USign—A Security Enhanced Electronic Consent Model Yanyan Li 1 Mengjun Xie 1 Jiang Bian 2 1 University of Arkansas at Little Rock 2 University of Arkansas.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Anonymity without Sacrificing Performance Enhanced Nymble System with Distributed Architecture CS 858 Project Presentation Omid Ardakanian * Nam Pham *
Advertisements

CS470, A.SelcukCryptographic Authentication1 Cryptographic Authentication Protocols CS 470 Introduction to Applied Cryptography Instructor: Ali Aydin Selcuk.
Fusion of HMM’s Likelihood and Viterbi Path for On-line Signature Verification Bao Ly Van - Sonia Garcia Salicetti - Bernadette Dorizzi Institut National.
Chapter 9 Creating and Maintaining Database Presented by Zhiming Liu Instructor: Dr. Bebis.
Fingerprint Minutiae Matching Algorithm using Distance Histogram of Neighborhood Presented By: Neeraj Sharma M.S. student, Dongseo University, Pusan South.
CS Team 5 Alex Wong Raheel Khan Rumeiz Hasseem Swati Bharati Biometric Authentication System.
Forged Handwriting Detection Hung-Chun Chen M.S. Thesis in Computer Science Advisors: Drs. Cha and Tappert.
Part 4: Evaluation Chapter 20: Why evaluate? Chapter 21: Deciding on what to evaluate: the strategy Chapter 22: Planning who, what, where, and when Chapter.
GUIDE TO BIOMETRICS CHAPTER I & II September 7 th 2005 Presentation by Tamer Uz.
APPLAUS: A Privacy-Preserving Location Proof Updating System for Location-based Services Zhichao Zhu and Guohong Cao Department of Computer Science and.
05/06/2005CSIS © M. Gibbons On Evaluating Open Biometric Identification Systems Spring 2005 Michael Gibbons School of Computer Science & Information Systems.
Oral Defense by Sunny Tang 15 Aug 2003
A Brief Survey on Face Recognition Systems Amir Omidvarnia March 2007.
Authors: Anastasis Kounoudes, Anixi Antonakoudi, Vasilis Kekatos
Ensuring Home-based Rehabilitation Exercise by Using Kinect and Fuzzified Dynamic Time Warping Algorithm Qiao Zhang.
WebQuilt and Mobile Devices: A Web Usability Testing and Analysis Tool for the Mobile Internet Tara Matthews Seattle University April 5, 2001 Faculty Mentor:
1 Authentication Protocols Celia Li Computer Science and Engineering York University.
A survey of image-based biometric identification methods: Face, finger print, iris, and others Presented by: David Lin ECE738 Presentation of Project Survey.
Thermal imaging of ear biometrics Steinar Watne. Outline – Introduction to biometrics – Ear as biometric – Research questions – Experiment – Pre-processing.
Evaluation of digital Libraries: Criteria and problems from users’ perspectives Article by Hong (Iris) Xie Discussion by Pam Pagels.
Biometrics: Ear Recognition
KinWrite: Handwriting-Based Authentication Using Kinect Proceedings of the 20th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2013 Jing.
UMedCT University Medical Clinical Tracking Eric Cox Thesis Project INFO-I 680/681 TCO IU School of Informatics.
Petter Nielsen Information Systems/IFI/UiO 1 Software Prototyping.
Using Technology to Strengthen Human Subject Protections Patricia Scannell Director, IRB Washington University School of Medicine.
Open Data from Reliable Records Anne Thurston. The Open Data movement, a key aspect of Open Government, is now a top development interest across the world.
Solutions to Security and Privacy Issues in Mobile Social Networking
Introduction to Biometrics Charles Tappert Seidenberg School of CSIS, Pace University.
Keystroke Biometric System Client: Dr. Mary Villani Instructor: Dr. Charles Tappert Team 4 Members: Michael Wuench ; Mingfei Bi ; Evelin Urbaez ; Shaji.
Using Identity Credential Usage Logs to Detect Anomalous Service Accesses Daisuke Mashima Dr. Mustaque Ahamad College of Computing Georgia Institute of.
User Authentication Using Keystroke Dynamics Jeff Hieb & Kunal Pharas ECE 614 Spring 2005 University of Louisville.
The Future of Biometrics. Operation and performance In a typical IT biometric system, a person registers with the system when one or more of his physical.
Signature with Text-Dependent and Text-Independent Speech for Robust Identity Verification B. Ly-Van*, R. Blouet**, S. Renouard** S. Garcia-Salicetti*,
Signature with Text-Dependent and Text-Independent Speech for Robust Identity Verification B. Ly-Van*, R. Blouet**, S. Renouard** S. Garcia-Salicetti*,
Introduction to Biometrics Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas Lecture #23 Biometrics Standards - II November 14, 2005.
Online Kinect Handwritten Digit Recognition Based on Dynamic Time Warping and Support Vector Machine Journal of Information & Computational Science, 2015.
SID Patient Interface An Update. Current SID System Interface is built on existing SID platform.
1 Evaluating the Quality of the e-Learning Experience in Higher Education Anne Jelfs and Keir Thorpe, Institute of Educational Technology (IET), The Open.
Introducing the Separability Matrix for ECOC coding
Software quality factors
I can be You: Questioning the use of Keystroke Dynamics as Biometrics —Paper by Tey Chee Meng, Payas Gupta, Debin Gao Presented by: Kai Li Department of.
Login session using mouse biometrics A static authentication proposal using mouse biometrics Christopher Johnsrud Fullu 2008.
Handwritten Signature Verification
Biometric for Network Security. Finger Biometrics.
Secure Unlocking of Mobile Touch Screen Devices by Simple Gestures – You can see it but you can not do it Muhammad Shahzad, Alex X. Liu Michigan State.
Feature Selection and Weighting using Genetic Algorithm for Off-line Character Recognition Systems Faten Hussein Presented by The University of British.
Florida Rural Household Travel Survey Mobile App
I can be You: Questioning the use of Keystroke Dynamics as Biometrics Tey Chee Meng, Payas Gupta, Debin Gao Ke Chen.
Fast face localization and verification J.Matas, K.Johnson,J.Kittler Presented by: Dong Xie.
Data Analytics Framework for A Game-based Rehabilitation System Jiongqian (Albert) Liang*, David Fuhry*, David Maung*, Alexandra Borstad +, Roger Crawfis*,
THIS TRAINING IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SECURITY TO INITIATE HIRING PACKETS FOR NEW EMPLOYEES. Hire Xpress User’s Training NAU’s Automated Hiring.
E-Government in Germany: The Example of Process Chains Federal Chancellery Better Regulation Unit
Signature Recognition Using Neural Networks and Rule Based Decision Systems CSC 8810 Computational Intelligence Instructor Dr. Yanqing Zhang Presented.
Incorporating Privacy Into Systems Development Methodology Phil Moleski Director Corporate Information Technology Branch Saskatchewan Health
Experience Report: System Log Analysis for Anomaly Detection
Stephanie Oppenheimer, MS SUCCESS Center Erica Ellington, CRA, CHRC
Outline Introduction Standards Project General Idea
BLIND AUTHENTICATION: A SECURE CRYPTO-BIOMETRIC VERIFICATION PROTOCOL
Authentication.
Multimodal Biometric Security
FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
Biometrics.
Secure and Privacy-Preserving User Authentication Using Biometrics
Human Factors Issues Chapter 8 Paul King.
Collaboration with Google Drive
Visual Signature Verification using Affine Arc-length
Forged Handwriting Detection
Biometrics.
The Capture of Social and Behavioral Determinants of Health in
Visual-based ID Verification by Signature Tracking
Presentation transcript:

USign—A Security Enhanced Electronic Consent Model Yanyan Li 1 Mengjun Xie 1 Jiang Bian 2 1 University of Arkansas at Little Rock 2 University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences August 29, 2014 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Outline Introduction Related Work Design and Implementation of USign System Evaluation Conclusion University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Introduction University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Why electronic consent? Improve efficiency and quality E.g. recruit more subjects and save time and money in clinical trails Problems in electronic consent Lack of considerations in security and privacy Most focus on improving participant comprehension of consent Collected signatures are only for archival purpose Proposed solution – USign Collects signatures for authentication purpose Guarantees the signer is the person he/she claim to be University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Related Work University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Electronic Consent Give researchers greater access to rural populations Captured signature is only used as a record Electronic Signature Use predefined signature styles, not real ones Not for verifying a signer’s identity Signature Verification Signatures are commonly accepted High accuracy (low error rate) has been achieved University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Design and Implementation of USign University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Motivation Enhance the security of the existing eConsent system University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Existing eConsent System USign Security Enhanced eConsent System Your identity could be impersonated by others Only genuine users can login / sign document

Comparison between existing and proposed system University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Identity Verification in User Login Identity Verification in Document Signing Existing eConsent systemWeakNo USign-based eConsent system model StrongYes

Design of USign system Prototype system follows client-server model University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Android Client Tomcat Server MySQL database HTTPS SOCKET Operates User Client SideServer Side

Login interface of the client application University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Signature Verification Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) method is used University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Workflow of user identity verification

Data Acquisition step Users’ signature data are obtained via tablet/smartphone Collected many features related to the signature itself X and Y Coordinates, timestamp, pressure, touch area Preprocessing is not included in this system Cause information loss University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Feature Selection step Extract ∆x and ∆y from original X and Y coordinates Difference of X and Y coordinates between two consecutive points Pressure and touch area features are not selected Studies show these features are not effective Selected features: ∆x and ∆y University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Pairwise Alignment step Calculate DTW distances of all reference signatures Create a matrix to record all calculated distance values Calculate the minimum distance for each row Derive the average minimum value, avg(d min (R ID )) University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Distance Normalization step To restrict the distance values in a certain range of variation University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Genuine Training Sigs Reference Sigs d min (GTr, R ID ) d min (FTr, R ID ) Forged Training Sigs avg(d min (R I D )) d min (GTr, R ID )/avg(d min (R ID )) d min (FTr, R ID )/avg(d min (R ID )) Separating Boundary

Verification step Login signatures go through all aforementioned steps Including distance calculation and normalization Normalized value will be compared with boundary value If smaller than boundary --> authentic Otherwise --> forgery signature University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

System Evaluation University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Experiment Methodology Use SVC2004 Task1 dataset as the data source 40 writers, 40 signatures for each writer The first 20 are genuine sigs, and the rest are forgery sigs University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Data SetTypeEach UserTotal Size ReferenceGenuine12480 TrainingGenuine/Forgery2/2160 Test 1Genuine6240 Test 2Forgery18720

Error Rate False Rejection Rate (FRR) / False Acceptance Rate (FAR) Equal Error Rate (EER) EER for this DTW method with the given data source is close to 5.6% University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Separating Boundary FRRFAR %4.2% %5.4% %7.2% %10.3%

System Usability 10 students are randomly recruited to test this system Q1: Is this eConsent system easy to use? Q2: Would you like to use it in the future? Q3: Do you feel secure using your signature to login the system? Q4: Do you have some concerns regarding it? University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25 Questions# of Yes# of No Question 182 Question 291 Question 391 Question 428

System Usability Two concerns C1: Somebody may forge my signature to log into the system C2: Troublesome registration Our future plan Conduct more extensive usability evaluation in a larger scale to understand those user concerns we may not be aware of Improve the system usability based on the evaluation feedback University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Conclusion University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Present a security enhanced eConsent model, USign Strengthening the identity protection and authentication Develop a prototype of USign Conduct preliminary evaluation on system accuracy/usability Evaluation results show the feasibility of proposed model University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25

Thank you! Questions? University of Arkansas at Little Rock Electronic Consent ModelAugust 29, / 25