ENGAGE RESPOND PROJECT UNCLASSIFIED MINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS BRIEF TO MINWARA Spring Conference, May 11 MajGen T. C. “BT” Hanifen, USMC Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division UNCLASSIFIED

OPNAV N85 Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85) Naval Special Warfare Branch (N851) Mine Warfare Branch (N852) Amphibious Warfare Branch (N853) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Branch (N857) NSW Requirements Information Warfare Airborne Surface RMS ABS Unmanned MCM Vehicles Mining In-service Amphibious Ships Future Amphibious Ships NBE NSFS MPF(F) LCAC/SSC/LCU/JHSV NECC NCF MESF EOD/JEOD COMCAM ECRC ELSG NEIC JNLW MCAST Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare CNO’s Staff Subject Matter Expert on Mine Warfare Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Advocate for the Fleet

Agenda Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)--“American Style” -Stand Off -Blockades -UUVS/Submarines -Advanced Underwater Weapon Systems (AUWS) MCM In Support Of Maritime Homeland Defense -LCS Transition -Importance of MCM for Homeland Defense -MCM for Homeland Defense Requirements -“Fly Away” Capability Mine Counter Measures—Thinking outside the box -Additional Thoughts on MCM -Guinea Pig Ships -Budget

Opening Thought “Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, land in our rear, and on both of our flanks at the same time… Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do!” ---U. S. Grant

A2/AD, “American Style” A2 / AD Minefields Sub Base Sub Base “Deploying smart mobile mines might prove particularly effective in attriting submarines and/or blocking them from access to their bases” --AirSea Battle Concept “The Navy should develop … smart mobile mines capable of autonomous movement to programmed locations over extended distances” --AirSea Battle Concept

Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries A2/AD “American Style” In time of conflict the USN must own the maritime domain The seas are ours; we must control our adversaries’ ability to access that domain Exit and chokepoint control techniques Submarines Airpower Mining Boundaries and shielding techniques Investment and current capability is not aligned with level of warfighting contribution of mining Current stockpile of mines only covers the shallow water No significant S&T investment in recent years USN proficiency in mining has declined Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries

Concepts for the Future Expendable Target Detection Devices Long-range Weapons Unmanned Vehicles Expendable Target Detection Devices Encapsulated Weapons

From Current Mines to an Advanced Underwater Weapon System (AUWS) Wide Area Coverage Stand Off Delivery High Volume Placement Sensors Target Detection Target Discrimination UUV Delivery / Re-position On Demand Command & Control RECO, Change Mission, IFF Dual Mode weapons Long Duration Rechargeable Power source In theatre rearming Legacy Weapons (QuickStrikes) Current Autonomous Weapons w/ Mobile Warheads Near-Term LD-UUV Weapons with Mobile Warheads Far-Term Reduces number of weapons---Increases utility

Value of an AUWS Risky Delivery & Extensive Clean-up Traditional Mining (strategic, autonomous) Transformational AUWS (tactical, controlled) Quickstrike SLMM (through FY12) LD-UUV w/ Mobile Mines or Torpedoes UAV, USV, UUV, UGV SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE DEEP SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE DEEP Distributed Sensors 400 Traditional Mines 1 Transformational Mine Adapt to new Goal Sterilize/ Destruct Decide Deliver Arm / Engage Clear Destruct/ DisArm Decide Deliver Arm Engage Extract Days Days - Months Months Days Hours Minutes+ Minutes+ Minutes+ Hours Risky Delivery & Extensive Clean-up Eases Delivery & Clean-up; Provides Tactical Flexibility 9

Transition from Mining to an AUWS Now Manned delivery, Estimated emplacement, Ambiguous engagement Next Unmanned delivery, Precision emplacement, Controlled engagement Future Autonomous delivery, Precision positioning, Cooperative engagement Improved Standoff / Precision Quickstrike AUWS UAV Improved Standoff / Precision USV SLMM AUWS Capability UUV Technology Sensors Vehicles Weapons Distributed Sensors / TDDs LCS CDV SDV LD-UUV SSN/SSGN LWT Next Gen Mine Transition to Smart Mobile Mines and Unmanned Vehicles

Mine Countermeasures Roadmap MCM Force in Transition Removing the Sailor from the Minefield To Increase Clearance Rates Distributed and Netted Unmanned Operations Cooperative Behavior Computer Aided Detect/Classify Common Operational Picture Sea Warrior Transformation FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MCM VISION: Field a Common Set of Unmanned, Modular MCM Systems Employable from a Variety of Host Platforms or Shore Sites that can Quickly Counter the Spectrum of Mines to Enable Assured Access with Minimum Risk from Mines Slow Heavy Large footprint Stovepiped Primarily CONUS-based Manpower Training Intensive Fast and Agile Precise Lethal Modular Organic Optimized Manpower Requirements 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept Detect, Classify & Identify Engage (Neutralize) Engage (Sweep) LCS 2 (GD) LCS 2 (GD) MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV LCS 1 (LM) MH-60S MH-60S MH-60S MH-60S MH-60S ALMDS LCS 1 (LM) UISS AMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADE AMNS RMMV AQS-20A AQS-20A OASIS OASIS: Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep / AMNS: Airborne Mine Neutralization System RMMV: Remote Multi Mission Vehicle / UISS: Unmanned Influence Sweep System / ALMDS: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System

LCS Based MCM System Components Organic/LCS-Based Mine Countermeasures (OMCM) Mission Package (MP) Systems LCS Based MCM System Components Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill) Minefield Detection and Neutralization Laser (Hunt) Airborne Mine Neutralization Near-Surface Upgrade IOC: FY13/FOC: TBD Assault Breaching System IOC: FY13/FOC: FY22 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25 Buried Mine – Promising Potential with Low Frequency Broad Band Remote Minehunting System & MH-60S AN/AQS-20A Airborne Mine Neutralization System Unmanned Surface Sweep System / Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Underwater Vehicle and Low Frequency Broadband Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill) IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25 Sonar (Hunt) IOC: FY15/FOC: Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Sweep Buried Mine Detection IOC: FY16/FOC: FY24 RMS IOC: FY15/FOC: FY25 AN/AQS-20A IOC: FY12/ FOC: FY25 UISS IOC: FY16/FOC: TBD OASIS IOC: FY14/ FOC: FY26

MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense: Why is this important? In 2008, U.S. ports imported and exported nearly 7.6 billion tons of cargo International trade via our ports accounts for more than 32 percent of the U.S. GDP There is $3.8B worth of goods moving in and out of U.S. seaports each day All U.S. ports are “minable”

Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions… MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense Responsibilities for defending our ports is prescribed in Presidentially directed and validated Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) USCG lead in port defense against terrorist attack DOD support for MCM Navy is only DOD MCM capability DOD lead in port defense against state actors Response time, capacity and prioritization being defined by NORTHCOM N85 is studying and resourcing UMCM forces with rapid fly-away capabilities to counter this threat Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions…

for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission UMCM Capabilities for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission Fielded Capability

Mid-Term UMCM Capabilities for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission Delivered through the FYDP

Other Thoughts on MCM In-Stride Neutralization Non-traditional methods Rapid clearance enablers/Assault Breaching Systems Real Time Communications to allow for real time MIW analysis UxV decoy systems

Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk Mine Resistant Vessel a.k.a. “Guinea Pig” COTS solution? Command and Control Solution? Hardening of Existing Vessels for Use We can do this with an out of service tanker? Can we do it with a USV or autonomous vessel? Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk

Navy Budget PB12 is currently on the “Hill” Navy TOA for PB12 is $161.4B, $.8B more than FY11 N8 Warfare Sponsors control $54B; 33% of Navy TOA N85 PB12 TOA is $6.2B in 76 Programs of Record which is 4% of overall budget Mine Warfare budget is $930M across 14 programs, which is .6% of Navy TOA* *LCS Ship SCN/MH-60S APN Costs excluded N852 allocated 33% of FY11 budget to legacy systems; this decreases to ~20% by FY17 as organic systems enter fleet

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