International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and RSACs Tom Ellacott Director-International Safeguards Division Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11 November 2011 Seminar – 20 Years of ABACC

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 2 Introduction Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority Evolution of Safeguards in Canada –1969Non-Proliferation Treaty –1972Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement –2000Additional Protocol –Sep 2005Broad Safeguards Conclusion –Dec 2005State-Level IS Approach for Canada –Jan 2010SLA established for entire State

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 3 Canadian Fuel Cycle Uranium Mining and Milling U3O8 Uranium Refining UO3 Uranium Conversion Uranium Fuel Fabrication Power Reactors UO2 Fresh Fuel Research and Development Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) and Research Reactors Spent Fuel Spent Fuel

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 4 State-Level Concept Change in perspective IAEA’s Evaluation Process Optimization

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 5 Features of the State-Level Approach Main Considerations for Canada –Presence of an IAEA regional office –Natural uranium fuel cycle –Absence of enrichment or reprocessing Elements –Division of the fuel cycle into Sectors –Secure electronic communication system –Randomization of inspections –Cooperative arrangements with the IAEA

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 6 Sector-Based Approach Sector 1 –Conversion and fuel fabrication facilities –On-load reactors and associated dry storage facilities Sector 2 –Chalk River Laboratories Sector 3 –Research reactors and critical assemblies –Static spent fuel dry storage facilities –Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) Sector 4 –Mines, mills and decommissioned facilities

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 7 Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-1: Development of IAEA Procedures Collaborative approach –IAEA IS procedures developed through a consultative process involving IAEA, CNSC and facility operators –Total of 10 procedures developed to cover all locations in Canada –Ownership of documents with IAEA but used as the basis of IS implementation by CNSC and operators

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 8 Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-2: Provision of Information Secure communication system –Secure channel for provision of information electronically –Provides near-real time overview of the flows of nuclear material –Content and frequency of submissions specified in agreed procedures –Digital signature provides sender authentication and non-repudiation

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 9 Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-3: Inspector Access Short-Notice Random and Unannounced Inspections –For the detection and deterrence of nuclear material diversion and facility misuse –Detection of borrowing Physical Inventory Verification –Randomized selection –Short notification –Non-simultaneous inventory takings

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 10 Enhanced Cooperation with SSAC-4: Expansion of Support Activities Physical Inventory Taking Evaluation –Assessment to determine if a facility not selected for a physical inventory verification was properly prepared Information flow –Supervision and administration of near-real time accountancy and operational information through the mailbox

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11 Implementation of the SLA-1 Considerations –Sector-by-sector approach –Determination of priorities Established order: –Spent fuel transfers at CANDU stations –Research reactors and LOFs –CANDU stations and bulk handling facilities –Chalk River Laboratories

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 12 Implementation of the SLA-2 Agreed work plan i.Draft procedures agreed to by the CNSC and the IAEA ii.Bilateral meetings between the CNSC and the facilities iii.Trilateral meetings among the CNSC, the facilities and the IAEA iv.Field trials (as required) v.Operational experience and revision

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 13 Timeline of SLA Implementation Facility/ActivityImplementation Date Research reactors, Locations Outside Facilities, static spent fuel dry storages January 2007 Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit power reactors March 2007 Multi-unit power reactor stationsJuly 2008 Conversion and fuel fabrication facilitiesOctober 2008 Single-unit power reactor stationsJanuary 2009 Chalk River LaboratoriesNovember 2009 Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at single-unit power reactors January 2010

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 14 PDIs in Canada

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 15 Lessons Learned / Good Practices Importance of trilateral collaboration Recognition of evolutionary approach Need for synchronization Need for information management

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 16 Future Refinement Conceptual –DDG’s vision for information-driven and objectives-based safeguards –Working group on a revised SLA for Canada Procedural/Technical –Quantity and type of information provided –Spent Fuel transfers at multi-unit stations –Material flows at Chalk River Laboratories

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 17 Conclusion Achieve the goal of a unified State level approach Achieve further efficiencies in the application of safeguards

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 18 Questions/discussions