton, CA

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 5,000-15,000 Marines + Sailors 30 days sustainment Commanded by: Brig. General

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 2,200 Marines + Sailors 15 days sustainment Forward deployed on amphibious ships 6 hour response Can reach 75% of world’s littorals in about 5 days Commanded by: Colonel

MEU – Typical Operating Areas II MEF 22nd MEU 24th MEU 26th MEU I MEF 11th MEU 13th MEU 15th MEU III MEF 31st MEU

Special Purpose MAGTF Anything and everything Tailored to meet specific missions Occasionally assembled because no other MAGTF structures are available

Recent Examples MEF MEB MEU SPMAGTF OIF: I MEF (rein with 2nd MarDiv) deployed to Kuwait and attacked 500 miles into Iraq, 2003 MEB Desert Storm: 4th + 5th MEBs conducted an amphib demonstration (deception) off Kuwaiti coast, 1991 MEU East Timor: 11th MEU (SOC) – humanitarian assistance, 1999 Liberia: 26th MEU (SOC) landed Marines to support peacekeeping efforts in Monrovia, 2003 SPMAGTF New Orleans: Humanitarian assistance ops post Katrina, 2005

“If we didn’t have a Marine Corps, we would have to invent one.” USMC: What we are… A forward deployed force A Truly expeditionary force in readiness An instrument of real presence A young force A lean force An inexpensive force An institutionally paranoid force “If we didn’t have a Marine Corps, we would have to invent one.”

…and what we are not An Army An Air Force A Special Operations Force Immense combat power Logistics for the sustained fight An Air Force Strategic Lift Air-to-Air Refueling Numbers & Endurance Strategic Piece A Special Operations Force Training Equipment

Bottom Line The Marine Corps can: The Navy-Marine Corps Team can: Kick down the front door Go in the back door (stealth and surprise) Knock the house down (destroy) Fix the house (humanitarian-disaster relief) The Navy-Marine Corps Team can: Loiter for long periods (threat, diplomatic pressure) Self sustain

Bottom Line The Marine Corps cannot: Replace the Army Replace the Air Force Replace Special Operations Forces

Take Aways Unique culture Warfighting philosophy based on maneuver and combined arms Expeditionary force-in-readiness Task organized as MAGTFs = Combined arms, air-ground team

Questions?