Public opinion and elections POLI 352A

Following up on welfare-state issues Work incentives in social-democratic vs. liberal vs. corporatist welfare states –Atkinson and Mogenson (1993) Welfare and Work Incentives in Northern Europe –Not much effect on work incentives  Generous benefits don’t seem to lead to less work  Employment rates about same in U.S. and Sweden (higher than Germany, Italy, France)

Following up on welfare-state issues Quality of life across countries –UN Human Development Indicators measure life expectancy, knowledge and education, and GDP per capita 1.Norway 2.Australia 4. Canada 6. The Netherlands 7.Sweden 8.France 12. Finland 13. United States

Explaining policy variation: What voters want? If democracy is rule by the people, then differences in policy choice should reflect differences in what people want. Democracy is a relationship of delegation –Voters are principals –Elected officials are their agents

Mechanisms of voter control Electoral turnover –Replace politicians whose policies we don’t like with those whose policies we do BUT it needn’t come to this… Government responsiveness –Fearing electoral punishment, governments respond to voters’ wishes

Median

Median voter theorem Anthony Downs: If voters’ policy views fall along a continuum, and if they vote for party with closest policy position, then parties in a two-party race will take the policy position of the median (middle) voter.  Variations in policy should reflect variations in view of the median voter.

Why voters don’t always rule Information and attention Inconsistent opinions Strategies of blame avoidance Imperfect electoral competition

Information and attention The median-voter model assumes voters know: 1.Policies government has enacted 2.Policies opposition advocates 3.Effect of government policies 4.Effect of opposition policy proposals

Information and attention Why so little political knowledge? Attention is a scarce resource Politics and policy are complex –Good info is costly Political ignorance may be rational

Information and attention Mechanisms that allow inattentive voters to control their government: Shortcuts –Take cues from others –Selective attention –Ideology and party ID Mediating organizations –Unions –Religious organizations –Parties

Inconsistent opinions People simultaneously have conflicting views on policy issues. Framing effects –Can politicians manipulate opinion?

Strategies of blame avoidance Individuals have a negativity bias –Care more about what politicians do to them than what politicians do for them  Politicians try to avoid blame - Through policy design and policy process

Strategies of blame avoidance Delay the pain –Inflict pain after next election Pass the buck –Delegate tough choices to someone else Hide the costs

Imperfect electoral competition: 2000 Election Liberals Canadian Alliance Progressive Conservative Vote share (%) Seats in Commons

Imperfect electoral competition: 2000 Election Liberals Canadian Alliance Progressive Conservative Vote share (%) Seats in Commons

Imperfect electoral competition Electoral rules may distort results Parties may not differ on issues  No choice

Complex link between voters and policy Politicians want to be reelected BUT Voters may pay little attention Voters may have malleable views (framing) Voters can be fooled (blame avoidance)

Complex link between voters and policy Electoral rules may hamper competition But But elections may still matter

An irony: When elections matter When median voter is strong, elections don’t change policy much. Parties close together But policy tied to public opinion  A TOOL FOR CROSS-NATIONAL EXPLANATION. When median voter is weak, elections make a bigger difference: Parties further apart Electoral turnover  ideological change in government But then public opinion’s a weaker cross-national explanation. It’s parties’ ideologies.