Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management Lev Ratnovski Bank of England & University of Amsterdam
2June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Liquidity Risk A solvent bank cannot refinance Stylized facts (recent events) Solvency concerns 1991, Citibank and Standard Chartered (HK) 1998, Lehman Brothers 2002, Commerzbank Strain in wholesale finance 2006, BAWAG, 5% retail withdrawals
3June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Liquidity and Transparency Two ways to manage liquidity risk: Liquidity buffer of short-term assets Transparency mechanisms that facilitates communication of solvency info enable refinancing Both - strategic ex-ante decisions Optimal choices, interaction, policy implications
4June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Strategic Transparency Invest today into ability to borrow tomorrow Transparency: ex-ante Disclosure: ex-post – info release Uncertain credibility / effectiveness Examples: Subordinated debt Risk management / external oversight Streamlining LCFIs Commitment to credible disclosure Citicorp 1987: provisions $3bn, positive reaction
5June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Strategic Transparency Imperfect Country determinants Industry effects – externalities / coordination Many “everyday” beneficial effects Better screening / monitoring Lower funding costs Most pronounced in unforeseen shocks Highest asymmetric information
6June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Main results Banks can combine liquidity and transparency in risk management Liquidity – small shocks, complete Transparency – all shocks, partial Banks may under-invest in both Leverage (or LOLR or externalities) Regulation complicated by multitasking Liquidity requirements can compromise transparency choices
7June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Policy Solvency is not enough Asymmetric info Liquidity risk Liquidity regulation If incorrect, can compromise transparency Extra emphasis on transparency beneficial
8June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Set-up Liquidity risk driven by asymmetric information Wholesale refinancing for known solvent banks Bank has a valuable long-term project Small probability of 0 return Does not prevent initial funding Intermediate refinancing Exogenous random withdrawal Most states – bank confirmed solvent, investors willing to refinance Risk: negative signal (possible for a solvent bank), no refinancing
9June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Economy Multiple competitive investors Endowed with money Lend at 1 risk-free interest A bank with an investment project Date 0: Investment Date 1: Refinancing Date 2: Returns, per unit invested:X w.p. 1–s 0 w.p. s (s small) A bank does not borrow more than 1 at date 0
10June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Intermediate Refinancing – date 1 Random withdrawal, L<1 or 1 w.p. ½ Uninformed depositors Maturing term liabilities Noisy solvency signal Fundamentals: solvent 1–s, insolvent s solvent Probability 1–s–q: correct signal “solvent” Outsiders willing to refinance possibly insolvent Probability s+q: “possibly insolvent” High posterior insolvency s /(s+q) > s Outsiders unwilling to refinance, incl q solvent banks
11June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency 1–s–qsq InsolventSolvent 1–s Positive signal, known solvent Solvent, but unable to refinance Negative signal, pooled together s
12June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Hedging Liquidity buffer Invest L into short-term assets Covers small outflows internally Not suitable for large outflows Complete insurance against small shocks Transparency Invest T to establish communication mech-ms Helps resolve uncertainty, refinance any shocks Effective only with probability t<1 Partial insurance against any shocks
13June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Transparency Effectiveness t Probability of successful communication Exogenous to bank’s decision Determinants Financial development Market size / liquidity Other banks – externalities (Admati and Pfheiderer, 2000) or coordination
14June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Optimal choices Liquidity and transparency are costly hedges When costs are sufficiently low… Banks can optimally combine liquidity and transparency in risk management Liquidity – small shocks, complete Transparency – large shocks, partial
15June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Distortion Banks are leveraged Can under-invest in both liquidity and transparency Alternative set-ups possible (LOLR rents or systemic externalities)
16June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Regulation Liquidity is verifiable impose ratios Transparency ? Multi-tasking Liquidity requirements can compromise transparency choices Impose “too much” liquidity on transparent banks, get liquidity only & exposure to larger shocks
17June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Contribution Novel model of liquidity risk Closest: Chari and Jagannathan, 1988 Consumer runs under asymmetric information Uninformed observe a withdrawal May be not information-based Amplification of liquidity withdrawals No refinancing Our approach Wholesale funding under asymmetric information Downplay withdrawals: Known solvent can refinance, Goodfriend and King, 1988 Refinancing problem: Imprecise info of informed investors How to prove solvency? Liability-side liquidity risk, but no bank runs Reflects flight to quality
18June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Is cash negative debt? Acharya at al., 2006: future access to finance is uncertain Financial constraints Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Paravisini, 2006 Jointly determined by liquidity and transparency Empirical implications
19June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Main results Banks may combine liquidity buffers and transparency investments in risk mgmt Liquidity fully insures small shocks; Transparency partially all shocks Both may be compromised by leverage; Regulation complicated by multitasking Lessons for liquidity regulation If incorrect, can compromise transparency Important that thoroughly designed May require extra emphasis on transparency
20June 2007Ratnovski: Liquidity and Transparency Main results Banks can combine liquidity and transparency in risk management Banks may under-invest in both Regulation is complicated by multitasking Lessons for liquidity regulation Solvency regulation not enough Incorrect liquidity requirements can compromise transparency choices Additional emphasis on transparency beneficial