PIC configuration (maskable/unmaskable circuits) I. Romera MPP meeting – 07.03.2014.

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Presentation transcript:

PIC configuration (maskable/unmaskable circuits) I. Romera MPP meeting –

I.Romera - TE/MPE Powering and Beam Interlocks 2

I.Romera - TE/MPE Definition of essential and auxiliary  Essential circuits are connected to unmaskable input of BIS => BEAM DUMP under any condition (including safe beams)  Auxiliary circuits are connected to maskable input of BIS => BEAM DUMP if unsafe beams (can be masked on the BIS when running with safe beams) NOTE: No difference between Essential and Auxiliary definition with unsafe beams!  None of the above => no impact on beam 3

I.Romera - TE/MPE Interface to the Beam Interlock System  Redundant beam dump request propagation to the BIS  XILINX XC95144 CPLD for faster transmission of unmaskable signals 4 SIEMENS 319 CPU Max 16 Inputs / Patch Panel Max 96 Inputs / Total PROFIBUS MATRIX ESSENTIAL CIRCUITS ESSENTIAL + AUXILIARY CIRCUITS = UNMASKABLE BEAM DUMP REQUEST OF THIS PIC = MASKABLE BEAM DUMP REQUEST OF THIS PIC

I.Romera - TE/MPE Initial configuration (2009)  RB, RQD, RQF, RQX, RD1-4, RQ4-RQ10 as unmaskable (essential for operation)  RCS, RQT%, RSD%, RSF%, RCBXH/V and RCB% (except RCBCHS5.L8B1) as maskable (not essential with safe beam)  RCD, RCO, ROD, ROF, RQS, RSS no impact 5

I.Romera - TE/MPE Modifications during Run1  RQSX3: Included in Maskable PIC configuration after trip provoking fast orbit changes and beam losses in SR7 (event on June 2011 – ECR )ECR

I.Romera - TE/MPE Proposed changes for Run2  ROD/ROF: Trips on such circuits provoked several dumps due to EMC on neighbouring circuits (typically RSF and RSD…) => MASKABLE 7 30-APR-11 8:20AM => Octupole circuit ROD.A12B1 tripped due to fault in the auxiliary power supply. This one would not trigger the dump on it's own, but it took down due to electromagnetic coupling as well 3 more circuits RSF1.A12B1, ROF.A12B1 and RSD2.A12B1, and the RSF1.A12B1 eventually dumped the beams some 70ms after the initial fault. 13-APR-12 6:59PM => Internal failure of power converter ROD.A12B1 (due to AUX power supply), requiring exchange of power module. Clean dump. 11-JUN-12 17:01PM=>Trip of ROD.A81B1 (RR13), followed by ROF.A81B1 and RSF1.A81B1 looks like a SEU.Under investigation by the MPE experts.Clean dump.

I.Romera - TE/MPE Proposed changes for Run2  ROD/ROF: Trips on such circuits provoked several dumps due to EMC on neighbouring circuits (typically RSF and RSD…) => MASKABLE 8 30-APR-11 8:20AM => Octupole circuit ROD.A12B1 tripped due to fault in the auxiliary power supply. This one would not trigger the dump on it's own, but it took down due to electromagnetic coupling as well 3 more circuits RSF1.A12B1, ROF.A12B1 and RSD2.A12B1, and the RSF1.A12B1 eventually dumped the beams some 70ms after the initial fault. 13-APR-12 6:59PM => Internal failure of power converter ROD.A12B1 (due to AUX power supply), requiring exchange of power module. Clean dump. 11-JUN-12 17:01PM=>Trip of ROD.A81B1 (RR13), followed by ROF.A81B1 and RSF1.A81B1 looks like a SEU.Under investigation by the MPE experts.Clean dump.

I.Romera - TE/MPE Proposed changes for Run2  ROD/ROF: Trips on such circuits provoked several dumps due to EMC on neighbouring circuits (typically RSF and RSD…) => MASKABLE 9 30-APR-11 8:20AM => Octupole circuit ROD.A12B1 tripped due to fault in the auxiliary power supply. This one would not trigger the dump on it's own, but it took down due to electromagnetic coupling as well 3 more circuits RSF1.A12B1, ROF.A12B1 and RSD2.A12B1, and the RSF1.A12B1 eventually dumped the beams some 70ms after the initial fault. 13-APR-12 6:59PM => Internal failure of power converter ROD.A12B1 (due to AUX power supply), requiring exchange of power module. Clean dump. 11-JUN-12 17:01PM =>Trip of ROD.A81B1 (RR13), followed by ROF.A81B1 and RSF1.A81B1 looks like a SEU.Under investigation by the MPE experts.Clean dump.

I.Romera - TE/MPE Proposed changes for Run2  RCBCHS5.L8B1: Circuit repaired and back to operation => MASKABLE  Highly resistive circuit (around 22 mohm) on the cold side at 4.5 K. It was replaced by a nc circuit during Run1…  RQS: Proposal to be included in MASKABLE configuration  From M. Giovannozzi “to correct the beam coupling, these circuits have the same function as the RQSX3, which were included in the PIC configuration”  No evidence of beam dumps found during Run1 in PostMortem DB 10

I.Romera - TE/MPE How to deploy new configuration…  Apply changes to reference DB  Generate configuration data (script)  Download new configuration to PLC, MATRIX and WinCC  Repeat commissioning procedure  Time estimated for changes: 2 days! 11