Equilibrium Refinements Lifei Sheng 2014/01/23. Outline  Motivation of equilibrium refinements  Introduce different ways to refine Nash equilibrium.

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Presentation transcript:

Equilibrium Refinements Lifei Sheng 2014/01/23

Outline  Motivation of equilibrium refinements  Introduce different ways to refine Nash equilibrium ▪ definition ▪ why useful/reasonable ▪ toy example

Why Equilibrium Refinements?  Nash Equilibrium: intersection of best responses  A little exercise:  Equilibrium refinements: ▪ games with multiple equilibria ▪ consider additional criteria and select a subset of NEs in order to make better prediction Pure-strategy NE?

Refinements with Simple Features  Symmetric Nash Equilibrium ▪ symmetric game  Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium ▪ pre-game communication  Strict Nash Equilibrium ▪ Definition: A strategy profile is a strict NE if every player’s strategy is a unique best response to the other players’ strategies ▪ mixed-strategy NE is not strict; pure-strategy NE may or may not be strict Disadvantage: May Not Exist!

Equilibrium Refinements

Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Equilibrium

Perfect Equilibrium Example when n is large enough

Perfect Equilibrium Example

Equilibrium Refinements: Proper Equilibrium  Proper Equilibrium ▪ motivated by perfect equilibrium ▪ a player is more likely to tremble in directions that are least harmful to him ▪ difficult to verify

Conclusion  This talk introduced several equilibrium refinements ▪ symmetric NE, Pareto optimal NE, strict NE ▪ admissibility and iterated admissibility ▪ perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium  Additional Comments ▪ no ideal refinements ▪ relationship between these refinements is complicated ▪ other equilibrium refinements in extensive-form game

Reference  Govindan, Srihari and Wilson, Robert, Refinements of Nash Equilibrium (2005). Available at SSRN: or  Refinements of Nash Equilibrium, John Nachbar (2011), lecture note  Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept, R. Myerson, in Y. Varoufakis: Game Theory: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp  "Nash Equilibrium", "Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium", "Proper Equilibrium", Wikipedia, (/Trembling_hand_perfect_equilibrium/ Proper_equilibrium)  Admissibility in Games, Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg, H.Jerome Keisler, (2007)  Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory, Mario Gilli, Journal of Economic Literature  A Relation bewteen Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games, E.van Demme, Delft, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol 13, Issue 1, Page 1-13  Trembling Hand Prefect Equilibrium, lecture note

Thank You