What is the issue? SubjectObject IdeaEvent MindWorld Experiencer Experienced Inner Outer MeIt SubjectObject IdeaEvent MindWorld Experiencer Experienced Inner Outer MeIt
The problem is: if all events are loose and separate, how is there a continuity in our experience of them?
What does loose and separate mean? Hume distinguishes between matters of fact and relations of ideas. What distinguishes matters of fact from relations of ideas is that no matter of fact implies a contradiction. No matter of fact, no event or state of affairs, implies or entails any other event. Thus all events are loose and separate. Hume distinguishes between matters of fact and relations of ideas. What distinguishes matters of fact from relations of ideas is that no matter of fact implies a contradiction. No matter of fact, no event or state of affairs, implies or entails any other event. Thus all events are loose and separate.
Why causation? Hume’s interest in causation is motivated by the need to know what knowledge of matters of fact amounts to. Beyond the present testimony of our senses or memory, the relation of cause and effect is the only way we can know about matters of fact. Hume’s interest in causation is motivated by the need to know what knowledge of matters of fact amounts to. Beyond the present testimony of our senses or memory, the relation of cause and effect is the only way we can know about matters of fact.
§5 Skeptical Solutions of These Doubts What kind of Skeptic is Hume? Hume’s skepticism is more of a conservatism. He wants us to be as cautious as possible about the knowledge claims we make. Ultimately, Hume’s skepticism has no effect upon everyday life (see 235 a). What kind of Skeptic is Hume? Hume’s skepticism is more of a conservatism. He wants us to be as cautious as possible about the knowledge claims we make. Ultimately, Hume’s skepticism has no effect upon everyday life (see 235 a).
What’s the problem again? Again, the problem is that the relation of cause and effect is the only way we can have knowledge of matters of fact beyond the present testimony of our memory and senses. But inferences from cause to effect are not founded upon reason, i.e., inductive arguments are circular. But we clearly make these kind of inferences. So where do they come from? Again, the problem is that the relation of cause and effect is the only way we can have knowledge of matters of fact beyond the present testimony of our memory and senses. But inferences from cause to effect are not founded upon reason, i.e., inductive arguments are circular. But we clearly make these kind of inferences. So where do they come from?
So what is the solution? The inference that allows us to know that event B will follow from event A--even though these events are loose and separate-- is the Principle of Custom or Habit. This principle is not on the objective/ world side of our polarity, it is a principle of Human Nature (see 235 b). The inference that allows us to know that event B will follow from event A--even though these events are loose and separate-- is the Principle of Custom or Habit. This principle is not on the objective/ world side of our polarity, it is a principle of Human Nature (see 235 b).
How does it work? In the relation between any two events A & B, when our experience tells us that there is a causal relation between them, we have a kind of knowledge of this relation. This knowledge is founded upon being accustomed to the constant conjunction of A & B. This “knowledge” is really a BELIEF that follows from expereince of their constant conjunction a sufficient number of times. But, Hume says that the belief is a NECESSARY one. In the relation between any two events A & B, when our experience tells us that there is a causal relation between them, we have a kind of knowledge of this relation. This knowledge is founded upon being accustomed to the constant conjunction of A & B. This “knowledge” is really a BELIEF that follows from expereince of their constant conjunction a sufficient number of times. But, Hume says that the belief is a NECESSARY one.
But what is Belief? Fiction vs Belief The difference between the two is that the latter is attended with a feeling or sentiment that cannot be attached to it merely by the will. The “force of custom” carries the mind to conceive of the object that is normally conjoined with the one that is present to our senses. “belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain (237 b). Fiction vs Belief The difference between the two is that the latter is attended with a feeling or sentiment that cannot be attached to it merely by the will. The “force of custom” carries the mind to conceive of the object that is normally conjoined with the one that is present to our senses. “belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain (237 b).
Hume’s Naturalism Hume’s explanation of our experience of causation is psychologistic rather than physicalistic, it is mental rather than objective, it is based upon instinct rather than intelligence, on intuition rather than reason. This is a naturalistic explanation because it claims that this is an inborn faculty rather than a learned skill. Hume’s explanation of our experience of causation is psychologistic rather than physicalistic, it is mental rather than objective, it is based upon instinct rather than intelligence, on intuition rather than reason. This is a naturalistic explanation because it claims that this is an inborn faculty rather than a learned skill.
Why is this a Skeptical Solution? The solution remains skeptical because it limits our knowledge of the world to a kind of knowledge that is not imbued with certainty. For Hume, knowledge of the world analogous to the mathematical model of knowledge (Descartes), is impossible. The solution remains skeptical because it limits our knowledge of the world to a kind of knowledge that is not imbued with certainty. For Hume, knowledge of the world analogous to the mathematical model of knowledge (Descartes), is impossible.
§ 7 Of the Idea of Necessary Connection One of Hume’s targets is the metaphysicians of his day. He was suspicious that they were using language that had no meaning. His proposed method of ascertaining the meaning in terms like “power, force, energy, or necessary connection” is to trace the words back to their original concepts. The upshot of this endeavor is twofold: it shows that most of the other guys don’t know what they are talking about It offers another proof for the Principle of Custom. One of Hume’s targets is the metaphysicians of his day. He was suspicious that they were using language that had no meaning. His proposed method of ascertaining the meaning in terms like “power, force, energy, or necessary connection” is to trace the words back to their original concepts. The upshot of this endeavor is twofold: it shows that most of the other guys don’t know what they are talking about It offers another proof for the Principle of Custom.
The original impression We do have an idea of necessary connection But it does not come from our experience of objects. All we find there is constant conjunction. Could the idea come from reflection on our inner experience? We do have an idea of necessary connection But it does not come from our experience of objects. All we find there is constant conjunction. Could the idea come from reflection on our inner experience?
The original impression cont. No, the idea of power or energy cannot come from reflection upon the power of our mind and will on our body. We have no idea of how the will actually effects the body The actual power of the will over the body is pretty limited Although we will the doing of something, the physiological processes that accomplish our aim are not directly willed. No, the idea of power or energy cannot come from reflection upon the power of our mind and will on our body. We have no idea of how the will actually effects the body The actual power of the will over the body is pretty limited Although we will the doing of something, the physiological processes that accomplish our aim are not directly willed.
The original impression cont. Nor can we get the original impression of power or energy from reflection upon our mind alone. We actually have no sense of how the mind goes about its business And the power of the imagination is limited And the self-command of the mind differs at different times. Nor can we get the original impression of power or energy from reflection upon our mind alone. We actually have no sense of how the mind goes about its business And the power of the imagination is limited And the self-command of the mind differs at different times.
The original impression cont. In the end, our ideas of necessary connection, power, force, or energy can come from only one place. Reflection upon the feeling or sentiment that accompanies the constant conjunction of two events. In the end, our ideas of necessary connection, power, force, or energy can come from only one place. Reflection upon the feeling or sentiment that accompanies the constant conjunction of two events.