HTTP.sys Vulnerability CVE-2015-1635 MS15-034 Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. 1.

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Presentation transcript:

HTTP.sys Vulnerability CVE MS Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. 1

Outline What is HTTP.sys? What does the “Range” header do? How is it exploited? How to test if you are vulnerable Examples of Current Exploits in the Wild 2

No Logo? No Catchy Name HTTP deRANGEd 3

HTTP.sys Parses HTTP Requests Caches response using kernel caching If a “Range” header is used, extracts specific portion of page from Kernel Cache to pass to client Used in IIS 6 and later. NOT JUST USED BY IIS (part of Windows) 4

Range Header (RFC 7233) Used for partial downloads Often used to complete downloads Mobile clients (podcast clients) download pages in “chunks”. GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: test Range: bytes=0-5,

Range Header Response HTTP/ Partial Content Content-Type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=513da661b3ac6e --513da661b3ac6e Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-range: bytes 0-5/ da661b3ac6e Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 6

No Upper Limit “Since there is no predefined limit to the length of a payload, recipients must anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows.” (RFC 7233) 7

Exploit IIS limits the range to a 64 Bit Unsigned number. Maximum Number: 2^ xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF If lower end 0 -> No exploit 8

Exploit (2) Lower end > Size of file: No exploit Lower end > 0 and <=Size of file: Exploit!! Integer Overflow 9

Exploit Request GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: test Range: bytes=x X=0 no exploit X>0 and X<Filesize Exploit 10

Information Leak If “lower end” = “file size - 1” Not reproducable in my testing Dumps kernel memory (same segment as “cache”?) Maximum size depends on size of file 11

Tests Send large HTTP Range request with lower end 0.. Other Software using http.sys netsh http show servicestate Check if patch is installed wmic qfe | find KB

Other Protections I(D|P)S: Does not work for SSL Host based IPS e.g. Symantec has signatures that block exploit WAF Authentication: Disable Anonymous Access 13

Current Exploits Many vulnerability scans (range starts at “0”) Some random DoS exploit attempts No Information Disclosure exploits in honeypot so far Reports of more targeted exploit attempts. 14

Risk Exposed Public Systems are at immediate risk of DoS Memory Disclosure likely “stable” in a couple days Remote Execution unlikely (in the near future) 15

What to do next? Expedite Patching MS Consider “virtual patching” via WAF until patch is applied and verified Add IDS rules to detect exploit attempts Please… share anything you see! Is it as bad as Heartbleed? No… 16

Questions? Daily Podcast… 17