Institutions Über Alles North, Wallis, Weingast: Limited Access – Open Access – Doorstep conditions for transition Rajan: Rent Preservation – Beneficial.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Government’s Role in Economy
Advertisements

Political – Economic Interactions: Acemoglu and Robinson’s Extractive and Inclusive Institutions Why nations fail: Geography hypothesis Culture hypothesis.
Two theories: Government ownership of banks (GOB) should be more prevalent in poorer countries, with less developed financial markets, with less well-
“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC ENTRENCHMENT, and GROWTH” Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard Yeung Journal of Economic Literature September 2005,
Why is Economic Development so Difficult? [2 – June ]
Tirsdagsseminaret ved ISV 16/ Carl Henrik Knutsen ISV, UiO Africa's Growth Tragedy Revisited: Weak States, Strong Rulers.
Diverse Structures and Common Characteristics
Measuring Openness Law of one price – For goods – For factors: GNP vs. GDP... Immigration Rates Volume of Trade Sachs-Warner 1 or 0 in each year – Low.
Development Prospects
Colonial legacy, factor endowments, and institutions
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 2 Comparative Economic Development.
Comparative Economic Development
Explaining Economic Development A Survey Saving  physical capital, k Population growth Human capital, h Nutrition/healthEducationOpennessGovernment Rule.
Inequality, Institutions and Long-Term Growth in Colombia Michael Clemens William Easterly Carlos Esteban Posada Banco de la República, Bogotá, Nov. 19,
Growth empirics or how do we use growth theory in practice Silvia Dal Bianco Advanced Macroeconomics Pavia, A.Y
1 Backtrack: the raw facts Income gaps are huge And they are not narrowing: Though some regions breaking through Others are falling further behind.
By Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, 2001
“The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson (2001)
Political institutions. I. Unbundling institutions, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) Two theories of the state 1. Contract theory: the state provides the legal.
Institutions and Development Emiko Nishii & Elisabeth Niendorf January 11th, 2010 University of Warsaw - MADE.
Firm Growth and Finance: Are Some Financial Institutions Better Suited to Early Stages of Development than Others? Robert Cull L. Colin Xu World Bank Conference.
Economics 3510 African Economic Development Spring 2010 Introduction Instructor: A. R. M. Ritter May 11, 2010.
Comparative Economic Development
Economics 3510 African Economic Development Spring 2009 Introduction Instructor: A. R. M. Ritter May 11, 2009.
Colonial Period: Contemporary Interpretations Lecture # 3 Week 2.
7 CHAPTER D YNAMIC P OWER P OINT ™ S LIDES BY S OLINA L INDAHL The Wealth of Nations and Economic Growth.
Determinants of Growth Danyang Xie Fall 2013 Outline A Tale of Two Nations: Philippines and South Korea Growth Makes a Difference How can a country grow.
Long-Run Economic Growth
UNDP Ukraine1 Investment Climate in Ukraine: Old and New Challenges Iryna Akimova, Chief Economic Advisor, UNDP Ukraine ABCDE, Amsterdam, th of May,
Measuring & Monitoring Governance in Developing Countries Stephen Knack The World Bank 2 nd International Roundtable Marrakesh, Feb
Stoiana Florentina - Macroeconomics and Inequality- Winter Term Presentation Stanley L. Engerman Kenneth L. Sokoloff.
Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven Webb and Barry R
Growth & Less Developed Countries The International Economy.
10th Class Attendance Sheet Audio Recorder on Review Legal Origin Exam –24 hour take home exam –Monday-Wednesday, April –Probably 3 documents.
Rethinking Bank Regulation James Barth Gerard Caprio Ross Levine.
1 CESifo Economic Studies Conference on Understanding the Chinese Economy 10 – 11 June 2005 CESifo Conference Centre, Munich India China: Diverging to.
Determinants of Economic Growth of Russian Regions O. Lugovoy The Institute for the Economy in Transition In collaboration with: I. Mazayev, D. Fomchenko,
Victor Polterovich, Vladimir Popov ACCUMULATION OF FOREX AND LONG TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH.
NS4053 Winter Term 2014 Country/Region Indices. Country Indices/Rankings I There are a number of organizations that provide rankings of countries based.
Growth, Initial Conditions, Law and Speed of Privatization in Transition Countries: 11 Years Later presented at Conference “Comparative Transitions: A.
10-1 Governance and Profitability Around the World Vince Hooper, Ah Boon Sim and Asfandyar Uppal School of Banking and Finance The University of New South.
Cumulative Causation: Stuck in a Trap Lack of social infrastructure Low payoff to skill  Little skill acquisition  Lack of social infrastructure Lack.
Competition Policy and Economic Development by Rughvir (Shyam) Khemani Advisor, Competition Policy Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency.
GOVERNANCE & ANTICORRUPTION An Introductory Course.
Jared Barnett David Alexander Nancy Du Varun Sharma.
Lecture 91 Risks in Foreign Investments I.Sources of Political Risk Macro Risks Micro Risks II. Management of Political Risk Assessing Political Risk Managing.
Political economy Lecture 3 Economic growth & institutions Jan Fałkowski Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw February-June 2010.
Openness in growth models  Introduction trade gains, conceptualize trade, trade policy example  Openness and growth what is openness (how to define it)
Aid, Policies and Growth Craig Burnside and David Dollar The American Economic Review September, 2000 AZIRIA Lemya & EL MALLAKH Nelly.
and Beyond: What research Directions on Corruption and governance? Daniel Kaufmann, WBI The World Bank Workshop.
NS4540 Winter Term 2015 Country Indices. Country Indices/Rankings I There are a number of organizations that provide rankings of countries based on factors.
Why Growth Rates Differ Chapter 8-3. Why Growth Rate Differ? A number of factors influence differences among countries in their growth rates.
Firm Size, Finance and Growth Thorsten Beck Asli Demirguc-Kunt Luc Laeven Ross Levine.
Overcoming the Resource Curse in African States: Examining the Effectiveness of the Developmental State Framework on Economic Development in Resource-Rich.
Growth accelerations and collapses. Highlights 1.Igniting growth requires a relatively narrow range of reforms, targeted at relaxing the “binding constraint”
Governance in Central and Eastern Europe Cheryl W. Gray Europe and Central Asia Region World Bank.
COUNTRY DATA POINTS CONNECTING THE DATA POINTS TO IMPROVING YOUR COUNTRIES STANDARD OF LIVING.
Copyright © 2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 2 Comparative Development: Differences and Commonalities among Developing Countries.
Competition Policy and Economic Growth: Evidence from Latin America Esteban Greco Diego Petrecolla Carlos A. Romero.
Section 7 - Module Economic Growth.
Development and Growth in Mineral-Rich Countries
Endogeneity and Instrumental variable estimation method
Development in Latin America NS4540 Winter Term 2018 Capt Pat Beville
Vilnius, Lithuania Monday, July 9, 2018.
Government’s Role in Economy
Jean-Pierre Chauffour Lead Economist, World Bank GWU, April 8, 2011
Structural Change: Pace, Patterns and Determinants
GOVERNANCE & ANTICORRUPTION
NS4540 Winter Term 2019 Latin America: Geography and the Colonial Legacy Beariz and Larrain, Ch 1.
Presentation transcript:

Institutions Über Alles North, Wallis, Weingast: Limited Access – Open Access – Doorstep conditions for transition Rajan: Rent Preservation – Beneficial changes blocked by vested interests Engerman & Sokoloff: Factor endowments  Institutions – Plantation economy  inequality  industrialization blocked – Hard-scrabble soil  family farms  open access  capitalism Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson: Institutions as Fundamental – Reversal of fortune – can’t fault geography – Settler mortality – Settler institutions  open access  capitalism Levine & Renelt: Openness YES/Policies NO! Sala-i-Martin: 2 million regressions – More things matter…but not gov’t stance/price distortion/ethnic…

Sala-i-Martin: 2 Million Growth Regressions… What matters? 22 of 59 variables …and policy indicators except OPENNESS do not matter Variables always in his growth regressions: – Initial Year GDP  convergence – Initial Year Life Expectancy; Initial year primary school enrollment Variables that “often” enter significantly in Sala-i-Martin’s growth regressions Regional variables: Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Latitude Political variables: Rule of law, Political Rights, Civil Liberties – Revolutions & coups/Wars hurt development – Gov’t spending in total or components don’t matter Religious variables: Confucian, Buddhist, Muslim help – Catholic, Protestant hurt Accumulation: Equipment investment, non-equipment investment – Found robust by Levine & Renelt Primary goods trap?: Primary goods/GDP hurts; Mining/GDP helps OPENNESS: Sach-Warner openness helps (found robust by Levine & Renelt) – Recall Lucas’ channel of convergence Other variables: Degree of capitalism (+)/Former Spanish Colony (-)

Easterly & Levine: Tropics, Germs and Crops Examine determinants of development (real gdp per capita), not growth Is it geography? – Tropical climate, landlocked location, commodity dependence – Geography championed by Sachs/Frankel & D. Romer (natural openness) Is it institutions? – Settler institutions vs. extractive institutions Protection of property rights Rule of law/lack of corruption… – AJR: Institutions proxied by germs (settler mortality) – ES: Institutions proxied by crops (sugar bad/wheat good) Do policies matter? Easterly’s priors: IMF/WB/UN policy advice pointless – Opposes Sachs Levine’s priors: Financial development…a “good” institution

Kaufmann Measures of Institutional Development Voice and accountability–citizens can choose their government, political rights, civil liberties, an independent press. Political stability / absence of violence—low likelihood gov’t overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. Government effectiveness—quality of public service delivery, competence and degree of politicization of civil servants Light regulatory burden— absence of government controls on goods markets, government interference in banking system, excessive bureaucratic controls on starting new businesses, excessive regulation of business and int’l trade. Rule of law—protection of persons and property against violence or theft, independent and effective judges, contract enforcement. Freedom from graft—use of public power for private gain, corruption. Easterly and Levine include protection of property rights index among institutional quality measures.

Easterly and Levine Variables Explaining y = real gdp per capita Institutions – Kaufmann index Endowments (“geography”) – Settler mortality – Latitude – Landlocked (or gravity model natural openness) – Crop and mineral dummy variables Policies – Openness to trade: Sachs-Warner classification – Distortion: Real exchange rate overvaluation – Inflation Other “exogenous” variables…possible determinants of y – Ethno linguistic fractionalization – Religion – Legal origin

Easterly and Levine Findings and Conclusions Endowments (“geography”) explain economic development (y) – Settler mortality (germs) particularly effective explanatory variable BUT Endowments also explain institutions and y is explained by institutional quality as predicted by endowments – This exogenous component of institutional quality remains significant even when other explanatory variables entered (ethnic, legal origin, religion) – Once exogenous institutions used to explain y, endowments themselves are not significant CONCLUDE: Endowments  Institutions  Economic Development What about policies? – Once y is explained by institutions, policy variables individually and together are insignificant CONCLUDE: Policies may affect growth over a decade (as found by other studies) Bad policies viewed as symptoms of bad institutions INSTITUTIONS MATTER FOR LONG-RUN DEVELOPMENT