The Limits to Europeanization Kevin Featherstone LSE

The limits… Ontological and empirical; Problems with the independent variable; Problems with the dependent variable; Determining the intervening variables.

The independent variable? The source of the stimulus? What is ‘Europe’ ? We attribute diverse qualities to ‘Europe’ – without clear definition. Explanatory rigour v. popular discourse. ‘Europe’ has a meaning greater than specific EU obligations. Delineate ‘transnational’ European pressures: –Multi-dimensional: socio-cultural; economic; political. –Actors: perceptions, understandings, norms, and values. –Is there a European ‘model’? What is there to import into the domestic system? Coherence and consistency.

Identifying the subject… Who are ‘we’? –No ‘European ‘demos’: with whom do we identify? Frames direction, purpose. –Inclusion, exclusion: defining the boundaries of ‘Europe’ – historically, geographically, culturally, etc. (shifting conceptions, cross- cutting cleavages). Turkey? –A changing ‘we’: multi-ethnic, multicultural.

The EU as the independent variable ‘EU-isation’: EU explains domestic change. EU attributes: domestic opinion can ascribe to EU qualities beyond matters of legal competence. Expectations, understandings, tactics: e.g. identity cards, privatisation. What is shared in the EU? –Shifting understandings of the EU’s mission. –Post Cold War: EU lacks a shared ‘narrative’ (T G Ash). Affects domestic response & impacts.

Linking mechanisms vary: Form of stimulus: ‘hard law’ (regulations, directives etc.) versus ‘soft law’ (open method of coordination / Lisbon 2000 agenda). Differences of ‘commitment device’: e.g. EMU v. Lisbon. Direction of stimulus: not just ‘top-down’ – EU impact on domestic level – also ‘bottom-up’ – national inputs at EU level. Interactive linkages. 2 complex arenas: EU institutional setting & domestic institutional setting. Ontological distinctions between structure & agency ?

‘Causality’? Independent variable: common EU commitments, stimuli. Intervening variable: domestic ‘institutional’ conditions frame responses & explain divergent outcomes. Dependent variable: domestic adaptation, shifts. Comparison between member states.

The dependent variable: what is changing? Politics: ideas (beliefs), interests, strategies. Polity: administrative adjustments, change in processes and institutions. Policy: beliefs, agendas, content, implementation. Effects: breadth/scope?; depth?; permanent? Asymmetrical empowerment.

Explaining divergent outcomes: intervening variables Role of ‘Agency’ - intentional/unintentional (Ioakimides). Discourse: legitimating adaptation to EU (Schmidt, 2002). Role of ‘Structure’: follow ‘new institutionalism’. –‘misfit’ between EU & domestic (Knill & Lenschow, 1998). Adaptation most likely when EU does not challenge core structures & practices. –‘push-pull’ (Boerzel, 2000): adaptation depends on misfit & mobilisation of domestic actors in support. –‘Reform capacity’ (A. Heritier et al, 2001): a typology of domestic conditions producing high/low capacity for change.

Domestic Vetoes Hypotheses: –Distances between veto players & their number will determine adaptation (Tsebelis, 2002). –the higher the number of veto points, the less likely is adaptation (Heritier & Knill, 2000). Distinguish between: –Individual & collective veto players (Tsebelis, 2002) –Competitive (diffuse) / collective (consensual) veto points (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998) –Formal (de jure) / informal (de facto) veto points (Heritier & Knill, 2000).

Path dependence of domestic system: resistence to change Corporatist model – interest mediation. –Greek exceptionalism: state corporatism’;‘disjointed’; ‘parentela pluralism’. Clientelism; rent-seeking. ‘Varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001). –Different institutional types shape economic performance & responses to external pressures. –Distinguish: liberal market economies (UK); coordinated market economies (Germany; Sweden).

Greek exceptionalism? ‘Mediterranean capitalism’ ?(Amable, 2003); high regulation, low competition. state capitalist ? (Schmidt, 2004); –State mediates inter-firm relations; centrality of state in econ dev.; heavy regulation; adversarial labour relations. ‘mixed market economies’ (Molina & Rhodes, 2005). –Unions & employers: strong, but fragmented. Problems in delivering collective goods, sustaining coordination.

Identifying the constraints… Crude paradox in Greece: general discourse v. opposition on distributional issues. Low state institutional capabilities (implementation). Conflicting political interests (electoral, clientelistic) undermines policy leadership. Disjointed, skewed union / employer representation. Absence of stable social dialogue. Weakness of technocratic policy legitimation.

The research challenge: ‘Europe’ ‘Unpack’ conceptual frame: –Clear hypotheses: identifying the linking mechanisms between EU stimuli and domestic response. Distinguish actors & structures. [Also assess depth & scope; permanence.] –Causality – not coincidence, co-variance. –Distinguish EU from other external pressures. –‘Europeanisation’: a predisposition to find effects.

The research challenge: domestic ‘model’ What ‘variety of capitalism’ in Greece? Hypothesis: structures interests, behaviour and produces domestic resistance. Show link with: –State-centric. Heavy market regulation. –Structure of firms: few big, many small. –Employment pattern: importance of agriculture & self- employment; few part-time. Black economy. High labour costs. –Clientelism, corruption. Stress here is on rational self interest, not values.

The limits to Europeanisation: Avoid fuzzy, aggregate assumptions of EU links & effects. Primacy of EU impact? Rigour of research design. Resilience to domestic change: rational interests drawn from current ‘model’. Greek exceptionalism explains membership behaviour? Changing identities, attributes of ‘Europe’. Divergent national perceptions, expectations of obligations, opportunities with direct/indirect links to EU competences. Issues here of governability & coordination.