Open Resolvers in COM/NET Resolution Duane Wessels, Aziz Mohaisen DNS-OARC 2014 Spring Workshop Warsaw, Poland.

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Presentation transcript:

Open Resolvers in COM/NET Resolution Duane Wessels, Aziz Mohaisen DNS-OARC 2014 Spring Workshop Warsaw, Poland

Verisign Public Outine Why do we care about Open Resolvers? Surveys at Verisign Characterizing Open Resolvers Intersection with COM/NET query sources Geographic distribution Discussion

Verisign Public Why do we care? Exploited in DDoS attacks Makes cache poisoning attacks much easier Cache snooping Analogous to open mail relays Note: we’re talking about unintentionally open resolvers here… 3

Verisign Public Two Surveys of IPv4 Open Resolvers

Verisign Public Models Target forwards query directly to Authority Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Q1 Q2 R1 R2

Verisign Public Models Target forwards to a “forwarder” Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder Q1 Q2 R1 R2

Verisign Public From Amazon Web Services Took 173 Hours :00 – :00 Sent 3,676,739,504 Q1 probes All IPv4 space, except class D/E, RFC1918 and do-not-probe list Received 43,538,209 Q2’s For 28,897,054 distinct probes From 277,049 distinct IP addresses Received 34,604,998 R2’s For 32,040,586 distinct probes From 31,424,854 distinct IP addresses October 2013 Survey

Verisign Public

Verisign Public From Verisign Took 17 hours :20 – :30 Sent 3,676,724,690 Q1 probes All IPv4 space, except class D/E, RFC1918, and do-not-probe list Received 38,079,578 Q2’s For 24,553,785 distinct probes From 230,417 distinct IP addresses Received 28,426,251 R2’s For 27,905,762 distinct probes From 27,281,623 distinct IP addresses May 2014 Survey

Verisign Public

Verisign Public Data is collected with pcap while scan runs Pcap files are then parsed into whitespace delimited text Separate files for Q1, Q2, R1, R2 The text files are loaded onto Hadoop Analyzed with Hive (SQL statements) Lots of large, multi-table joins Data Analysis

Verisign Public Closed Targets When the probe results in neither a Q1 nor an R2. Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder Oct 2013May 2014 Closed %

Verisign Public Open Targets When the probe results in either a Q1 or an R2. Oct 2013May 2014 Open Count33,660,90629,292,597 Oct 2013May 2014 openresolverproject 32,673,33727,454,609 Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder

Verisign Public Simple Open Resolver Q2 source address equals Target address i.e., Target does not forward elsewhere Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 %

Verisign Public Forwarder Q2 source address differs from Target address How many to Google? Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 % Forwarder79.8 %78.0 % Oct 2013May 2014 Google Fwds8.3 %8.9 %

Verisign Public No Q2, R2 Error Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder RCODEOct 2013May FORMERR0.0 % 2 SERVFAIL10.0 %9.1 % 3 NXDOMAIN3.0 %3.6 % 4 NOTIMPL0.0 % 5 REFUSED86.9 %87.3 % 70.0 % % Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 % Forwarder79.8 %78.0 % Err No Forward10.8 %12.6 % Didn’t get a Q2 query and got an Error response Usually REFUSED, which is good!

Verisign Public Got Q2, but R2 error code Received the Q2 query, but then got an error response. Usually SERVFAIL Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder RCODEOct 2013May FORMERR0.1 %0.4 % 2 SERVFAIL77.5 %75.9 % 3 NXDOMAIN0.4 %0.1 % 4 NOTIMPL0.0 % 5 REFUSED22.0 %23.6 % % Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 % Forwarder79.8 %78.0 % Err No Forward10.8 %12.6 % Err w/ Forward0.7 %0.5 %

Verisign Public R2 Blocked Received Q2 But no R2 Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder ? Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 % Forwarder79.8 %78.0 % Err No Forward10.8 %12.6 % Err w/ Forward0.7 %0.5 % R2 Blocked4.8 %4.7 %

Verisign Public Synthesized Answers No Q2 R2 had an Answer section with an A record, but wrong value. Many answer with their own IP Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 % Forwarder79.8 %78.0 % Err No Forward10.8 %12.6 % Err w/ Forward0.7 %0.5 % R2 Blocked4.8 %4.7 % Synthesized3.4 %3.6 %

Verisign Public Q2 Missing No Q2, but R2 had an Answer section with correct A record! How? Data collection problem Lucky guess Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder Oct 2013May 2014 Simple0.6 % Forwarder79.8 %78.0 % Err No Forward10.8 %12.6 % Err w/ Forward0.7 %0.5 % R2 Blocked4.8 %4.7 % Synthesized3.4 %3.6 % Q2 Missing0.0 % Totals100 % 120 times in Oct 2013 survey 1109 times in May 2014 survey

Verisign Public Weirdness: R2 not from Target Sent query to x.x.x.x Got response from y.y.y.y Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder ? Oct 2013May 2014 IP Changed2.1 %2.4 %

Verisign Public Weirdness: Local Port Changed Query sent from port X Response sent to port Y 1560 cases Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder X Y Oct 2013May 2014 Local Port

Verisign Public Weirdness: Remote Port Changed Query to port 53 Response from port != 53 Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder Oct 2013May 2014 Remote Port46.2 %46.7 %

Verisign Public Weirdness: Q2 with RD=1 Usually queries to Authoritative name servers have RD=0 Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder RD=1 Oct 2013May 2014 Q2 RD=

Verisign Public Weirdness: R2 with AA=1 Usually responses from recursive name servers have AA=0 Prober Auth NS Auth NS Target Forwarder AA=1 Oct 2013May 2014 R2 AA=10.7 %0.8 %

Verisign Public Intersection with COM/NET Queriers

Verisign Public Four Verisign “big” sites Only 4 of 13 gtld-servers.net letters COM/NET Query Data

Verisign Public What percent of open resolver exit Ips appear in the COM/NET query data? Example: At Amsterdam, we see 64.3% of the open resolvers IPs in one day. This is 5.2% of all COM/NET IPs seen there. Those IPs are responsible for 51.7% of COM/NET queries at the site. Intersection of open resolvers and COM/NET (Oct 2013)

Verisign Public

Intersection of open resolvers and COM/NET (May 2014)

Verisign Public Geographic Distribution

Verisign Public Open resolvers are massively distributed 232 countries (including special territories) 10,240 different cities 13,887 different organizations (including ISPs) 83,407 different networks (domains) All distributions are heavy tailed (city, org, net, country) Open resolvers/forwarder associations are distributed Includes across country associations Not only limited to well-understood applications, but includes service providers association without territory resolvers Open Resolvers Geographical Distribution

Verisign Public Open Resolvers Geographical Distribution

Verisign Public Per-user distribution is consistent with overall per-country, except in a few cases (small, hop countries) Open Resolvers vs. Internet Usage

Verisign Public Organization Level Distribution – Resolvers

Verisign Public Organization Level Distribution – Open Resolvers Per Forwarder

Verisign Public Organization Level Distribution - log 10 (Forwarders)

Verisign Public Final Thoughts

Verisign Public Key Points Still many millions of Open Resolvers on the Internet The trend is decreasing Most Open Resolvers forward to another recursive About half respond from the wrong port! Open Resolver forwarder IPs are strongly linked to COM/NET queries. Responsible for 50% of the query traffic 42

Verisign Public Questions?