Cyril Ritter, DG COMP, Unit A1 Amsterdam, 29 January 2015 Information exchange under Article 101 TFEU

Article 101 TFEU Agreements Concerted practices Decisions of association of undertakings By object By effect 2

Concerted practices Type 1 (e.g. Polypropylene)  Evidence of communication (intelligent adaptation = OK)  No evidence of conduct  Legal test: ‒ "Influence or disclose" (Sugar) ‒ "Substantially reduce uncertainty" (Cement)  Anic presumption (never rebutted so far; see Solvay) ‒ Information presumed taken into account ‒ Causal link presumed Type 2 (e.g. Woodpulp)  No evidence of communication  Evidence of conduct  "No other plausible explanation" 3

Type 1 concerted practices (i.e. evidence of communication) Key definitions in the case-law: Dyestuffs para 64: "coordination which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition" Sugar para 174: Article 101 "strictly precludes any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market" Polypropylene (Anic) paras : "a concerted practice implies, besides undertakings' concerting together, conduct on the market pursuant to those collusive practices, and a relationship of cause and effect between the two. … Subject to proof to the contrary, which it is for the economic operators concerned to adduce, there must be a presumption that the undertakings participating in concerting arrangements and remaining active on the market take account of the information exchanged with their competitors when determining their conduct on that market, particularly when they concert together on a regular basis over a long period …" "Removing uncertainty", "lessening uncertainty", "reducing uncertainty", "substantially reducing uncer- tainty": Woodpulp para 64; John Deere para 90; Cement para 1852; Asnef para 51; T-Mobile para 35 4

Type 2 concerted practices (evidence of conduct/"only plausible explanation") Key definitions in the case-law: Dyestuffs paras 65-66: "By its very nature, then, a concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter alia arise out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behaviour of the participants. Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market …" Sugar para 301: "it is necessary to consider whether the conduct which the Commission alleges … can only reasonably be explained by the existence of a concerted action" CRAM and Rheinzink para 16: "it is sufficient for the applicants to prove circumstances which cast the facts established by the Commission in a different light and which thus allow another explanation of the facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the contested decision" Tournier para 24: a concerted practice "cannot be presumed where the parallel behaviour can be accounted for by reasons other than the existence of concerted action" Woodpulp para 71: "parallel conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of concertation unless concertation constitutes the only plausible explanation for such conduct" CISAC para 161: the Commission has the burden of showing that the adduced explanation is implausible 5

Case study on both types of CPs: Woodpulp There were two aspects in Woodpulp Type 1 CP, i.e. evidence of communication  Commission's theory of harm: signalling through the press  Annulled because not through the press, only to customers ‒ Paras. 64 together with 87 Type 2 CP, i.e. evidence of conduct  Commission's TOH: "no other plausible explanation"  Annulled because there was another plausible explanation ‒ Para

Type 1 concerted practices (i.e. evidence of communication): key factors Nature of the information "Commercially sensitive" = significant enough? Public/non-public (see TACA, John Deere, but HG paras ) About the past/about the future Structured (very few EU cases)/unstructured Public/private exchange One-way/two-way (Cement, Tate & Lyle, T-Mobile) Standalone/in combination with other conduct By object/by effect Cartel? 7

Example #1: John Deere (1998) Commercially sensitive information about the past Structured Private Standalone By effect  Market characteristics  Characteristics of the information: ‒ age ‒ frequency ‒ level of aggregation Not a cartel 8

Example #2: T-Mobile (2009) Commercially sensitive information about the future Unstructured Private Standalone By object  One meeting enough  One-way communication enough What's the difference with a cartel? Not much 9

Example #3: Bananas (2013) Commercially sensitive information  mostly about the future  not public Unstructured, private, standalone By object, regardless of  Regulatory framework  Market structure Cartel: yes!  Leniency 10

Example #4: Signalling Unstructured, standalone Advance price announcements Not firm/not immediate Public exchange, i.e. customers get the info as well Assessment: Not an "only plausible explanation" case By object? Horizontal guidelines paras. 63 and 74 Intentions? Distancing? Article 101(3) benefits? Precedents: ATP (FTC 1993), Mobiles (ACM 2014) 11

Example #5: Hub and spoke Information goes from A to B to C With vertical element or not – makes a difference Examples:  EU cases: E-books, Bananas  UK cases: Dairy, Replica kit, Hasbro Toys, Private Schools Different approaches:  check "state of mind" and "use of the information" as in the UK case-law  apply the standard case-law on "single and continuous infringement" ("awareness")  Apply the AC Treuhand case-law 12

Key sources 1.Horizontal Guidelines Maritime Guidelines ( ) 3.OECD paper on unilateral announcements (2012) 4.OECD paper on information exchange (2010) 13

Questions? 14

Backup slides 15

Concerted practices: several cycles over the last 40 years 1970s/early 1980s: weak investigative tools, several CP cases (Dyestuffs, Sugar, Zinc, Woodpulp) 1980s/early 2000s: better investigative tools, more straightforward "agreement" cases (starting with PVC, LDPE, PP, etc, and even more so from the 1996 Leniency Notice) Early 2000s until now: trend towards less straightforward collusion, i.e. more CP cases (Water management products, Bananas, Container shipping, and more) 16

Concerted practices compared to agreements CPs and agreements are similar: object/effect vertical/horizontal 101(3) "Agreements and CPs "are intended to catch forms of collusion having the same nature and are only distinguishable from each other by their intensity and the forms in which they manifest themselves". Is that really true? CPs and agreements are different: 101(2) standard of proof the Anic presumption is rebuttable 17

Concerted practices = cartels? The "cartel" label has serious consequences No Article 9 Immunity/leniency Settlement Procedural consequences (see Best Practices) Only some CPs are cartels: i.e. only if Horizontal By object Secret 18