DDOS Defense by Offense OFFENSE Presented by: Anup Goyal Aojan Su.

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Presentation transcript:

DDOS Defense by Offense OFFENSE Presented by: Anup Goyal Aojan Su

Objections  Several objections identified By Authors itself Bandwidth Envy Flash Crowds Variable bandwidth cost  Is It Practical in real Internet ??

Clients ’ upload capacity  Clients with limited upload capacity (dialup users) can not “ speak-up ”  They can ’ t increase their chance to obtain service. In worse case, they can suffer when everyone else speaks up.

Can ’ t detect malicious client  Even good clients need to flood the server to get service.  It could be much more difficult to detect attackers.

Access Link Congestion  If the access link of thinner is congested, legitimate clients would back off due to congestion control.  Attackers could ignore congestion control and send at higher capacity.

Edge Network Flooding  Good client ’ s flooding traffic effect edge networks by increased traffic volumes. potentially harming other flows.

Problem for good guys  No good way to accommodate client è le (good and bad) coming from the same location.  Good Client always loose while sharing a Bottleneck link.

Impact on Other Traffic THIS IS BAD !!!!

Problems Unaddressed/overlooked  Effect of low-rate attack not addressed Bad client also has spare bandwidth.  Assumptions hold because of nature of current network characteristics How to detect when these assumptions break? Switch off speak-up (automatically?) under these conditions. Effect of various traffic patterns? (i.e. heavy-tail distribution)

My Question  Are speak-up ’ s assumptions reasonable? “ The thinner is never congested ” ?  Impact on network good traffic amplifier? How much bandwidth will be wasted for dummy bytes?

Primary Focus on HTTP  Focus primarily on Web traffic and its properties (e.g. HTTP).  Does not mention its usefulness for any other situation or protocol.

Market Survey Missing  The researchers have not done a market survey, thus all their findings are theoretical.  Economic issue consideration is missing.

Extra hardware  There is extra hardware (the Thinner) that has to sit in front of any server we want to protect by Speak-Up.  Expensive  Single Point of Failure