1 Avoidable and unavoidable aging in Europe François Héran I N E D 33 rd Global Conference, ICSW Tours, Vinci Congress Centre, 2 June 2008

2 1. The factors of population aging

3 The 1 st factor of population aging Population aging high up the age pyramid (in French: "vieillissement par le haut") Due to increased longevity The first factor of aging in importance: a 4 th floor added to the age pyramid = "unavoidable aging"

4 Population aging high up the pyramid

5 Population aging high up the pyramid (additional floor due to longevity)

6 The French case: Age pyramids in 2005 and 2050 (INSEE demographic prospects)

7 The 2 nd factor of population aging Population aging generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas") Secular decline of fertility under replacement level, below 2.05 children per woman due to deep reasons ("2 nd demographic transition") : –generalized participation of women in the LF –raising costs of education –more individual autonomy… = "avoidable aging", open to pro-active policy (in principle)

8 Population aging at the bottom (before)

9 Population aging at the bottom (after)

10 The 3 rd factor of population aging Present impact of temporary rise of fertility: e. g. the backlash of the baby boom –In the first decades large birth cohorts rejuvenate the age pyramid; –in the following decades, they make it older Strong factor but limited in time "Unavoidable aging"

11 A temporary additional fertility (baby-boom) which first rejuvenates the population…

12 …but 40 years later makes it older

13 The raising number of deaths in Europe, (for 100 deaths in 2000) UN Prospects, central variant

14 Few deaths in France, for the time being Female deaths by age in 2004

15 Life expectancy of life at birth, in selected industrial countries

16 Life expectancy of women

17 Life expectancy of women

18 Life expectancy of women

19 The 2003 heat wave in France: impact on WOMEN's life expectancy

20 The 2003 heat wave in France: impact on MEN's life expectancy

21 The French natural increase (Insee prospects, medium variant)

2. The burden of an expanding older population: not that heavy What will be the impact of population ageing on the numbers of persons living in an institution (retirement home, nursing home)?

23 Great variations in the proportion of old persons living in residential cares Among the over-75s, it ranges from –a few percent in Poland (2%), Italy, Spain (4%) –to around 12% in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Luxemburg Causes: –Different cultural models of family solidarity –A certain imbalance between supply and demand for collective infrastructures of this kind

24 Proportion of persons aged 75+ living in an institution in different European countries (Eurostat, early 2000s)

25 Can we foresee the number of old persons living in an institution in 2030? Simply to provide the same level of coverage as today, the capacity of residential care should increase substantially in many countries –Around 70% in a couple of decades But this is only a mechanical projection, which does not provide for –the impact of measures to enable old people to remain in their own homes –the potential improvement in health status, if disability-free life expectancy tends to increase faster than total life expectancy

26 Foreseeable increase (in %) in the number of persons living in institutions in 2030, under two different scenarios

27 The hypothesis of later institutionalization (Alain Monnier) At ages 75-79, the proportion of persons living in an institution is quite low in the EU: rarely above 3% But the size of this age-group is still large Hence, year-olds represent between 15% and 20% of the population in residential care in the north-western EU Member states Therefore, slightly later entry into a retirement or nursing home (e.g. 5 years later, at age 80) would strongly limit the increase in capacity required : the demand would fall by 25 % in EU-15, and even more in the new Member states

28 Foreseeable increase (in %) in the number of persons living in institutions in 2030, under two different scenarios

29 A realistic hypothesis The hypothesis of later institutionalization is realistic It corresponds –to the wishes of old people –to the priorities of current old-age policies It will probably occur on a much larger scale than the very modest assumption used here (a 5-year postponement of institutionalization)

3. Can family policy or immigration policy counter population aging? A graphic illustration of the widening gap between the rate of growth of the elderly and that of the population in active age (United Nations demographic prospects, 2006 revision)

31 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 ITALY (per 100 persons in 2000)

32 Source: UN demographic prospects (2006) in a selection of EU countries compared to Russia and USA The graphs give the growth of three age groups: 65+, 15-64, -15, indexed to 100, over Basis: the "medium scenario", prolonging the present trends, with a convergence close to 1.8 children per woman in 2050 The "high variant" = an additional fertility of 0.5 child eventually 2.35 instead of 1.85 (a considerable change)

33 An illustration of the divide between "avoidable" and "unavoidable" aging (2) The widening gap between the 65+ and the (or –15) curves displays the relative population aging –countering population aging would mean closing the gap between the two curves ! (see last scenario of the UN report on "replacement migrations") The slim difference between "medium" and "high" fertility variants illustrates the capacity of a pro- natalist policy to maintain the active population over time –A limited impact, compared to the impact of increased longevity

34 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 ITALY (per 100 persons in 2000)

35 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 GERMANY (per 100 persons in 2000)

36 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 UK (per 100 persons in 2000)

37 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 FRANCE (per 100 persons in 2000)

38 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 SWEDEN (per 100 persons in 2000)

39 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 POLAND (per 100 persons in 2000)

40 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 RUSSIAN FED (per 100 persons in 2000)

41 Population aged 65+, aged and aged -15 U S A (per 100 persons in 2000)

42 Population des 65 ans et + et population des ans AFR. DU NORD (pour 100 personnes en 2000)

43 Population des 65 ans et + et population des ans AFR. SUB-SAHARA (pour 100 pers. en 2000)

44 Population des 65 ans et + et population des ans INDE (pour 100 personnes en 2000)

45 Population des 65 ans et + et population des ans CHINE (pour 100 personnes en 2000)

46 Conclusion (1) Sweden, UK or France: a population policy supporting the fertility rate is able to maintain the active population over the next decades Italy, Germany, Poland: it will fill but a part of the gap In all EU countries, however, the increased longevity accounts for most of the population aging process (France is no exception) In spite of its strong fertility, USA will not escape from the aging process Russia will, to some extent. But this is bad sign: people have no time to grow older

47 Conclusion (2) Immigration policy cannot counter population aging in Europe; it brings only a slight retrospective correction to the fertility rates of 30 years ago –however, immigration is essential to maintain the absolute numbers of active population and contribute to the good working of home care and institutional care Finally, population ageing cannot be compensated for by any population policy –neither policy immigration –nor family policy If population ageing is a demographic issue, it does not call for a demographic solution