Pi Sigma Alpha: political science honor society Membership requirements Applicant must be a junior, senior, or graduate student. Undergraduates must have completed 15 credits of political science; graduate students must have completed 9. Applicant must have a minimum 3.0 political science GPA. Must be in top third of graduating class. GPA cutoff = ~ 3.3 Interested: contact PSA: – Facebook: UOPiSigmaAlpha – Web: oregonpsa.weebly.com –

Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design Conflict/cooperation: if relevant actors prefer outcomes of conflict more than viable alternatives: NO institution Capacities 1: if capacity for BAD behavior depends on others: REGULATORY institution which LIMITS membership to capable states and COMMON obligations to ban behaviors that would allow others to engage in bad behavior Capacities 2: if some actors lack CAPACITY for GOOD behavior: PROGRAMMATIC institution which EXPANDS membership and DIFFERENTIATED obligations (donors/recipients) and RESPONSE of capacity enhancements (not rewards/sanctions)

Incentives 1: – Coordination: REGULATORY institution with COMMON obligations and NO response system – Up/Downstream: REGULATORY institution with DIFFERENTIATED obligations and LINKAGE response system – Collaboration: REGULATORY institution with COMMON obligations and RETALIATORY (“reversion”) response system Incentives 2: if strong incentives to cheat: clearly specified INSPECTION and RESPONSE rules (likely for collaboration & upstream/downstream but NOT coordination) Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design

Information: if little INFORMATION about consequences of behavior: PROGRAMMATIC or PROCEDURAL institution with weak information / response systems Norms: if effort by some to instill NORMS in others: GENERATIVE institution has WEAK information/response system (or sanctions if strong pre-institutional norm against behavior) Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design

Violation Tolerance: strong concern about violations: STRONG and SPECIFIC inspection and response system (or easy withdrawal) Inherent Transparency: if easy to know what other actors have done: WEAK INSPECTION procedures Response Incentives: if WEAK incentives to respond to violations: WEAK INSPECTION and RESPONSE procedures Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design

Security Basic problem: independent decisions lead to increasing costs yet greater risks of/in war If no agreement, arms race continues Key features: collaboration problem, no incapacity (or, in NPT, incapacity helps), no transparency, violation intolerant, strong response incentives

Security: Predictions based on Problem Structure Institutional type: reg, proc, prog, gen Membership Primary rules – Common or differentiated – Specificity Information system: self/monitor/verify Response system

Problem Structure, Institutional Design, & Security Non-Proliferation Treaty Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Q1: Conflict/deadlockCooperation possible Q2: Number of actorsMany: open membershipTwo: closed membership Q3: CapacityDiffer: differentiated obligationsSame: common obligations Q4: IncentivesUp/downstream: linkageCollaboration: regulatory institution Q5: InformationProblem understood Q6: ValuesLittle conflict/not important Violation toleranceLow: strong inspection/response Inherent transparencyNo: strong inspection Response incentivesStrong: linkage as responseStrong: withdrawal

Arms Control Treaties Biological Weapons Convention – Membership (Article XIV) – open to all states – Primary Rule System (Article I, II, III) – Information System (Article VII) - rudimentary – Response System (Article VII) – rudimentary INF Treaty – Membership – US and USSR only – Primary Rule System – Elimination ProtocolElimination Protocol – Information System – Inspections ProtocolInspections Protocol – Response System – Withdrawal (Article XV)Withdrawal (Article XV)

Trade Basic problem: free trade zone requires – Common market: Equalize and lower tariffs within – Customs union: Equalize tariffs without If no agreement, protectionist pressures lead to increasing tariffs on import-competing goods and reciprocal tariffs from others Key features: collaboration problem, no incapacity, inherent transparency, violation tolerant, strong response incentives

Trade: Predictions based on Problem Structure Institutional type: reg, proc, prog, gen Membership Primary rules – Common or differentiated – Specificity Information system: self/monitor/verify Response system

Problem Structure, Institutional Design, & Trade GATT/ WTOMercosur Q1: Conflict/deadlockCooperation possible Q2: Number of actorsMany: open membershipTwo: closed membership Q3: CapacitySame: common obligations Q4: IncentivesCollaboration: regulatory institution Q5: InformationProblem understood (not impt) Q6: ValuesNot important Violation toleranceHigh: weak inspection/responseLow: strong inspection/response Inherent transparencyYes: weak inspection Response incentivesStrong: reciprocity as response