Voting Review Material

Walking

How many people voted in this election? 13 35 45 55 Can’t tell 13 9 12 11 A B C D #3 0 of 30 Voting - Review

How many different preference ballots are there for an election with 6 candidates? 21 36 120 720 None of the above #5 0 of 30 Voting - Review

A preference schedule can have a row in which the same candidate appears twice True False Can’t tell 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

What’s wrong with this preference schedule? 5 2 3 A B C Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Nothing 0 of 30 Voting - Review

“Plurality” means Most number of votes 50% of the votes More than 50% of the votes More votes than most of the candidates 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Who wins using Plurality? 13 9 12 11 A B C D A B C D 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Who wins using IRV? 13 9 12 11 A B C D A B C D 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Who wins using Hare? A B C D 13 9 12 11 A B C D 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Who wins using Borda? A B C D 13 9 12 11 Pts A B C D 3 2 1 0 of 30 A B C D 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Who wins using Condorcet? 13 9 12 11 A B C D A B C D 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Who wins using Approval? (Voters approve of the candidates in RED) B C D 13 9 12 11 A B C D 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Jogging

An election involves three candidates An election involves three candidates. The preference schedule has two columns. So, there must be a majority winner. True False Can’t tell 0 of 30 Voting - Review

A Plurality winner Must be a majority winner Can be a majority winner Cannot be a majority winner 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

The greatest flaw of Plurality voting is Time consuming A small plurality could win Encourages voter apathy Costly Difficult to carry out 0 of 30 Voting - Review

The greatest flaw of IRV is A strong 3rd place finisher would be eliminated on 1st round A small plurality could win Time consuming Costly Difficult to explain 0 of 30 Voting - Review

An IRV winner always winds up with A plurality A majority Neither 0 of 30 Voting - Review

If there are three candidates in an election IRV and Hare Never choose the same candidate Sometimes choose the same candidate Always choose the same candidate 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the IRV method Must choose A May not choose A Cannot choose A 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the Hare method Must choose A May not choose A Cannot choose A 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

On each re-tally, the Hare method eliminates the candidate with 13 9 12 11 A B C D The least number of first place votes The most number of last place votes Neither 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the Borda method Must choose A May not choose A Cannot choose A 1 0 of 5 Voting - Review

The Condorcet Method Never produces a winner Always produces a winner May not produce a winner Can produce two different winners 3 0 of 5 Voting - Review

Using the Condorcet method, if A beats B, and B beats C, then A must beat C A can’t beat C A may beat C 2 0 of 5 Voting - Review

In the Approval method you Can vote for any number of candidates Cannot vote for all candidates Must vote for at least 2 candidates 1 0 of 30 Voting - Review

Some voters exhibited irrational behavior when voting using the Approval method. How many columns contain highly suspicious entries? 1 column 2 columns 3 columns 4 columns None 13 9 12 11 A B C D 0 of 5 Voting - Review

Who wins? A B C D Can’t tell 13 9 12 11 A B C D 0 of 5 Voting - Review

Running

A student club has 10 members A student club has 10 members. They will use the Borda method (3 – 2 – 1 – 0) to elect A, B, C, or D president. A gets 19 points, B gets 20, and C gets 18. How many points does D get? 3 6 9 15 Can’t tell 0 of 30 Voting - Review

The Borda method will pick the same winner regardless of how the points are assigned to each preference level True False 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

To show that Approval voting violates the Majority Criterion we must show If a candidate wins using Approval, that candidate has a majority If a candidate has a majority that candidate wins using Approval 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

To show that Hare voting violates the Condorcet criterion we must show There is a Condorcet winner but Hare doesn’t pick that candidate The Hare winner is not a Condorcet winner. 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

To show that Borda violates the Irrelevant Alternative criterion we must show that C wins the 1st election but H wins the 2nd C wins the 1st election but Me wins the 2nd Me wins the 1st election but H wins the 2nd 2 0 of 30 Voting - Review

End

A candidate having a majority of the votes may not win using Plurality and IRV Plurality and Hare Borda and Approval Borda and Condorcet 0 of 30 Voting - Review