Brian J. Gorman, M.Sc., J.D. Towson University, Maryland Presentation for The National Academies’ Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security October 30, 2006 Balancing Secrecy and Open Science The Dual Use Dilemma

The Dual Use Dilemma. Open publication of scientific methods Helps advance science Helps terrorists and rogue states pursue bioweapons

The Biosecurity Threat Unique Threat of Bioterrorism  Lowest financial barrier at $1 per life  Lowest access barrier to equipment  Least effective detection modalities  Longest lead time before awareness  Largest population with technical know- how  Weakest state controls  Weakest international treaties  Widest reach due to transmissibility  Worst cooperation from professionals  Widest access to sensitive information

Prevention Experiments of Concern* 1.Renders a vaccine ineffective 2.Alters resistance to antibiotics agents 3.Increases virulence of a pathogen 4.Increases transmissibility of a pathogen 5.Alters the host range of a pathogen 6.Enables evasion of detection 7.Enables the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin * Committee on Research Standards and Practice to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, National Research Council of National Academy of Sciences, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 2004

Prevention Due Process Vetting RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE #5. Would this paper lead to the increased transmissibility of a pathogen? #5. Would this paper lead to the increased transmissibility of a pathogen? 1. Unforeseeable 2.Remote 3. Possible 4. Likely 5. Imminent 1. Unforeseeable 2.Remote 3. Possible 4. Likely 5. Imminent #7. Would this paper help enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities? #7. Would this paper help enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities? 1. Unforeseeable 2.Remote 3. Possible 4. Likely 5. Imminent 1. Unforeseeable 2.Remote 3. Possible 4. Likely 5. Imminent

Prevention Risk Assessment Scale Flow Chart New Article Author RAS Score IRB RAS Score Journal/Peer Review RAS Score BRC RAS Screening Publish BRC Vetting Request Article Author IRB Journal Gorman, 2005

Prevention Due Process Vetting Scale Flow Chart Publish AuthorJournalIRB Consent Demand Hearing Demand Hearing Demand Hearing Initial BRC Review and Finding Article recommended for classification Gorman, 2005

Prevention Notice Mechanism for Sensitive Science The national security community has no advance warning of publications on sensitive science. The national security community has no advance warning of publications on sensitive science. Export rules address national security by controlling the transfer of U.S. technology to countries of concern. Export rules address national security by controlling the transfer of U.S. technology to countries of concern. Fundamental research is exempt from export license requirements. Fundamental research is exempt from export license requirements. Removal of the fundamental research exemption for select agents would provide the national security community with notice of sensitive dual use science before publication to assure proper vetting. Removal of the fundamental research exemption for select agents would provide the national security community with notice of sensitive dual use science before publication to assure proper vetting. Gorman, 2006

Prevention Proposals on Scientific Communication and National Security Brian J. Gorman, “Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due Process Vetting,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Spring Brian J. Gorman, “Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due Process Vetting,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Spring Brian J. Gorman, “Biosecurity and Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory and a Call for Executive Action,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Winter Brian J. Gorman, “Biosecurity and Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory and a Call for Executive Action,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Winter 2006.

Brian J. Gorman, M.Sc., J.D. Towson University, Maryland Presentation for The National Academies’ Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security October 30, 2006 Balancing Secrecy and Open Science The Dual Use Dilemma