Hiding Amongst the Clouds A Proposal for Cloud-based Onion Routing Nicholas Jones Matvey Arye Jacopo Cesareo Michael J. Freedman Princeton University.

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Presentation transcript:

Hiding Amongst the Clouds A Proposal for Cloud-based Onion Routing Nicholas Jones Matvey Arye Jacopo Cesareo Michael J. Freedman Princeton University

We

and

but...

and

CORCOR outing loud-based nion

Benefits, Risks, and Challenges  Potential benefits of cloud infrastructure  High performance  Adaptability to censorship  Economic challenges  New security problems

Benefits of Cloud Infrastructure Performance (latency, throughput) Censorship Resistance

Performance  Individual nodes are higher bandwidth  Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 5:00 P.M.7:00 P.M.8:00 P.M.11:00 P.M.12:00 A.M.2:00 A.M.

COR has higher throughput than Tor US Only US & International 7.6x speedup

Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor Datacenter Home 1-10 Mbps Sprint Level 3 AT&T Gbps

Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage X X X X

Benefits of Clouds  Higher performance  Elasticity to scale to demand  Multi-homing and scale makes eavesdropping difficult  Elasticity forces censors to make hard choices: collateral damage or unblocked access

Economics Cloud pricing is affordable for end users

Cost of running COR in the cloud  Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth Amazon EC2 Pricing  CPU is cheap  100+ users on a 34 ¢/hr node  Bandwidth is dominant cost  100MB as low as 1 ¢

Tor’s Total Bandwidth Cost in the Cloud Approximately 900 MB/s 376 TB/month COR Cost: $61,200/month

Security Challenges and Solutions Involved Parties and Trust Model Building Tunnels Paying for Tunnels Learning About Relays

Distributing Trust  Tor  Tunnels between volunteer relays  COR  Tunnels between clouds from different providers

Is that sufficient?  Should users pay cloud providers directly?  Not anonymous: Credit cards and Paypal leak info  Another layer of indirection: Anonymity Service Providers  Operate relays and pay cloud providers  Mask users’ identities  Accept anonymous payment for access

System Roles  Cloud Hosting Providers (CHPs)  Provide infrastructure for COR relays  Anonymity Service Providers (ASPs)  Run relays and directory servers  Sell tokens  Redeemable for XX MB of connectivity or XX amount of time

System Architecture Example Organizations used above are examples only Cloud Hosting Providers IP IP Anonymity Service Providers

Circuit Construction Must be Policy Aware  Two relays within each datacenter  Different entry and exit ASPs  Different entry and exit CHPs  ASP and CHP relays are contiguous within a circuit

Paying for Access  Users purchase tokens  Redeem tokens for access (bandwidth or time)  Chaum’s e-cash:  Cryptographically untraceable

How do users gain access?  Users need two things:  Tokens  COR Directory  Solution: Bootstrapping Network  Low speed  High Latency  Free

Adversaries enumerate and block ingress  Current technologies  Tor Bridges  Two separate problems:  COR Relays  High speed, low latency, not free  Bootstrapping  Low speed, high latency, free

Summary Tor COR Secure High Speed Dynamic Scaling Free Adaptive to censorship