© Michael Lacewing Moral motivation as natural disposition Michael Lacewing

Hume The foundation of morality is a feeling of approval/disapproval –‘That which pronounces characters praiseworthy or blameable depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species’ Praise of a person always attaches to happiness and satisfaction society receives from his presence and actions (utility)

Why are we pleased by utility? Approval is not based on self-interest –we approve of things that seem to have nothing to do with our interests – and a real feeling can’t arise from an imaginary interest; –we can distinguish affection for virtue and private advantage – and can respect it in enemies; –we try to persuade others without referring to their self-interest

Sympathy Approval is based on sympathy We are clearly moved by effects of misery; can we be indifferent to its causes? And likewise with happiness From sympathy with those affected by the action, we approve or disapprove of its motive

Sympathy and self-interest But can sympathy overcome self-interest? There is no fundamental conflict: –‘Are we apprehensive lest those social affections interfere… with private utility, and cannot be gratified, without some important sacrifice of honour and advantage? If so, we are but ill- instructed in the nature of the human passions, and are more influenced by verbal distinctions than by real differences.’(Enquiry, 230)

Can morality be based on sympathy? Sympathy is stronger for those we know and love, but moral judgment treats everyone as equal Hume agrees; to generate moral judgments, we must render our feelings ‘more public and social’ This can involve reasoning

Moral authority Can sympathy explain our saying ‘you must do this’? Can’t someone simply reply that they don’t care about sympathy? Yes - we can’t argue someone into being moral But anyone completely without sympathy is a sociopath

Morality beyond sympathy According to Hume, we approve of what is pleasurable and useful, and disapprove of what is not But what about ideas of self-denial, self-sacrifice and penitence? –Hume rejects them