Assessment Report Electricity Governance in the Philippines Maria Teresa Diokno-Pascual March 30, 2006 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND POLICY.

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Presentation transcript:

Assessment Report Electricity Governance in the Philippines Maria Teresa Diokno-Pascual March 30, 2006 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND POLICY PRAYAS-PUNE

Outline of Presentation Background to Philippine electricity sector Overall findings Use of consultants Participation of weaker stakeholders Lessons from the Philippines

Electricity Sector Reform Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA, or Republic Act No. 9136) passed in June 2001 Involved:  Privatization of state-owned National Power Corporation  Restructuring and unbundling of the industry  Deregulation of generation and supply, regulation of distribution and transmission  Creation of (limited) competitive market for electricity Supposedly to address:  High cost of electricity  Over-contracted capacity  Consistent financial losses and heavy indebtedness of NPC  Widespread allegations of corruption and fraudulent debt  Non-universal access to electricity at the household level

5 Years Later Tariffs unbundled, electricity rates (generation, transmission, distribution) raised, VAT imposed Tariff philosophy changed from PPA to GRAM to PBR PhP200 billion (about US$4B) of the NPC debt assumed by National Government; PhP18B of EC debt assumed by PSALM Cross subsidies being phased out (excl lifeline rate) Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC): grid code, distribution code, licensing of generation companies, Magna Carta for consumers 3 ERC Chairmen appointed by the President in 5 years, tariff decisions twice nullified by Supreme Court 5 rural electric co-ops serving as pilots for investment management contracts with private firms.

5 Years Later Three new corporations created:  Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)  National Transmission Company (TRANSCO)  Philippine Electricity Market Corporation (PEMC) Functioning legislative oversight committee or Powercom Behind schedule:  Privatization of generation and transmission assets of NPC  Transition supply contracts w/ utilities and rural electric co-ops  Commercial operation of wholesale electricity spot market (narrowed to Luzon grid only)  Open access for large consumers  Transmission grid connecting Mindanao to Luzon and Visayas

Example: ESA7 Public participation in setting minimum environmental performance standards Elements of QualityScore Evidence of public consultation in determining standards1 Evidence of communication of public input1 Existence of explanation for existing standards0 Regular reporting on the compliance of the electricity sector with environmental standards. 0 Total Score2/4

Overall Findings Weakest: Policy processes, in all governance principles, especially in the involvement of more vulnerable and affected stakeholders. Also significantly lacking in transparency Strongest: Regulatory processes, particularly in accountability and redress mechanisms  largely because ERC is a legally mandated independent quasi- judicial and regulatory body  relatively clear-cut procedures, standards and rules in place for tariff setting, licensing, generation, distribution and transmission, electricity consumers’ rights  but weak in transparency and participation

Overall Findings Environmental and social aspects strong in transparency and access to information, weak in accountability and redress mechanisms.  Disconnect between environmental and social objectives and power development goals  Renewable energy seen as indigenous and therefore strategic to meet the goal of energy security  Local low quality dirtier coal also seen in same light Highest average score: capacity, more of CSOs, less of government  Despite high capacity of NGOs, the absence of enabling structures for their participation in Policy Processes and ESA makes governance ineffective.

Only 17/68 indicators Indicators with a rating of “medium-high” or “highest” Policy Process Regulatory Process Environmental and Social Aspects T None RP10: Procedural certainty about regulatory processes and decisions (highest) ESA1: Clarity of authority to grant environmental clearance for power projects (highest) ESA2: Clarity of executive’s environmental and social mandates (medium-high) P None ESA10: Public participation requirements in EIA laws and procedures (highest) ESA21: Participation in development of policies to promote low environmental impact management and technology options (medium-high)

Indicators rating “h” or “mh” Policy Processes Regulatory ProcessesEnvironmental and Social Aspects A PP4: Annual reports of the Department of Energy (medium-high) RP7: Appeal mechanism (highest) RP18: ERC Orders and decisions (highest) RP22: Licensing (highest) RP23: Consumer service and quality of supply (medium-high) ESA15: Quality of judicial and administrative forums that address environmental and social claims (highest) C PP13: Capacity of civil society organizations (medium-high) RP1: Institutional structure for regulatory decisions (highest) RP2: Authority of the ERC (medium-high) RP8: Training of ERC members and staff (medium-high) ESA4: Executive’s capacity to evaluate environmental and social issues (highest) ESA14: Capacity of civil society to address environmental and social aspects of decision- making (highest)

Use of consultants 3 indicators—PP11, RP9, PP12—all rated “lowest” Not available: contracts, terms of reference Not known: budgets, procedure for selecting consultants Known at times: financing No established process to ensure report is easily accessible in a timely fashion No process to independently review consultants’ recommendations Potential governance problems: Consultants have clients doing business with the electricity sector whose policies they are helping to shape

Participation of weaker stakeholders Indicators focusing on mechanisms for participation of weaker stakeholders in regulatory processes: RP15, RP16 Indicators with EoQ assessing systematic efforts to reach out to disadvantaged communities: PP9, PP14, ESA2, ESA3 Indicator (ESA19) assessing scope for project-affected people to exercise their rights

Participation of the weak No routine/ad hoc considerations of the interests of the weaker stakeholders in regulatory and policy processes No diverse structures to enable such representation in policy formulation and regulation No effort to build capacity of weaker stakeholders No financial analytical resources made available to build capacity No efforts to inform marginalized groups of ESA performance of electricity sector Case study: Not all project-affected groups were recognized or assisted, no full and prior information including potential threats to the community

Lessons from the Philippines

Policy processes matter Achieving good governance in the electricity sector starts with the policy process. Reforms that tend to be creditor-driven, or that favor the industry players over the public, are not good for governance. Also not good: reforms enacted through processes that  exclude effective public participation through lack of transparency and accountability  Fail to involve the public or exclude outright groups perceived as “nuisance” or opposed to reforms  do not consciously build public capacity to participate effectively

Effective regulation Effective regulation needs to put in place the right rules, but this is not enough.  Where enforcement is weak, and threat of punitive action is not enough to compel compliance.  Where it is more profitable to break or change the rules even if detrimental to the public. Need to recognize inherent imbalance in incentive to participate in the process between consumers and industry players Moreover, the regulator must have in-depth understanding of the interests of all stakeholders in the electricity sector, particularly of weaker ones.

Transparency Needed: Transparent, accountable, competent agencies of government Needed: Conscious comprehensive effort to overcome the information asymmetry in the electricity sector  allocation of subsidies  analyses, process of policy reform  bidding and privatization processes  contracts with IPPs, etc. Needed: Full disclosure by government and its creditor/donor agencies of the role played by the latter in shaping electricity sector policy  financial assistance  policy advice  technical assistance  consultants they finance (terms of reference, contracts, industry links, clients in the industry or supplying the industry)

Participation Participation of empowered stakeholders is necessary to compel the electricity sector to operate and function according to the best interests of the majority. Such participation not limited to the market, but in all the processes of governance in the electricity sector:  policy setting, policy review and modification  power planning  independent regulation  environmental and social impact assessment and monitoring  demand side management, etc. Corollary: processes needed to ensure that government responds to inputs by the public on all these aspects

Environmental and social objectives The disconnection hurts affected communities who already have little opportunity to participate in policy processes, and hold companies and government to account through ERC and environmental regulatory bodies. Need to integrate environmental and social aspects of electricity sector into policy and regulatory processes.

Thank you