Samsara: Honor Among Thieves in Peer-to-Peer Storage Landon P. Cox and Brian D. Noble University of Michigan.

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Presentation transcript:

Samsara: Honor Among Thieves in Peer-to-Peer Storage Landon P. Cox and Brian D. Noble University of Michigan

Samsara  From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia  Sa ṅ sāra or Sa ṃ sāra (Sanskrit: संसार )  Literally means "continuous flow"  Is the cycle of birth, life, death, rebirth or reincarnation within many Eastern religions

Paper overview  Proposes an incentive mechanism motivating participants in a P2P distributed file system to contribute as much space as they consume  Addresses the tragedy of the commons  Requires each peer that requests storage from another peer to hold a claim for same amount of storage  Claims can be exchanged

The tragedy of the commons  Assume a group of herders that a common pasture, on which they are entitled to let their cows graze  To maximize his/her personal benefit, each herder will put as many cows as it can on the common pasture  As a result, the common pasture becomes overgrazed and useless  Happened to the Boston Common

Boston common

Introduction  P2P file systems have many advantages  Require users to consume storage according to their contribution  Otherwise system will collapse  Solution is a mechanism enforcing "storage fairness"  Incentive mechanism

Extant solutions  A trusted third-party enforcing quotas  Requires a centralized administration  Letting people buy and sell storage space  Requires a trusted clearance infrastructure  Using certified identities and trusted keys  Requires a trusted certification authority  Enforcing total symmetry within pairs of peers  Unpractical

Samsara key idea (I)  Manufacture symmetric relations  through claim forwarding  All exchanges of data for claims form symmetric contracts  Each node periodically checks the other for compliance  Done in a probabilistic fashion  When a node breaches the contract, other node is free to drop the data of its partner

Samsara key idea (II)  Nodes can forward claims rather than honoring them  Still remain responsible for the claims they have forwarded  Mechanism penalizes unresponsive nodes in a probabilistic fashion  A node suffering a short outage may lose some replicas of its data

Background  Samsara is an add-on to Pastiche a P2P cooperative backup system  To be discussed later  Built itself on top of Pastry network Pastiche SamsaraPastry OS + Disks

Overall design  Objective is equal exchange  If A stores data for B then B must store an equal-size claim for B  If B discards A’s claim then A can discard B’s data  Equal exchange is enforced by periodic queries  Not answering a query is a sufficient reason to have you data dropped

The problem  This simple claim model punishes nodes too severely for transient failures  New approach  Is probabilistic  Takes into account transient failures  When a node fails to answer a query, each of is replica sites drops data with some probability

Claim construction (I)  Claims are “incompressible placeholders”  Computing a claim requires  a secret passphrase P  a secret symmetric key K  and a location in storage space

Claim construction (II)  Assuming we have 512-byte claims  The first claim C 0 would contain  Twenty-five 20-bit hashes h i = SHA1(P, i) where P is the secret pass phrase and i the hash index  First 12 bits of next hash in sequence all encrypted with the symmetric key K C 0 = {h 0, h 1, …, first 12 bits of h 25 } K

Claim construction (III)  Successive claims are built using repeating the process C 1 = {h 26, h 27, …, first 12 bits of h 51 } K C i = {h j, h j+1, …, first 12 bits of h j+25 } K where j = 26i

Answering claim queries  Can be done with a single SHA1 hash  Querying party provides  Unique value h 0  List of objects to verify  Responding party  Append h 0 to first object O 0 in list and compute h 1 = SHA1(O 0, h 0 )  Recursively computes h i+1 = SHA1(O i, h i )  Returns last h j

Example (I)

Example B has claim β 1 on A and B has claim γ 1 on B

Example Node B does not have enough space to hold claim γ1

Example Node B forwards its claim for space on node A to node C

Claim forwarding  If a node X  has a claim ξ on another node Y and  owns a claim ζ to a third node Z  It can forward its claim ζ to node Y  Everything works fine until a node fail

Failures in dependency chains

 Before failure,  B stores data for A,  C stores data for B  …  E stores data for D and hold a claim ε 1 on A  When C fails and stop answering queries from B,  B uses it storage rights on A and replaces claim ε 1 by its own claim β 1

Failures in dependency chains  After that we have a cascade of damaging actions  A fails to answer queries from E  E holds D responsible for loss of claim ε 1 and discards the data it had stored for D  D loses its backup data on E even though it had always operated in a correct fashion  Forwarding claims increases the risk of data losses

Failures in dependency cycles

 The effect of a failure is much less dramatic when we have a dependency cycle, where  B stores data for A,  C stores data for B  …  E stores data for D  A stores data for E

Failures in dependency cycles  When C fails and stop answering queries from B,  B uses it storage rights on A and requests it to store its claim β 1  Since A stores data for E, it can forward claim β 1 to E  Since E stores data for D, it can forward claim β 1 to E  E keeps claim β 1 because it has data on E

Evaluation  Samsara is faster than scp  Most chain are short as long as there is free space  Great news!  Nodes should forward claims in a very conservative fashion to minimize data losses