Burcad Badeed: Somalia’s “Sea Bandits” Power Vacuum or Alternative?

Piracy - a Definition “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft..” -- UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

Varieties of Piracy State-affiliated: co-optation (1600s China), rent-seeking (Barbary States), and privateering (Francis Drake) Absence of political authority but also an alternative form of power

History of Somalia Siad Barre dictatorship rebellions in Puntland and Somaliland Civil War and intervention ( ) Ethiopian invasion ( ) Civil War continues; failed state

Beginnings Vacuum of formal state filled by others “coast guards” with fishing licenses : hijacking of large vessels Today, only 6.5% against fishing vessels Foreign fishing vessels protected by fees payment to pirate groups

Networks of Authority Small-time fisherman model no longer viable Consolidation into larger networks to mobilize skills and resources Piracy is developed, predictable, business Those who profit become new sources of political and economic power

Afweyne Network South Central Somalia Distributions of payments through local patron-client relations of lineage groups/clans Generate conflict with old elders/elites

Puntland - Official Collusion Maxamed Faroole, President Ilkajiir, Interior Minister Government officials = intelligence source

Why Piracy?

Structural Causes Extreme poverty coupled with high unemployment Illegal foreign fishing ($300 million a year) depleting tuna stocks Toxic dumping off Somali Coast

Rational Choice Piracy is a rational response to a series of opportunities in the local setting The opportunities are absent political authority, availability of inputs, good location The risk-reward structure is in the pirate networks’ favor

Business Model Profit margins are substantial: revenue of $50-$130 million annually in ransom Set dividends for all participants Payoffs to local political leaders factored into costs

Political Authority Weak and compliant state (TFG) Collaboration from local authorities Social acquiescence

Implications LOCAL: Piracy based economy; undermining authority REGIONAL: Increased weapon smuggling; increase in fishermen income (Kenya) GLOBAL: Threat to international commerce; Increased costs

International Response Lack of authority; coordination Naval response ignores root causes Merchant shipping adopt low-cost solutions Slow response to shift in pirate strategy

Attacks in 2006

Attacks in 2008

Attacks in 2009

Legal Authority Legal limitations Less than 50% of captured pirates prosecuted “We discharged out international obligation. Others shied away form doing so and we cannot bear the burden of the international responsibility.” - Kenya 2010 Unintended consequences: private security

Conclusions Somali piracy results from authority vacuum, but also creates new power structures International neglect - nation-building unrealistic Raising risks/costs for pirate backers Time for a new UN Resolution? Long-term: build local capacity