Efficient Voting via the Top-k Elicitation Scheme: A Probabilistic Approach Joel Oren, University of Toronto Joint work with Yuval Filmus, Institute of.

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Presentation transcript:

Efficient Voting via the Top-k Elicitation Scheme: A Probabilistic Approach Joel Oren, University of Toronto Joint work with Yuval Filmus, Institute of Advanced Study 1

Motivation Common theme: communication-efficient group decision- making. How to pick the single “best” item/candidate, without extracting too much information from the customers/committee members. Hiring committees: members can’t rank all of the candidates. Too many candidates. Committee members may only be familiar with just subsets of candidates in their own fields. 2

The Basic Setting 3 1.A canonical task: select the “best” outcome. 2.What is the information need for doing so. 1.Social choice: methods for aggregating preferences. 2.Efficient preference elicitation.

Basic Definitions 4 Borda Harmonic Geometric

5

Previous Work 6

7

Three Distributional Models (and high-level Results) 8

9

Empirical Results for the three algorithms 10 FairCutoff overlaps with Opt

A Threshold Theorem for PSRs 11

Applications 12

Proof Sketch – Order Statistics of Correlated RVs 13

Proof Sketch (continued) 14

15

The Adversarial Model 16

17

Conclusions & Future Directions 18 Scoring rule LBUB Borda Harmonic Geometric Copeland

Contact: Homepage: Thank you! 19

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