SCOPING STUDIES ON CUSTOMARY TENURE SECURITY TOOLS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Emmanuel Offei Akrofi & Anthony Arko-Adjei Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology

Framework for Identification and Analysis of tools  Why were the tenure tools designed?  How were the tools designed?  Which external and internal factors influenced the design of the tool?  Who are the stakeholders?  What tenure insecurity issues is the tool addressing?  How do the tools operate in the customary governance system?  At what scale or level is the tool operating?  How has the tool been influenced by the statutory systems/legal regulations? Is the recognised by legal provisions of the country?  How far do the national laws, policies and governance supports the development of the tools?

Identified tools  Well-known tools  COR  Customary land Secretariats  Land Boards  Progressive titling systems  Tribal lands  Village and community titling  Community Land Trust (Kenya)  Decentralisation and land reform  Certificate of occupancy  Slum and informal settlements upgrading  Anti-eviction laws  Group rights  Up and coming tools  Compensation approaches  Inheritance  Land allocation committees  Natural resources schemes  Participatory approaches  GIS and Remote Sensing technology  Natural resource management schemes (Irrigation, fishing, etc)  Group lease farming  Issuance of allocation notes  Gender evaluation criteria  Awareness creation  Spousal consent

Introduction  Customary tenure system has been afflicted by many problems leading to tenure insecurity:  land ownership conflicts;  boundary disputes;  haphazard and/or unregulated land developments resulting in the creation of informal settlements;  lack of good governance;  lack of information on land transactions; and  unscrupulous land dealings.  In the past few years various tools have been developed to secure customary rights

Terms of Reference (TOR)  Desk study focused on sub-Saharan Africa  Objectives:  Identification and description of the secure tenure tools;  Categorisation of the tools with respect to the internal or external pressures the tools is addressing;  Analysis of the tool with respect to GLTN core values; and  Identification of good practices

Scope  Documentation and review of the tools includes those developed and/or used in IFAD and other GLTN’s partner projects  Criteria for selecting the tools:  innovative tools  have been/are developed and operate in local communities as response to specific external and internal challenges.  address tenure insecurity issues of the poor and marginalised groups

Preliminary findings ToolsStakeholders Tenure insecurity issues Legal recognition & support Implementation challenges Compensation approaches Traditional leaders Family heads Land Boards Indigenes Fear of eviction Forced eviction Land contestations between traditional authorities and indigenous members of landowning groups Legally recognised in some countries Unsatisfactory compensation packages Difficulty in enforcement Distress sale Spousal consent Couples Children Family heads NGOs Government Loss of land rights of spouses and children Land policies and other legislative instruments Laxity in enforcement due to cultural and religious beliefs Awareness creation Traditional leaders Opinion leaders State agencies Community members NGOs Ignorance on rights and responsibilities Outmoded cultural practices Legally recognised in some countries Lack of funds Lack of political will

Preliminary findings ToolsStakeholders Tenure insecurity issues Legal recognition & support Implementation challenges Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms Traditional leaders Formal courts NGOs Religious leaders Land conflicts and litigation Legally recognise and supported by in some countries Possibility of disputants not accepting decisions Collateral schemes Cooperatives tenant farmers Land owners State institutions Financial institutions Private organisation NGOs Security of tenancy Access to credit by tenant farmers Support by state institutions Distinction between the land and the property on the land Proliferation of educated chiefs, development chiefs and advisors Traditional leaders Community members Philanthropists Lack of expertise in aspects of the land management and dispute resolution processes Supported by constitution and legislation Possibility of a corrupt traditional leaders surrounding themselves with cronies

Preliminary findings ToolsStakeholders Tenure insecurity issues Legal recognition & support Implementation challenges Land allocation committees Traditional leaders Community members Land professionals State institutions NGOs Inefficient land delivery process Unavailability or inaccessible customary land information Unregulated land developments Unscrupulous dealings in land transactions Supported by legislation and land policies Some have specific legislations Funding Lack of expertise Processes may tend out to be complex and expensive Abuse of office Co- management schemes Opinion leaders Community members State institutions NGOs Lack of accountability and transparency Protection of group rights Legally recognised in some countries Lack of funding Manipulation by powerful members/elites Recording of customary land information Traditional leaders Community members Land conflicts No legislation Illiteracy

Thank you

Framework for Analysis- categorisation of tools  Recording and registration of customary land  Facilitating dealings in customary land for improved tenure security and development  Protecting and assisting customary groups in land dealings for pro-poor and equitable output  Pro-poor and equitable customary dispute resolution mechanism  Participative development planning of customary land for improved tenure security  Assessing customary land for public services and infrastructure  Women, customary land and development  Transparent and effective customary land administration  Customary peri-urban/informal settlement tenure security  Relationship between statutory land administration and customary land governance

Framework for Analysis-GLTN core values GLTN Core ValuesAssessment Questions Pro-poor 1.To which extent does the tool aim to reduce poverty? 2.To what extent does the tool allow poor and marginalised group participate in the decision making processes? 3.What are the likely disincentives of the tool for the poor? 4.Are the land rights of the marginalised groups protected? Equity and gender responsiveness 1.To what extent does the tool treat poor and the rich? 2.To what extent does the tool treat men and women in tenure security issues? 3.Are women and men involved in the decision-making process and governance system developed for the tool? Affordability 1.Is the cost of securing rights through the tool a ff ordable for all social groups? 2.Is the tool cheap enough both for the poor as well as government or other bodies that manage them? 3.Is the tool easily understandable and free of technical and legal costs? 4.Are there special concessions (affirmative actions) for the marginalised groups?

Framework for Analysis-GLTN core values GLTN Core ValuesAssessment Questions Sustainability 1.Does the tool have the capability to be implemented at the local level in the future without input from outside sources? 2.Is the tool self-financing? 3.Does the community see itself as owners of the tool and play active role in its implementation? Subsidiary 1.To what extent does the tool address the needs of the local people? 2.Is the tool capable of being applied at the lowest level of authority? 3.To what extent has the tool been built to secure localised land rights? Governance 1.Does the tool take into account how decisions are made regarding access to and use of land at the local level? 2.Does the tool take into account how decisions on lands are implemented? 3.Does the tool incorporate local mechanisms of addressing conflicting interests in land? Scalability 1.Is the tool implemented at a large scale or does it have the potential to be implemented at a large scale? 2.Is the tool flexible enough to deal with wide range of situation? 3.Can the tool be replicated easily and at little cost?