Session Announcement Protocol Colin Perkins University College London.

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Presentation transcript:

Session Announcement Protocol Colin Perkins University College London

Status In Washington DC we thought this was ready for last call, after minor revision This was conducted earlier this year and showed that a number of open issues remain Two more revisions of the draft have addressed some of these –draft-ietf-mmusic-sap-v2-06.txt We have to resolve the rest today

Summary of changes (I) Timer reconsideration algorithm updated to match RTCP Remove references to "client" in the text, now talks about SAP announcers and listeners only. Clarify that TTL scoping is discouraged –Use administrative scoping instead Clarify section on session deletion

Summary of changes (II) Remove the optional timeout field from the packet format It was only used for encrypted SAP, for those cases where a proxy didn't have the decryption key. We now rely on either: –the receiver of an announcement understands the payload, and can derive the session timeout from it (common case) –the announcer sends explicit deletion packets –the receiver will timeout an announcement

Summary of changes (III) Clarify why we use application level authentication, not IPsec –very little IPsec deployment –unclear how to setup the necessary authentication infrastructure for multicast IPsec, when the sender doesn’t know the receivers Instead we leverage application level authentication, with well defined mechanisms –PGP, CMS

Summary of changes (IV) Make all authentication schemes optional –Previously, authentication was optional but if implemented PGP had to be supported –Now it’s optional, with no mandated algorithms PGP and CMS are specified

Open issue How do we perform authentication? Authenticated payload –Uniform authentication mechanism per payload format Authenticated transport –SAP is payload independent, this allows us to authenticate the sender of any form of announcement...and prevent spoofing of deletion messages... Proposal: include authentication in SAP, separate development of payload authentication if desired.

What next? Resolve authentication issues A new working group last call, for experimental