Quantum information as high-dimensional geometry Patrick Hayden McGill University Perspectives in High Dimensions, Cleveland, August 2010.

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Presentation transcript:

Quantum information as high-dimensional geometry Patrick Hayden McGill University Perspectives in High Dimensions, Cleveland, August 2010

Motivation 1m.1nm

Outline The one-time pad: classical and quantum – Argument from measure concentration Superdense coding: from bits to qubits – Reduction to Dvoretzky (Almost Euclidean subspaces of Schatten l p ) More one-time pad: – Exponential (and more) reduction in key size – Decomposing l 1 ( l 2 ) into a direct sum of almost Euclidean subspaces

One-time pad 1 bit of key per bit of message necessary and sufficient [Shannon49] Shared key Message

Sets are to information as… (Unit) Vectors are to quantum information. One qubit: Two qubits: |1 i |0 i |0 i +|1 i |1 i |1 i ? |1 i |0 i |0 i |1 i |0 i C2C2 C2 ­ C2C2 ­ C2 Light pulse State 0 Superposition: States 0 and 1

Distinguishability

Physical operations… Are unitary: They preserve inner products

Physical operations… Are unitary: They preserve inner products

One-time pad 1 bit of key per bit of message necessary and sufficient [Shannon49] Shared key Message

Quantum one-time pad Shared key Message Minimal key length: k = 2n

Approximate quantum one-time pad Can achieve using n+log(1/ε 2 ) bits of key – Reduction of factor 2 over exact security Proof: – Select {U j } i.i.d. according to Haar measure on U(2 n ) – Use net on set of {X} ε-approximate security criterion: [H-Leung-Shor-Winter 03]

APPROXIMATE ENCRYPTION: MORE LATER…

Measuring entanglement Entanglement: nonlocal content of a quantum state (normalized vector) Product vector Maximally entangled vector

Dvoretzky’s theorem à la Milman ProductMaximally Entangled [Hayden-Leung-Winter 06, Aubrun-Szarek-Werner 10] For p approaching 1, subspace S is all but constant number of qubits.

j 2 {0,1,2,3} Superdense coding jj Time 1 qubit 1 ebit [Bennett-Wiesner 92] Bob receives one of four orthogonal (distinguishable!) states depending on Alice’s action |   i = |00 i AB + |11 i AB 1 ebit + 1 qubit ≥ 2 cbits

Superdense coding of arbitrary quantum states Suppose that Alice can send Bob an arbitrary 2 qubit state by sharing an ebit and physically transmitting 1 qubit. 1 qubit + 1 ebit ≥ 2 qubits 2 qubits + 2 ebits ≥ 4 qubits Substitute: (1 qubit + 1 ebit) + 2 ebits ≥ 4 qubits 1 qubit + 3 ebits ≥ 4 qubits Repeat: 1 qubit + (2 k -1) ebits ≥ 2 k qubits

Superdense coding of maximally entangled states Time 1 qubit 1 ebit |   i = |00 i AB + |11 i AB Alice can send Bob any maximally entangled pair of qubits by sharing an ebit and physically transmitting a qubit.

Superdense coding of maximally entangled states Time log(a) qubits log(a) ebits Alice can send Bob and maximally entangled pair of qubits by sharing an ebit and physically transmitted a qubit. 2 log(a) qubits

Superdense coding of arbitrary quantum states log(a)+const qubits log(a) ebits Asymptotically, Alice can send Bob an arbitrary 2 qubit state by sharing an ebit and physically transmitting 1 qubit. 2 log(a)-const qubits 1 qubit + 1 ebit ≥ 2 qubits

Approximate quantum one-time pad from superdense coding Asymptotically, Alice and send Bob an arbitrary 2 qubit state by sharing an ebit and physically transmitting 1 qubit. log(a)+const qubits log(a) ebits 2 log(a)-const qubits Time-reverse!

Approximate quantum one-time pad from superdense coding Asymptotically, Alice and send Bob an arbitrary 2 qubit state by sharing an ebit and physically transmitting 1 qubit. log(a)+const qubits log(a) ebits 2 log(a)-const qubits Time-reverse! {U j } forms a perfect quantum one-time pad: Total key required is 2 x ( log(a) + const ).

Encrypting classical bits in quantum states Secret key Strongest security: for any pair of messages x 1 and x 2, Eve cannot distinguish the encrypted x 1 from the encrypted x 2. (TV ≤ δ) Strongest security: for any pair of messages x 1 and x 2, Eve cannot distinguish the encrypted x 1 from the encrypted x 2. (TV ≤ δ) Less strong security: Assume x uniformly distributed. Eve uses Bayes’ rule to calculate p(x|measurement outcome). TV from uniform ≤ δ for all measurements and outcomes. Less strong security: Assume x uniformly distributed. Eve uses Bayes’ rule to calculate p(x|measurement outcome). TV from uniform ≤ δ for all measurements and outcomes.

Encrypting classical bits in quantum states Secret key Less strong security: Assume x uniformly distributed. Eve uses Bayes’ rule to calculate p(x|measurement outcome). TV from uniform ≤ δ for all measurements and outcomes. Less strong security: Assume x uniformly distributed. Eve uses Bayes’ rule to calculate p(x|measurement outcome). TV from uniform ≤ δ for all measurements and outcomes. Colossal key reduction: Can take k = O(log 1/δ). Proof: Choose {U j } i.i.d. using Haar measure, no ancilla. Adversarial argument for all measurements complicated. Colossal key reduction: Can take k = O(log 1/δ). Proof: Choose {U j } i.i.d. using Haar measure, no ancilla. Adversarial argument for all measurements complicated. [HLSW03], [Dupuis-H-Leung10], [Fawzi-H-Sen10]

Quantum encryption of cbits: Connection to l 1 ( l 2 ) Each V k gives a low-distortion embedding of l 2 into l 1 ( l 2 ). C A B D uniform Secret key j Quantum one-time pad Proof that this works is an easy calculation. (Really!) Leads to key size O(log 1/ε) with ancilla of size O(log n + log 1/ε) [Fawzi- H-Sen 10]

Explicit constructions! Adapt [Indyk07] construction of l 2 into l 1 ( l 2 ) to produce a quantum algorithm for the encoding and decoding. Recursively applies mutually unbiased bases and extractors. Build Indyk embedding from an explicit sequence of 2-qubit unitaries. Procedure uses number of gates polynomial in number of bits n. (Indyk algorithm runs in time exp(O(n)).) Get key size O(log 2 (n)+log(n)log(1/ε)). Also gives efficient constructions of: – Bases violating strong entropic uncertainty relations – Efficient protocols for string commitment – Efficient encoding for quantum identification over cbit channels

Summary Basic problems in quantum information theory can be interpreted as norm embedding problems: – Approximate quantum one-time pad – Existence of highly entangled subspaces – Quantum encryption of classical data – Additivity conjecture! (Not even mentioned) Formulating problems this way simplifies proofs and allows application of known explicit constructions

Open problems Explicit constructions for embedding l 2 into Schatten l p ? Why do all these results boil down to variations on Dvoretzky? – What other great theorems should quantum information theorists know?