Internet Security: How the Internet works and some basic vulnerabilities Slides from D.Boneh, Stanford and others 1.

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Presentation transcript:

Internet Security: How the Internet works and some basic vulnerabilities Slides from D.Boneh, Stanford and others 1

Backbone ISP Internet Infrastructure Local and interdomain routing TCP/IP for routing and messaging BGP for routing announcements Domain Name System Find IP address from symbolic name ( 2

TCP Protocol Stack Application Transport Network Link Application protocol TCP protocol IP protocol Data Link IP Network Access IP protocol Data Link Application Transport Network Link 3

Data Formats Application Transport (TCP, UDP) Network (IP) Link Layer Application message - data TCPdataTCPdataTCPdata TCP Header dataTCPIP IP Header dataTCPIPETHETF Link (Ethernet) Header Link (Ethernet) Trailer segment packet frame message 4

Inside a LAN: Layer 2 issues - ARP 5

Addressing in Layer 2 / Layer 3 Layer 3 (IP) IP Address 32 bits long Layer 2 (MAC) MAC address 48 bits long How to translate from IP address to MAC address? Layer 2.5 protocol : ARP 6

ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) ARP request – broadcast to all stations on LAN Computer A asks the network, "Who has this IP address ?“ 7

ARP(2) ARP reply Computer B tells Computer A, "I have that IP. My Physical Address is [whatever it is].“ 8

Cache Table Every computer stores the translations it knows in a “cache” To view: “arp –a” 9

ARP Poisoning Simplicity also leads to insecurity No Authentication ARP provides no way to verify that the responding device is really who it says it is Stateless protocol Attacks Denial of Service (DoS)  Hacker can easily associate an operationally significant IP address to a false MAC address Man-in-the-Middle  Intercept network traffic between two devices in your network 10

Man-In-The-Middle: poison #1 11

12 Man-In-The-Middle: poison #2

13 Man-In-The-Middle: success!

Layer 3 issues - IP 14

Internet Protocol Connectionless Unreliable Best effort Notes: src and dest ports not parts of IP hdr IP VersionHeader Length Type of Service Total Length Identification Flags Time to Live Protocol Header Checksum Source Address of Originating Host Destination Address of Target Host Options Padding IP Data Fragment Offset 15

IP Routing Typical route uses several hops IP: no ordering or delivery guarantees Meg Tom ISP Office gateway Source Destination Packet

IP Protocol Functions (Summary) Routing IP host knows location of router (gateway) IP gateway must know route to other networks Fragmentation and reassembly If max-packet-size less than the user-data-size Error reporting ICMP packet to source if packet is dropped TTL field: decremented after every hop Packet dropped if TTL=0. Prevents infinite loops. 17

Basic IP tools 18

“spoofing”: no src IP authentication Client is trusted to embed correct source IP Easy to override using raw sockets Libnet:a library for formatting raw packets with arbitrary IP headers Anyone who owns their machine can send packets with arbitrary source IP  … response will be sent back to forged source IP  Implications : (solutions in DDoS lecture)  Anonymous DoS attacks;  Anonymous infection attacks (e.g. slammer worm) 19

Routing Vulnerabilities 20

Routing Vulnerabilities Routing protocols: OSPF: used for routing within an AS BGP: routing between ASs Attacker can cause entire Internet to send traffic for a victim IP to attacker’s address. Example: Youtube mishap (see DDoS lecture) 21

Interdomain Routing connected group of one or more Internet Protocol prefixes under a single routing policy (aka domain) OSPF BGP Autonomous System (AS) earthlink.net Stanford.edu 22

Whois: IP/Domain/AS information 23

BGP example [ D. Wetherall ]

Security Issues BGP path attestations are un-authenticated Attacker can inject advertisements for arbitrary routes Advertisement will propagate everywhere Used for DoS, spam, and eavesdropping Human error problems: Mistakes quickly propagate to the entire Internet BGP operators are a “club”, they don’t accept members so easily 25

OSPF: Routing inside an organization Link State Advertisements (LSA): Flooded throughout AS so that all routers in the AS have a complete view of the AS topology Transmission: IP datagrams, protocol = 89 Neighbor discovery: Routers dynamically discover direct neighbors on attached links --- sets up an “adjacency” Once setup, they exchange their LSA databases 26

Ra LSA DB: Rb Rb LSA R3 Ra Rb Net-1 Ra LSA Ra Rb Net Example: LSA from Ra and Rb 27

Security features OSPF has message integrity (unlike BGP) Every link can have its own shared secret Unfortunately, OSPF uses an insecure MAC: MAC(k,m) = MD5(data ll key ll pad ll len) Every LSA is flooded throughout the AS If a single malicious router, valid LSAs may still reach dest. The “fight back” mechanism If a router receives its own LSA with a newer timestamp than the latest it sent, it immediately floods a new LSA Links must be advertised by both ends 28

Still many attacks [NKGB’12] Threat model: single malicious router wants to disrupt all AS traffic Example problem: adjacency setup need no peer feedback LAN Victim (DR) a remote attacker adjacency False Hello and DBD messages net 1 phantom router adjacency Result: DoS on net 1 29

Layer 4 issues - TCP 30

Transmission Control Protocol Connection-oriented, preserves order Sender  Break data into packets  Attach packet numbers Receiver  Acknowledge receipt; lost packets are resent  Reassemble packets in correct order TCP BookMail each pageReassemble book

TCP Header (protocol=6) Source PortDest port SEQ Number ACK Number Other stuff URGURG PSRPSR ACKACK PSHPSH SYNSYN FINFIN TCP Header 32

Review: TCP Handshake C S SYN: SYN/ACK: ACK: Listening Store SN C, SN S Wait Established SN C  rand C AN C  0 SN S  rand S AN S  SN C SN  SN C +1 AN  SN S Received packets with SN too far out of window are dropped 33

Basic Security Problems 1. Network packets pass by untrusted hosts Eavesdropping, packet sniffing Especially easy when attacker controls a machine close to victim 2. TCP state easily obtained by eavesdropping Enables spoofing and session hijacking 3. Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities DDoS lecture 34

Why random initial sequence numbers? Suppose initial seq. numbers (SN C, SN S ) are predictable: Attacker can create TCP session with spoofed source IP Victim Server SYN/ACK dstIP=victim SN=server SN S ACK srcIP=victim AN=predicted SN S command server thinks command is from victim IP addr attacker TCP SYN srcIP=victim 35

Example DoS vulnerability [Watson’04] Attacker sends a Reset packet to an open socket If correct SN S then connection will close ⇒ DoS Naively, success prob. is 1/2 32 (32-bit seq. #’s).  … but,host systems allow for a large window of acceptable seq. #‘s. Much higher success probability. Attacker can flood with RST packets until one works Most effective against long lived connections, e.g. BGP 36

Domain Name System (sort of layer5) 37

Domain Name System Hierarchical Name Space root edu net org ukcom ca wisc ucb stanford cmu mit cs ee www DNS 38

DNS Root Name Servers Hierarchical service Root name servers for top-level domains Authoritative name servers for subdomains Local name resolvers contact authoritative servers when they do not know a name 39

DNS Lookup Example Client Local DNS resolver root & edu DNS server stanford.edu DNS server NS stanford.edu NS cs.stanford.edu A www=IPaddr cs.stanford.edu DNS server DNS record types (partial list): - NS:name server (points to other server) - A:address record (contains IP address) - MX:address in charge of handling - TXT:generic text (e.g. used to distribute site public keys (DKIM) ) 40

nslookup 41

Caching DNS responses are cached Quick response for repeated translations Useful for finding servers as well as addresses  NS records for domains DNS negative queries are cached Save time for nonexistent sites, e.g. misspelling Cached data periodically times out Lifetime (TTL) of data controlled by owner of data TTL passed with every record 42

DNS Packet Query ID: 16 bit random value Links response to query (from Steve Friedl) 43

Resolver to NS request 44

Response to resolver Response contains IP addr of next NS server (called “glue”) Response ignored if unrecognized QueryID 45

Authoritative response to resolver final answer bailiwick checking: response is cached if it is within the same domain of query (i.e. a.com cannot set NS for b.com) 46

Basic DNS Vulnerabilities Users/hosts trust the host-address mapping provided by DNS: Used as basis for many security policies: Browser same origin policy, URL address bar Obvious problems Interception of requests or compromise of DNS servers can result in incorrect or malicious responses  e.g.: malicious access point in a Cafe Solution – authenticated requests/responses  Provided by DNSsec … but few use DNSsec 47

DNS cache poisoning (a la Kaminsky’08) Victim machine visits attacker’s web site, downloads Javascript user browser local DNS resolver Query: a.bank.com QID=x 1 attacker attacker wins if  j: x 1 = y j response is cached and attacker owns bank.com ns.bank.com IPaddr 256 responses: Random QID y 1, y 2, … NS bank.com=ns.bank.com A ns.bank.com=attackerIP 48

If at first you don’t succeed … Victim machine visits attacker’s web site, downloads Javascript user browser local DNS resolver Query: b.bank.com QID=x 2 attacker 256 responses: Random QID y 1, y 2, … NS bank.com=ns.bank.com A ns.bank.com=attackerIP attacker wins if  j: x 2 = y j response is cached and attacker owns bank.com ns.bank.com IPaddr success after  256 tries (few minutes) 49

Defenses Increase Query ID size. How? Randomize src port, additional 11 bits  Now attack takes several hours Ask every DNS query twice: Attacker has to guess QueryID correctly twice (32 bits) … Apparently DNS system cannot handle the load 50

DNS poisoning attacks in the wild January 2005, the domain name for a large New York ISP, Panix, was hijacked to a site in Australia. In November 2004, Google and Amazon users were sent to Med Network Inc., an online pharmacy In March 2003, a group dubbed the "Freedom Cyber Force Militia" hijacked visitors to the Al-Jazeera Web site and presented them with the message "God Bless Our Troops" 51

DNS Rebinding Attack Read permitted: it’s the “same origin” Firewall web server ns.evil.com DNS server corporate web server TTL = [DWF’96, R’01] DNS-SEC cannot stop this attack 52

DNS Rebinding Defenses Browser mitigation: DNS Pinning Refuse to switch to a new IP Interacts poorly with proxies, VPN, dynamic DNS, … Not consistently implemented in any browser Server-side defenses Check Host header for unrecognized domains Authenticate users with something other than IP Firewall defenses External names can’t resolve to internal addresses Protects browsers inside the organization 53

Summary Core protocols not designed for security Eavesdropping, Packet injection, Route stealing, DNS poisoning Patched over time to prevent basic attacks (e.g. random TCP SN, random DNS source port) More secure variants exist IP IPsec DNS DNSsec BGP SBGP 54