Poverty Traps and Resource Dynamics In Smallholder Agrarian Systems Chris Barrett Cornell University Guest Lecture January 27, 2009.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Sustainable Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction
Advertisements

Comments on What are the constraints on inclusive growth in Zambia? Elena Ianchovichina and Susanna Lundström Arne Bigsten University of Gothenburg.
The Well-being of Nations Chapter 1 Emerging Social and Economic Concerns.
Key Challenges and Opportunities for Reducing Vulnerability 1.Diversification - No Framework for Implementing and Evaluating Payments for Ecosystem Services.
1 School of Oriental & African Studies Reducing Food Price Volatility for Food Security & Development: G20 Action December 2010 Andrew Dorward Centre for.
Poverty Traps, Resilience and Resource Dynamics Among the Extreme Rural Poor Chris Barrett Cornell University Seminar at James Cook University (Townsville,
Friederike Mikulcak, Jamila Haider, Jens Newig & Joern Fischer Leuphana University Lueneburg Stockholm Resilience Center Resilience 2014, Montpellier,
Christopher B. Barrett and Mark A. Constas Cornell University Presentation at the International Food Policy Research Institute August 2, 2013 Toward A.
Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN FOOD SECURITY MEASUREMENT -WHAT AND HOW TO MEASURE DST & HSRC SEMINAR 12 NOV 2013 Dr Joyce Chitja University of Kwazulu-Natal.
Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment
Heterogeneous Wealth Dynamics: On the roles of risk and ability Paulo Santos and Christopher B. Barrett.
1 Risk and Asset Management in the Presence of Poverty Traps: Implications for Growth and Social Protection Christopher B. BarrettMichael R. Carter Cornell.
Lecture 22: The Environment and Development
Assets, Poverty Traps and Rights Natural Resource Management
Poverty Traps, Safety Nets and Sustainability Chris Barrett Robin Hill Seminar Cornell University April 28, 2005.
Welfare Dynamics in Rural Kenya and Madagascar Christopher B. Barrett, Paswel Marenya, John McPeak, Bart Minten, Festus Murithi, Willis Oluoch- Kosura,
Heterogeneous Wealth Dynamics: On the roles of risk and ability Paulo Santos and Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University Michigan State University guest.
Economics of Poverty Traps and Persistent Poverty: An Asset-based Approach Michael R. Carter University of Wisconsin Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University.
Inclusive Agricultural and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa Chris Barrett Cornell University November 16, 2004 USAID BASIS CRSP Policy Conference.
Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 4 Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment.
Cornell Leadership on Sustainable Global Poverty Reduction Chris Barrett February 24, 2009 CALS Alumni Affairs, Development and Communications Staff briefing.
A business case to reduce rural poverty through targeted investments in water in sub-Saharan Africa WWF5 Session How can food market measures boost.
Long-Run Economic Growth
An Asset-Based Approach to Poverty Dynamics and Safety Nets: Research and Policy Questions Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University Michael R. Carter.
Competitiveness and Growth in Argentina: Appropriability, Misallocation or Disengagement? Gabriel Sánchez and Inés Butler IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea.
Christopher B. Barrett and Michael R. Carter Seminar at University of California at Riverside May 24, 2012 T HE E CONOMICS OF P OVERTY T RAPS AND P ERSISTENT.
Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University James Cook University SIS group meeting July 8, 2013 Chronic Rural Poverty and Resilience: Some Reflections and.
Opportunity 104: Inequality in Developing Countries Chris Barrett October 30, 2008 Cornell Club New York City.
RURAL MARKETS, NATURAL CAPITAL AND DYNAMIC POVERTY TRAPS IN EAST AFRICA Discussion of Prototype CLASSES* Model Presently Under Development: A Work in Progress.
Research Activities Under the Project “Rural Markets, Natural Capital and Dynamic Poverty Traps in East Africa” Presentation to BASIS CRSP Technical Committee.
Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University May 22, 2013 remarks at panel discussion on Risk & Vulnerability Monash Centre for Development Economics Resilience.
Modern Economic Theory and Development Karla Hoff Joseph E. Stiglitz October 8, 1999.
Enhancing Developing World Agricultural Performance: getting beyond the current plateau through R&D Prabhu Pingali Deputy Director Agriculture Development.
Investment in Sustainable Natural Resource Management (focus: Agriculture) increases in agricultural productivity have come in part at the expense of deterioration.
Welfare Dynamics in Rural Kenya and Madagascar: Preliminary Quantitative Findings Chris Barrett Cornell University March 15, 2004 BASIS CRSP Project Annual.
RURAL MARKETS, NATURAL CAPITAL AND DYNAMIC POVERTY TRAPS IN EAST AFRICA Principal Investigator C. BARRETT - CORNELL Co-Principal Investigators F. MURITHI.
Asia Pacific Consultation on Building Regional Evidence for the First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.
NS4053 Winter Term 2015 South African Convergence.
Assessing vulnerability: linking livelihoods & climate Gina Ziervogel, Emma Archer & Anna Taylor.
Innovation and Transformation in Agricultural Systems Mike Jones Swedish Biodiversity Centre IUCN Resilience Task Force Resilience Alliance Connector.
Rural Poverty Dynamics: Development Policy Implications Christopher B. Barrett And Festus Murithi August 2003 USAID BASIS CRSP TC Meeting Pumula Beach.
Smallholder Market Participation: Concepts and Evidence from Eastern and Southern Africa Christopher B. Barrett, Cornell University FAO workshop on Staple.
Rural Poverty Dynamics: Development Policy Implications Christopher B. Barrett August th triennial IAAE conference Durban, South Africa.
RURAL MARKETS, NATURAL CAPITAL AND DYNAMIC POVERTY TRAPS IN EAST AFRICA USAID Broadening Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems Collaborative Research.
PRESENTATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP) SUMMIT IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW GROUP (SIRG)OEA/Ser.E First Regular.
On Climate Variability And Resource- Dependent Wealth Dynamics: The Case of Ethiopian Pastoralists Paulo Santos University of Sydney Christopher B. Barrett.
THE LINKS BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO UNDER-SECRETARY GENERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.
Path creation and destruction – C. Davis – ISRN – Vancouver - May 2004 Path creation and destruction in industries, regions, and firms Strengths and limitations.
NS3040 Fall Term 2015 Economic Geography. Economic Geography I Deichmann and Gill article Not NAFTA specific, but many implications for Mexico Main point:
Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University Monash University Workshop on “Ecologists and Economists: scope for collaboration?” March 13, 2013 Chronic Rural.
Dynamic Effects of Index Based Livestock Insurance on Household Intertemporal Behavior and Welfare Munenobu Ikegami, Christopher B. Barrett, and Sommarat.
1 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE: The Role of Land Policies Gershon Feder The World Bank.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 4 Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment.
African Economic Conference 2007, Addis Ababa 1. 2 Presentation Outline What wisdom have we gained so far to explain growth in Africa?  Several explanations.
Research Needs and Outcomes in Agro-enterprise Development Peter J. Batt.
Poverty Traps, Resilience and Coupled Human-Natural Systems Chris Barrett, Cornell University May 20, th Annual Conference on Economics and Catholic.
Weather index insurance, climate variability and change and adoption of improved production technology among smallholder farmers in Ghana Francis Hypolite.
Systematic country diagnostic: Poverty and equity analyses Poverty and Equity GP Summer University, July 2017.
Building a Resilient and Sustainable Agriculture in Africa
Assets, Poverty Traps and Rights Natural Resource Management
Poverty Traps, Resilience and Coupled Human-Natural Systems
Trade and Investment for Inclusive Growth, Evidence and Elements of a Coherent Policy Framework – Lessons from Southern Africa Ramos Mabugu Financial.
Human Capabilities and Poverty Dynamics in the Face of Agro-Ecological Shocks Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University USAID/NBER event on “Resilience.
Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment
Human Capabilities and Poverty Dynamics in the Face of Agro-Ecological Shocks Christopher B. Barrett Cornell University World Bank seminar “Resilience.
Poverty Traps, Safety Nets and Sustainability
Michael R. Carter University of Wisconsin Christopher B. Barrett
Christopher B. Barrett, Cornell University
Welfare Dynamics in Rural Kenya and Madagascar
Presentation transcript:

Poverty Traps and Resource Dynamics In Smallholder Agrarian Systems Chris Barrett Cornell University Guest Lecture January 27, 2009

Introduction Oikos (“estate” or “household”) – common etymological root to ecology and economics suggests deep connections. Yet strong latent connections commonly overlooked. Example: burgeoning literatures on thresholds and multiple dynamic equilibria: resilience, catastrophic collapse, poverty traps, etc. Need to integrate better. Conservationists need to consider predictable consequences of human agency Development scholars need to respect the feedback between human and natural processes.

Some African Examples A.The East African ASAL Recent evidence suggests multiple herd size equilibria: - low level associated with sedentarization and localized range degradation … a resource degradation poverty trap - high level associated with mobile pastoralism and resilient range ecology - multiple equilibria arise due to uninsured climate risk, and are faced by those with moderate-high herding ability (low ability herders face unique, low-level equilibrium) Effects are compounded by contested, unclear property rights in land (and insecure rights in animals) which leads to conflict and coordination problems … but different from the classic Hardin tragedy of commons concern.

Those who maintain a herd remain mobile on a resilient landscape, while those who lose their herd collapse into destitution on a degrading local landscape.

Some African Examples B. Western Kenyan Maize Systems -Shepherd and Soule (1998), Barrett et al. (2006) find homeostatic systems alongside poverty and severe soil degradation. -Lumpy and delayed payoff investments (tea, dairy) andINRM form a reinforcing feedback loop. -Collapses into persistent poverty trace back to (health) shocks. -Result is apparent multiple equilibria in both assets/incomes and in soil conditions -Market failures problems compounded by (i) informational lags and biases in soil perceptions, and (ii) serious coordination problems in striga mgmt

Some (but unfortunately not all) children in this system face a lush future.

Some African Examples C. Rice Systems in Madagascar A national scale resource degradation poverty trap? Heavy dependence on rice, but low uptake of improved inputs or production methods – due to many market imperfections (insurance, credit, land) – leads to low yields, soil nutrient mining, erosion, and slash-and-burn extensification. Imperfect learning about new rice technologies and bounded rationality associated with social customs (famadihana and ritual cattle sacrifice) Coordination problems in forest access and water use to facilitate SRI uptake and reduce deforestation and resulting siltation of irrigation canals.

Some African Examples The result is pockets of productive, seemingly sustainable agro-ecosystems amid broad-scale economic and ecological problems

The Economics of Poverty Traps Poverty trap = “any self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist” (Azariadis & Stachurski). This can include: (i)unique dynamic equilibrium systems (convergence on misery) that are empirically uninteresting (ii) conditional convergence systems (unique equilibria for distinct groups, only some below a poverty line) (iii) multiple equilibrium systems (initial condition guides resulting path dynamics)

Pov. line W2W2 W2W2 Well-being t+1 Well-being t Welfare Dynamics With Unconditional Convergence Key: unique, common path dynamics with a single stable dynamic equilibrium Welfare Dynamics With Conditional Convergence Low group High group Chronic poverty region ` Transitory poverty region Welfare Dynamics With Multiple Dynamic Equilibria Key: unique path dynamics with a single stable dynamic equilibrium that differs among distinct groups or individuals Key: nonlinear path dynamics with multiple stable dynamic equilibria and at least one unstable dynamic equilibrium (threshold effect) The Economics of Poverty Traps

How might multiple equilibria emerge? Three broad classes of explanations, each with quite different policy implications: A)Market Imperfections B)Imperfect learning and bounded rationality C)Spillovers, coordination failures and economically dysfunctional institutions The Economics of Poverty Traps

Multiple variants of market imperfections story: -Nonlinear pricing -Internal economies of scale (incl. sunk costs) -Credit (financial liquidity) constraint -Uninsured risk -Unobservable labor effort and resulting moral hazard and efficiency wages Implication: poverty traps can be overcome with adequate resources to overcome the market imperfections that presently obstruct capital accumulation and technology adoption in the poorest areas of the tropics. The Economics of Poverty Traps: Market Imperfections

Imperfect learning/bounded rationality alternative: Agents may have a difficult time observing changes in the environment around them, especially changes occurring at some distance from their current position. Differences in beliefs or subjective expectations can generate “inertial self-reinforcement” (Mookherjee and Ray2000) 3 variants of problem: informational lags (e.g., mosquito control, technology treadmill), differentiated social networks, norms/conventions under bounded rationality. Implication: Additional resources need not generate the most productivity-enhancing investments. Rather, the highest return interventions would provide more timely, accurate and universally available information so as to surmount barriers to learning and innovation. The Economics of Poverty Traps: Imperfect Learning/Bounded Rationality

The Economics of Poverty Traps: Spillovers, coordination failures and economically dysfunctional institutions Several variants of this explanation: -Technological and pecuniary externalities -Coordination failures more generally -(Formal and informal) rules of behavior that breed economically dysfunctional institutions: corruption, weak property rights, failure to contribute to public goods and services, etc. Implication: Need to craft rules of interaction – and rules for transitioning to new rules – to facilitate coordination, create focal points at Pareto dominant equilibria, and discourage venal behaviors.

Poverty Trap – Resource Dynamics Link A.The Poor’s Assets Poor smallholders’ heavy dependence on natural capital creates intrinsic linkages. When the key state variables of two systems are shared in common, strong interdependence follows automatically. Resource dependence need not lead to a poverty trap; indeed, resource exploitation has often been the pathway out of poverty. Key biophysical assets: human health is primary for the poor; complementary inputs from nature (forests, soils, water, wildlife), especially land (>70% of natural capital in low-income countries). Most biological assets follow highly nonlinear dynamics: generates coupled collapse or abundance in human well-being and biological resources … no automatic vicious cycle, rather multiple equilibria.

Poverty Trap – Resource Dynamics Link B. Poverty Trap Mechanisms Apply to NRM, too Market imperfections – e.g., credit constraints, uninsured risk, unobservable labor effort – cause underinvestment in natural resources conservation by smallholders. Information lags and flow barriers, and norms/conventions associated with bounded rationality all inhibit adaptation and lead to inertial self-reinforcement. Externalities, coordination failures and weak institutions pervasive and long recognized as central to NRM problems in the rural tropics: insecure property rights, lack of rules (or enforcement), corruption and powerlessness/voicelessness.

Policy Implications “Divergence, big time”: most low-income countries face declining per capita wealth while most high-income countries enjoy increasing per capita wealth. Poverty traps imply a clear compulsion to intervene … only reinforced by close coupling to environmental state But how to intervene is much less clear because alternative mechanisms imply different responses: DeSoto vs. Sachs. Most likely, face “fractal poverty traps” (Barrett and Swallow WD 2006) – interlinked processes across different scales, with micro-level market imperfections reinforcing (and reinforced by) meso-level information problems and macro-level institutional failures. Implication: high returns to detailed empirical study to identify proximate causes in a given setting.

Thank you for your time and interest!