PPD: Platform for Private Data Mohit Tiwari with Krste Asanović, Dawn Song, Petros Maniatis*, Prashanth Mohan, Charalampos Papamanthou, Elaine Shi, Emil.

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Presentation transcript:

PPD: Platform for Private Data Mohit Tiwari with Krste Asanović, Dawn Song, Petros Maniatis*, Prashanth Mohan, Charalampos Papamanthou, Elaine Shi, Emil Stefanov, Nguyen Tran UC Berkeley Intel*

The Age of Big Data Plentiful, and Private

Rich Applications Time Richness

Vulnerable software (Un) Intentional Misuse Insider Attacks Need Data Protection as a Service

Ideal: Privacy Preserving Cloud End User Developer privacy evidence privacy policy API App Cloud provider

Ideal: Platform for Private Data Data protection as a service Users – control access to their data – access third-party applications Developers – save resources, need not be security experts – access personal data hitherto unavailable

Challenge #1 Untrusted applications own users’ data. End User Developer API Cloud provider

Challenge #2 Novice Users

PPD: Platform for Private Data End User Developer privacy evidence intuitive privacy policy API App PPD Cloud provider App + Guest OS private data vault sealed container

Outline of this talk PPD: Platform for Private Data PPD Architecture PPD Prototype and Evaluation

PPD Applications user initiated sharing

End-User Hardware with TPM PPD Cloud Provider Untrusted Storage Trusted User Interface Protected Channel ACLs idorw A.taxAAA PPD Architecture: Users

Application Container App Untrusted Application End-User Developer Hardware with TPM PPD Cloud Provider PPD Controller and ACL Manager Cleartext data Untrusted Storage Trusted User Interface PPD Architecture: Applications uni-directional per-capsule: RW per-user: R all, W flagged

App Untrusted Application End-Users Developers Hardware with TPM PPD Cloud Provider PPD Controller and ACL Manager Dedup, Caching, Replication,… PPD Storage Proxy App Storage Container Integrity check Untrusted Storage Trusted User Interface PPD Architecture: Storage

PPD Timeline #1: User attests Client User Client Cloud Server TPM.send(hw id) Attest(code) Trusted PPD Server Response (result) Separation kernel on client checked sitekey Client attested Alice

PPD Timeline #2: User launches App User Client Cloud Server Alice Launch trusted UI Authentication Trusted PPD Kernel PPD UI, Control App + Guest OS Launch application Trusted PPD Kernel PPD UI, Control App + Guest OS App communication

User and Developer Interface User creates data capsules – personal by default and decides who to share it with – does not specify a lattice of security labels PPD System provides trusted UI to user – User conveys change of ACLs to PPD Developers can request – Application Containers: per-user, per-data-capsule – Storage Containers: per-application, per-system

Outline of this talk PPD: Platform for Private Data PPD Architecture PPD Prototype and Evaluation

PPD Building Blocks Data capsules – E.g. “tax documents”, “thanksgiving ” – System assigns ACL as private by default Protected Containers – Linux containers (LXC), Copy-on-write FS (UnionFS). – Stops all explicit communication, except channels. – Hardware side channels, timing leaks out of scope

PPD Building Blocks Protected Channels – iptables firewall rules for LXC containers – Encryption, integrity-checking (TLS/SSL for network) – Trusted Channel from User to PPD to change ACLs Storage Proxies – Key-value proxy: put, get, and setACL interface – File-system proxy: fuse-based layer on key-val proxy

PPD Building Blocks PPD Controller – manages containers and channels – dynamically creates containers based on user or application requests – assigns iptables rules for all containers Remote Attestation – Intel TXT, TPM v1.2 – attest correct PPD code on untrusted machines

PPD Applications Friendshare: online storage with de- duplication (like Dropbox) Git: repository version control server Etherpad: online, collaborative editing (like Google Docs)

PPD Prototype TLS Proxy Ether Pad Controller ACL Store K/V ProxyFS Proxy DeDup Secure Block Device Storage Friend Share TPM Chip (Remote Attestation) LXC Containers ACL changes Linux Kernel IPTables Application Layer Storage Layer End Users

Eval: Porting Apps for PPD Scripts to install and configure apps in containers Application v. Storage containers – Friendshare Application: Scan directories, chunk files, change ACL Storage: De-duplication – Git, Etherpad Application: entire functionality

Eval: PPD Application Performance Minimal effect on Friendshare throughput Small Requests: 10 filenames Big Requests: 10KB images

PPD Application Performance Minimal effect on Friendshare latency

Summary PPD: New Data-Centric Cloud Platform – user controlled sharing – rich, mostly legacy applications PPD Architecture – untrusted application and storage components PPD Prototype and Evaluation – small performance and porting cost

The PPD Team

Current and Future Work Applications – medical applications, business data analytics Client-side PPD on Android – light-weight containers and channels on Nexus S Application initiated sharing – differential privacy

Related Approaches DIFC – PPD does not do fine-grained information flow tracking – Constrained containers + Dev API = simple system Capabilities – Can be used to implement containers and channels – Re-write legacy applications Android Security – Static, Coarse-grained permissions – User does not own data

Conclusion End User Developer privacy evidence privacy policy API App PPD Cloud provider

Backups

PPD Insights Co-design UI and System software – User decisions are intuitive (“share doc with Bob”) – System manages untrusted apps and private data Developer API – Per-user functionality v. Cross-user Optimizations Privacy: Data owners’ access control policy – Apps ‘see’ data only in sealed containers

Summary

PPD Evaluation: Etherpad

PPD Evaluation: Git

PPD: Platform for Private Data PPD is a data-centric cloud platform – rich, untrusted applications – strong privacy guarantees for end user PPD will spark innovation – through apps from small developers – making more private data available

PPD Design Simplest: User + PPD – Data capsules + ACL: (UI) Next: User + Application (front-end) + PPD – Per-user, Sharing Next: + Backend Storage – Rich optimizations, integrity checked