Democratie consociative et fédéralisme belge Dave Sinardet Universiteit Antwerpen

CONSOCIATIONALISM - Conceptual confusion and conceptual stretching -From consociationalism to consensus democracy -From pillars to groups -Consociationalism and federalism - Model of conflict resolution for divided societies -Non-majoritarian -Rights to groups (instead of individuals) -Power sharing between elites / ‘elite accommodation’ -Elites represent their own group -Discouragement of mass interaction -Varying degree of formalisation Four distinguishing features (Lijphart, 1977) sharing executive power among representatives of different sub-groups sharing executive power among representatives of different sub-groups Mutual veto (on important issues) Mutual veto (on important issues) Segmental autonomy Segmental autonomy Proportionality (in representation) Proportionality (in representation)

BELGIAN CONSOCIATIONALISM Introduced in linguistic matters in the ‘first state reform’ of 1970 and pursued afterwards  Minority rights for francophones on the national level (and for Dutch-speakers in the Brussels district / region) - Division of national MP’s in two language groups - Special majority laws - Alarm bell procedure - Parity in Council of Ministers and decision by consensus - Similar mechanisms in Brussels district (parity – 1 in district college, alarm bell, …)  Language group logic in electoral reforms (EP, Senate, Brussels, …) => MP’s represent their own community => MP’s represent their own community => Mutual veto of the two communities and obligation to decide in consensus => Mutual veto of the two communities and obligation to decide in consensus => on the federal level, Flemish & Francophone language groups have to work within conscociational institutions => on the federal level, Flemish & Francophone language groups have to work within conscociational institutions => find a majority in other language group for institutional reform => find at least a minority of ¼ in other language group for other reforms

BELGIAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS OF 2007 Illustration of consociational logic (separation of groups and representation of groups by own elites) - no federal elections but ‘regional’ elections - ‘regional’ parties (linguistically split party system) - ‘regional voters’ (electoral system largely not crossing language borders) - ‘regional campaigns’ - ‘regional media’ (absence of Belgian media and public sphere) => two ‘regional election results’ put together to form a federal coalition

BELGIAN POLITICAL CRISIS OF Perverse effects of constitutional logic (elite accomodation falters) - efficiency problem due to polarised positions and ‘instrumental federalism’ => aggravated by incongruence between levels => aggraveted by lack of reformist dynamic => aggravated by distanciation within party families - democratic deficit due to lack of electoral accountability Partial reappraisal of consociational logic? => from instrumental to efficient and democratic federalism? => debate on ‘federal electoral district’ => debate on ‘federal electoral district’