Space Weaponization and Space Control: Who’s Doing What? Dr. S. Pete Worden Director, NASA Ames SETI Institute 10 Dec 2008

Outline Global Controversy What is a “Space Weapon?” What is “Space Control?” Force Application/Missile Defense? Who’s Doing What? –USA and Others Do Space Weapons make any sense? (probably not for the foreseeable future) –On-Orbit Servicing (OOS) – other dual use –“Intent” Conclusions

Global Controversy: US Air Force Master Plan: A Provocative Document US National Space Policy “Consistent with this policy, the United States will: … deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests”

Global Controversy: Space Weaponization? Bush likely to back weapons in space Arms race feared over 'death stars' and 'rods from God' Julian Borger in Washington Thursday May 19, 2005 The Guardian The Guardian Russia and China push for treaty banning weapons in space Russia and China released a working paper on June 9, 2005, asking that the UN Conference on Disarmament take up discussions of a treaty that would thwart the weaponization of space. At present, there is no treaty that would prevent any country from doing so… (UPI, June 20, 2005) – Center for Defense Information Security Update 9 Jul 2005

Military Space Definitions USA Areas of Space Weapon Possibilities

Types of Weapons Space to Space –Space Directed Energy – microwaves, lasers, particle beams –Kinetic Energy Interceptors –Space-based missile defenses Space to Ground –Directed Energy –Kinetic Impactors – “rods from God” Ground to Space –Direct ascent and co-orbital Anti-satellites (ASAT) –Ground-based missile defenses –Nuclear weapon pumped radiation belts

Not Space Weapons? Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) – GLONASS, GPS, GALILEO Surveillance and Reconnaissance Information Operations – Control of Military and Political Information Ground to Ground (ICBMs and other long range missiles – not considered space weapons! IF THE GUNSIGHT IS IN SPACE BUT NOT THE GUN IS THAT A SPACE WEAPON?

Defensive Counter Space (DCS) Electronic protection – designed to deny hostile users use of satellite capabilities – example; GPS encrypted signals Warning sensors – US CEASE - Compact Environmental Anomaly warning sensor Escort protection

Escort Protection - Dual Use? XSS-11(US DoD) XSS-11's objective is to demonstrate key elements of extended proximity operations using microsatellites. An agile, capable, affordable microsatellite will rendezvous with a resident space object and perform extended proximity operations including standoff inspection and circumnavigation. DART (NASA) DART will rendezvous with the target satellite, the Multiple Paths, Beyond-Line-of-Site Communications (MUBLCOM) satellite, also built by Orbital Sciences. Launched in May 1999, the MUBLCOM satellite was outfitted with equipment designed for future use with a video guidance system such as the Advanced Video Guidance Sensor (AVGS) onboard DART.

Past Offensive Counter Space (OCS) – 1960s-80s US F-15 MV Antisatellite (ASAT) Soviet Union co-orbital ASAT Debris issues!

Recent Offensive Counter Space (OCS) – 2008 Chinese Test (2007) Intercepted Chinese weather sat: FY-1C 3000 debris >5cm Increase of ~20% Conjunctions up >30% US Action (2008) Intercepted NRO sat USA-193 Less debris (lower orbit) Still increased risks to ISS

Offensive Counter Space (OCS) - Electronic Warfare Counter Communications System – declared operational 2004 Counter Surveillance and Reconaissance System – Terminated by US Congress and US DoD Numerous instances of non-US satellite jamming in past 15 years – example Indonesia-Tonga “Satellite War” Non-state actors – Falun Gong vs China HONG KONG (Reuters) - A Hong Kong-based satellite operator accused the Falun Gong spiritual group, banned in China as an "evil cult," on Monday of hacking into one of its satellites to illegally beam transmissions into mainland China. July 5, 2005 Falun Gong

Missile Defense - OCS Ground and air-based missile defense (and some air defense) systems of USA, Russia and China have the potential as ASATs Space-based missile defenses controversial –US Near Field InfraRed Experiment (NFIRE)

NFIRE – A “Tempest in a Teapot” or a Dangerous Initiative? US Missile Defense Agency experiment Pushed by 1980s missile defense enthusiasts Mandated by US Congress to be strictly a sensor test Doesn’t make any sense as a missile defense system against current “threats” such as North Korea vice other approaches

Force Application Space-Based Lasers – Effort terminated (weapon would weigh 100 tonnes, be vulnerable and probably easily countermeasured) US and Soviet efforts Capistrano Test Center Was it launched?

Rods from God? Kinetic energy at high velocities (10+ km/sec) approaches nuclear energy – 10 tonnes dropped from the moon=10kilotons Weapon concept is to place package in GTO or HEO orbit and de-orbit on need Time to Target – hours Ground-launched missiles far quicker (10-60 minutes) and more effective – mainstay of Chinese long-range strike force –US Hypersonic development program –Russia, China, India similar programs

High-altitude nuclear tests of 1958 and 1962 demonstrated wide-area effects with significant military impacts for numerous systems. –Radars: Blackout, absorption, noise, clutter, scintillation –Communications:Blackout, scintillation fading, noise, connectivity –Optical Sensors:IR, Visible, UV backgrounds, clutter;  noise –Satellites:Trapped radiation; radiation damage to electronics –Electronics & Power:Electromagnetic pulse; electrical systems damage STARFISH 1.4 MT at 400 km ORANGE 3.8 MT at 43 km KINGFISH __ MT at __ km TEAK 3.8 MT at 76.8 km CHECKMATE __ MT at __ km One High Altitude Nuclear Detonation Impacts Multiple Systems From Defense Threat Reduction Agency/Mission Research Corp briefing, 15 Jan 2003

Observations Too much rhetoric on all sides –Space Weapons zealots are “scaring the animals” –Alarmists enjoy being scared Space Control is a subset of security related information control “Weapons” generally don’t make much sense from a cost or effectiveness standpoint The USA is not actually doing much in the way of weapons in its $45B space program – and certainly not “rushing” into a space arms race Many nations are developing relevant “dual use” capabilities Significant need and opportunity for rational dialogue