Outsourcing Private RAM Computation Daniel Wichs Northeastern University with: Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Mariana Raykova.

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Presentation transcript:

Outsourcing Private RAM Computation Daniel Wichs Northeastern University with: Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Mariana Raykova

Problem Overview Client Server …

Private outsourcing is possible using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). [RAD78,Gen09,…] But FHE works over circuits rather than RAM programs. I’m very efficient! Use FHE! Done?

Circuits vs. RAM

Goals Client Server …

Goals Client Server …

Goals Non-interactive solution: “reusable garbled RAM”. Client Server

Garbled Computation Garbled Circuits [Yao82] Reusable Garbled Circuits [GKPVZ 13a,b] Can garble many inputs per circuit. Efficiently outsource circuit comp. Extension to TM. Garbled RAM [LO13, GHLORW14] Reusable Garbled RAM This Talk! Can garble many inputs per program. Efficiently outsource RAM comp.

Main Results 1-time Garbled RAM Reusable Garbled RAM+ Reusable Garbled Circuits New security/efficiency requirements. Instantiate with iO or Functional Rnc.

Main Result 1-time Garbled RAM Reusable Garbled RAM+ Reusable Garbled Circuits Stronger security requirements. Instantiate with “strong diO” (heuristic obf) with persistent data

Without Persistent Data

1-Time Garbled RAM Definition Client Server secret: k without persistent data View can be simulated given y

Reusable Garbled RAM Definition Client Server secret: k without persistent data

Construct reusable garbled RAM by combining: – one-time garbled RAM (GProg1, GInput1, GEval1) – reusable garbled circuits

Construct reusable garbled RAM by combining: – one-time garbled RAM (GProg1, GInput1, GEval1) – reusable garbled circuits Problem: In reusable garbled circuits of [GKPVZ13], size of garbled input always exceeds size of circuit output. Unfortunately: This is inherent. Cannot do better if want simulation security.

Construct reusable garbled RAM by combining: – one-time garbled RAM (GProg1, GInput1, GEval1) – reusable garbled circuits Solution: – Show that we do not need simulation-security for reusable garbled-circuits. A weaker notion suffices. – Construct reusable garbled-circuits with weaker security notion but better efficiency needed in construction.

Distributional Indistinguishability

With Persistent Memory

1-time Garbled RAM Definition Client Server secret: k with persistent data

Reusable Garbled RAM Definition Client Server secret: k with persistent data

Correlated Distributional Indistinguishability

Theorem: Get reusable garbled RAM where: – Garble, evaluate program: O(RAM run-time P). – Garble input = O( input + output size). assuming “ind. obfuscation” + stat. sound NIZK. Theorem: Get reusable garbled RAM with persistent memory where: – garble data = O( data size) – garble program = O( description size P ) – garble input = O( input + output size) – evaluate = O( RAM run-time P) assuming “strong differing-inputs obfuscation” (heuristic).

Outsourcing via Reusable G-RAM Client Server

Client Server Outsourcing via Reusable G-RAM

Don’t turn me into a circuit! Thank You!