Policing and ‘cracking down on crime’: tough questions and tough answers Assoc Professor Michael Rowe Institute of Criminology VICTORIA UNIVERSITY WELLINGTON

Policing and ‘cracking down on crime’: tough questions and tough answers Introduction Policing by numbers Patrol and crime control Extending legal powers Tough questions and tough answers

Policing by numbers National Party policy recruit 1,000 extra police officers by the middle of 2009; achieve a police-to- population ratio of 1:500 by the end of 2011; increase the number of sworn police by recruiting 224 new police officers on top of the present recruitment plan; commit all the 600 new sworn police officers to general duty roles: put 50 more police cars on our streets; provide a priority boost of 300 new frontline police to Counties Manukau by the end of 2010, put 25 more police cars on the streets of South Auckland; roll out Canterbury’s persistent-offender programme, which targets crime families, to other districts, subject to a positive evaluation of the trial; encourage police to develop and expand 'Reassurance Policing' programmes, work more closely with local communities to set and tackle local crime priorities, and reinvigorate Neighbourhood Watch schemes; ensure that road safety policing concentrates on preventing accidents by focusing on drivers and areas (e.g. blackspots) most at risk. Derived from accessed 23 February 2009http://national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleId=28867

Policing by numbers ‘a man in uniform will hardly ever take a thief’ Superintendent, London Metropolitan Police, to Parliamentary Select Committee, 1853 ‘Many studies show that the uniformed police have a substantially limited capability for crime control; they imply that simply putting more uniformed police officers on the street will yield few immediate pay- offs in terms of crime reduction’ Hough, 1996

Policing by numbers

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Patrol and crime control The renaissance of street patrol and the ‘blue revolution’ of the 1990s Impact of police patrols on violent crime in Indianapolis, North area– 29 per cent reduction in firearms related offences; – 40 per cent reduction in aggravated assault and armed robbery; – homicides down from 7 to 1 East area– homicides down from 4 to 0, but other firearms related offences increased in line with comparative areas North area adopted a strategy that targeted known offenders and suspicious activity East area adopted routine foot patrol as a general deterrence theory

Patrol and crime control Zero-Tolerance Policing in NYC: crime fell by 37 per cent and homicide by 50 per cent. ‘Crime is down in NYC: blame the police’ (Bratton, 1998) ‘there was perhaps no more attractive theory that the belief that smart policing stops crime. It offered a set of bona fide heroes rather than simply a dearth of villains’ (Levitt and Dubner, 2005: 129) ‘When crime rises no-one wants to take the blame, but when it falls everyone wants to take the credit. In New York only a circumstantial case has been made for the link between aggressive policing and falling crime’ (Bowling, 1999: 551)

Patrol and crime control ‘clear, if modest, general deterrent effects of substantial increases in police presence in crime hot spots … [it is time for] criminologists to stop saying “there is no evidence” that police patrol can affect crime’ (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995: 645-7). Crime outcomesOther outcomesDisplacement/diffusion 6 Reduced calls from public 6 None4 Diffusion of benefit 4 Reduced crime rates2 Reduced disorder4 Not measured 1 No effect1 Improved public opinion of police 3 Little evidence of displacement 1 Significant displacement Weisburd and Braga (2006: 233-4)

Extending legal powers ‘Cracking down on crime’ Legal powers only one dimension of police regulatory powers Operational priorities, working subcultures, service delivery

Tough questions and tough answers Criminal justice solutions to social problems?