Vanessa Teague Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Melbourne Australia.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Trusting the Vote Ben Adida - Cryptography and Information Security Group MIT Computer Science and Artificial.
Advertisements

Non-interactive Zero- Knowledge Arguments for Voting Jens Groth UCLA.
Receipt-Free Universally-Verifiable Voting With Everlasting Privacy Tal Moran.
Pretty Good Democracy James Heather, University of Surrey
Vote privacy: models and cryptographic underpinnings Bogdan Warinschi University of Bristol 1.
Talk by Vanessa Teague, University of Melbourne Joint work with Chris Culnane, James Heather & Steve Schneider at University of.
1 e-voting (requirements & protocols) 1) Aggelos Kiayias, Moti Yung: Self-tallying Elections and Perfect Ballot Secrecy 2) Jens Groth: Efficient Maximal.
Civitas Verifiability and Coercion Resistance for Remote Voting University of South Alabama August 15, 2012 Michael Clarkson The George Washington University.
Can voters check that their e-vote is cast as they intended and properly included in an accurate count? Vanessa Teague University of Melbourne
Civitas Security and Transparency for Remote Voting Swiss E-Voting Workshop September 6, 2010 Michael Clarkson Cornell University with Stephen Chong (Harvard)
Computational Democracy: Algorithms, Game Theory, and Elections Steven Wolfman 2011/10/27.
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems Jens Groth University College London.
A Supervised Verifiable Voting Protocol for the Victorian Electoral Commission Craig Burton 1 Chris Culnane 2 James Heather 2 Thea Peacock 3 Peter Y. A.
James Heather, University of Surrey Peter Y A Ryan, University of Luxembourg Vanessa Teague, University of Melbourne.
Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective Chris Karlof Naveen Sastry David Wagner UC-Berkeley Direct Recording Electronic voting machines (DREs)
1 Receipt-freedom in voting Pieter van Ede. 2 Important properties of voting  Authority: only authorized persons can vote  One vote  Secrecy: nobody.
Information Security Research Centre MCS Workshop, Melbourne Electronic Voting and Receipt-freeness Byoungcheon Lee 1,2, Colin Boyd 1, Ed Dawson 1 1 Information.
Receipt-Free Universally-Verifiable Voting With Everlasting Privacy Tal Moran Joint work with Moni Naor.
Electronic Voting Presented by Ben Riva Based on presentations and papers of: Schoenmakers, Benaloh, Fiat, Adida, Reynolds, Ryan and Chaum.
Civitas Verifiability and Coercion Resistance for Remote Voting Virginia Tech NCR September 14, 2012 Michael Clarkson George Washington University with.
Self-Enforcing E-Voting (SEEV) Feng Hao Newcastle University, UK CryptoForma’13, Egham.
Research & development A Practical and Coercion-resistant scheme for Internet Voting Jacques Traoré (joint work with Roberto Araújo and Sébastien Foulle)
Vote for your new Member of the Scottish Youth Parliament?
Five Options Requirements 19 core Required credits Algebra II, Chemistry, and Physics 26 or more total credits 5 Options.
Receipt-Free Universally-Verifiable Voting With Everlasting Privacy Tal Moran Joint work with Moni Naor.
How Hard Is It To Manipulate Voting? Edith Elkind, Princeton Helger Lipmaa, HUT.
10/25/20061 Threshold Paillier Encryption Web Service A Master’s Project Proposal by Brett Wilson.
Receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance: formal definitions and fault attacks Stéphanie Delaune / Steve Kremer / Mark D. Ryan.
Electronic Voting (E-Voting) An introduction and review of technology Written By: Larry Brachfeld CS591, December 2010.
1/11/2007 bswilson/eVote-PTCWS 1 Enhancing PTC based Secure E-Voting System (note: modification of Brett Wilson’s Paillier Threshold Cryptography Web Service.
PRESENTED BY CHRIS ANDERSON JULY 29, 2009 Using Zero Knowledge Proofs to Validate Electronic Votes.
Why don’t we practice what we teach? Andre Oboler, David McG. Squire and Kevin B. Korb School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University,
CS 430: Advanced Software Engineering Group Project eMU Elections System Creators: Brandon Pugh, Jonathan Crouse, Ben Butler, Mark Wrobleski.
Civitas Toward a Secure Voting System AFRL Information Management Workshop October 22, 2010 Michael Clarkson Cornell University.
Internet voting in Estonia Epp Maaten Councillor of the Elections Department Chancellery of the Riigikogu.
An Architecture For Electronic Voting Master Thesis Presentation Clifford Allen McCullough Department of Computer Science University of Colorado at Colorado.
Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective By Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, and David Wagner University of California, Berkely Proceedings of.
Single Transferable Vote. Multi Member Constituencies Only Voting is Preferential meaning voters indicate preference by numbers, In order of their favourite.
Characteristics of different versions of Single Transferable Vote Karpov A.V. (Higher School of Economics) Volsky V.I. (Institute of Control Science RAS)
Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 1 LinuxTag 2009 Berlin Verifiable E-Voting with Open Source Prof. Dr. Andreas Steffen Hochschule für Technik.
Evoting using collaborative clustering Justin Gray Osama Khaleel Joey LaConte Frank Watson.
Research & development Towards Practical Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections Jacques Traoré France Télécom / Orange Labs SecVote 2010 Bertinoro - Italy.
Coercion-Resistant Remote Voting Michael Clarkson Cornell University Coin (ca. 63 B.C.) commemorating introduction of secret ballot in 137 B.C. SecVote.
SANDRA GUASCH CASTELLÓ PHD EVOTING WORKSHOP LUXEMBOURG, 15-16/10/2012 SUPERVISOR: PAZ MORILLO BOSCH Verifiable Mixnets.
A remote voting system based on Prêt à Voter coded by David Lundin Johannes Clos.
Electoral System Families The Rockridge Citizens’ Assembly April 21, 2004.
The Paillier Cryptosystem
Remote Prêt à Voter 1.0 (FPTP): a voter-verifiable and receipt-free remote voting Zhe Xia (Joson) July 19, 2012.
My Dream Career By: Matthew Cruz Play me Software engineer A software engineer works with technology and computers. My responsibilities are making sure.
BY: CHRIS GROVES Privacy in the Voting Booth. Reason for Privacy Voters worry that their vote may be held against them in the future  People shouldn’t.
SA1: Living in a Democracy Electoral Systems. Proportional Representation Aims: Define Proportional Representation (PR) Examine different types of PR.
Electronic Voting R. Newman. Topics Defining anonymity Need for anonymity Defining privacy Threats to anonymity and privacy Mechanisms to provide anonymity.
Electronic Voting: Danger and Opportunity
The Administration of Elections Extent of Federal control Elections need to be free, honest, and accurate Most election law in the U.S. is State Law.
Usable Security Lab Crypto Lab Efficiency Comparison of Various Approaches in E-Voting Protocols Oksana Kulyk, Melanie Volkamer.
Direct Democracy Is it possible? Do we want? Henrik Ingo November 16th, 2007 Nottingham Published under (cc) Attribution license (
Cryptographic protocols
Single Transferable Vote (STV) System -an explanation of how to allocate seats using STV By CA VISHAL LANGALIA
Recipt-free Voting Through Distributed Blinding
The Australian electoral system (fun, fun, fun!)
ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin
The Australian electoral system (fun, fun, fun!)
Characteristics of different versions of Single Transferable Vote
Cryptographic Protocols
E-Procurement Support
Communication and Electronic Engineering Department
The Australian electoral system (fun, fun, fun!)
Cryptographic Protocols
AMS provides good representation.
Perpendicular and Parallel Lines
Presentation transcript:

Vanessa Teague Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Melbourne Australia

Key questions/issues (for me) To find electronic voting solutions that are appropriate for Australian elections, which means Single transferable vote (STV) (a.k.a. preferential voting or instant-runoff voting) Voters list all candidates in order of preference Many e-voting schemes don’t work for STV Receipt freeness is harder for STV Compulsory voting Makes for different tradeoffs

My work: Coercion resistance Addressing the “Italian attack” for STV The coercer orders a voter to select a particular permutation During tallying (or after the election), the coercer looks for that vote

Key results A definition of coercion-resistance that includes STV A scheme for proving correct STV tallying without allowing coercion Based on (honest-verifier) Zero knowledge proofs