© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-1 Minimizing Service Loss and Data Theft Protecting Against Spoofing Attacks.

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Presentation transcript:

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-1 Minimizing Service Loss and Data Theft Protecting Against Spoofing Attacks

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-2 Cisco Catalyst Integrated Security Features

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-3 DHCP Spoofing Attacks  An attacker activates a DHCP server on the VLAN.  An attacker replies to a valid client DHCP request.  An attacker assigns IP configuration information that establishes a rogue device as client default gateway.  An attacker floods the DHCP server with requests.

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-4 DHCP Messages

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-5 DHCP Snooping Protects Against Rogue and Malicious DHCP Servers  DHCP requests (discover) and responses (offer) are tracked.  Rate-limiting requests on untrusted interfaces limit DoS attacks on DHCP servers.  Deny responses (offers) on untrusted interfaces to stop malicious or errant DHCP servers.

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-6 DHCP Snooping  DHCP snooping allows the configuration of ports as trusted or untrusted.  Untrusted ports cannot forward DHCP replies.  Configure DHCP trust on the uplinks to a DHCP server.  Do not configure DHCP trust on client ports.

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-7 Configuring DHCP Snooping  Enable DHCP snooping globally.  Enable DHCP snooping on selected VLANs.  Configure trusted interfaces (untrusted is default).  Configure DHCP rate limit on untrusted interfaces. switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping information option switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping vlan 10,20 switch(config)# interface fastethernet 0/1 switch(config-if)# description Access Port switch(config-if)# ip dhcp limit rate 50 switch(config)# interface fastethernet 0/24 switch(config-if)# description Uplink switch(config-if)# switchport mode trunk switch(config-if)# switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20 switch(config-if)# ip dhcp snooping trust

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-8 Verifying DHCP Snooping switch# show ip dhcp snooping Switch DHCP snooping is enabled DHCP snooping is configured on following VLANs: 10,20 DHCP snooping is operational on following VLANs: 10,20 DHCP snooping is configured on the following L3 Interfaces: Insertion of option 82 is enabled circuit-id default format: vlan-mod-port remote-id: 001a.e372.ab00 (MAC) Option 82 on untrusted port is not allowed Verification of hwaddr field is enabled Verification of giaddr field is enabled DHCP snooping trust/rate is configured on the following Interfaces: Interface Trusted Allow option Rate limit (pps) FastEthernet0/1 no no 50 FastEthernet0/24 yes yes unlimited

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-9 ARP Poisoning

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-10 DAI Protection Against ARP Poisoning  Protects against ARP poisoning (ettercap, dsniff, or arpspoof)  Uses the DHCP snooping binding table  Tracks IP-to-MAC bindings from DHCP transactions  Drops gratuitous ARPs  Stops ARP poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks  Rate-limits ARP requests from client ports; stops port scanning

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-11 About DAI  DAI associates each interface with a trusted state or an untrusted state.  Trusted interfaces bypass DAI.  Untrusted interfaces undergo DAI validation.  DHCP snooping is required to build a table with MAC-to-IP bindings for DAI validation.

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-12 Configuring DAI  Enable DHCP snooping globally.  Enable DHCP snooping on selected VLANs.  Enable ARP inspection on selected VLANs.  Configure trusted interfaces (untrusted is default). switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping vlan 10,20 switch(config)# ip arp inspection vlan 10,20 switch(config)# interface fastethernet 0/1 switch(config-if)# ip dhcp limit rate 50 switch(config)# interface fastethernet 0/24 switch(config-if)# description Uplink switch(config-if)# switchport mode trunk switch(config-if)# switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20 switch(config-if)# ip dhcp snooping trust switch(config-if)# ip arp inspection trust

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-13 IP Source Guard Protection Against Spoofed IP Addresses  Protects against spoofed IP addresses  Uses the DHCP snooping binding table  Tracks IP addresses to port associations  Dynamically programs port ACLs to drop traffic not originating from an IP address assigned via DHCP

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-14 IP Source Guard  DHCP snooping must be configured to verify source IP addresses.  Port security with DHCP snooping allows verification of source IP and MAC addresses.

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-15 Catalyst Integrated Security Configuration sw(config)# ip dhcp snooping sw(config)# ip dhcp snooping vlan 10,20 sw(config)# ip arp inspection vlan 10,20 sw(config)# interface fastethernet 0/1 sw(config-if)# description Access Port sw(config-if)# switchport mode access sw(config-if)# switchport access vlan 10 sw(config-if)# switchport port-security maximum 2 sw(config-if)# switchport port-security violation restrict sw(config-if)# switchport port-security sw(config-if)# ip dhcp limit rate 50 sw(config-if)# ip verify source port-security sw(config)# interface fastethernet 0/24 sw(config-if)# description Uplink sw(config-if)# switchport mode trunk sw(config-if)# switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20 sw(config-if)# ip dhcp snooping trust sw(config-if)# ip arp inspection trust

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-16 Summary  DHCP spoofing attacks send unauthorized replies to DHCP queries.  DHCP snooping is used to counter a DHCP spoofing attack.  DHCP snooping is easily implemented on a Cisco Catalyst switch.  ARP spoofing can be used to redirect traffic to an unauthorized device on the network.  DAI in conjunction with DHCP snooping can be used to counter ARP spoofing attacks.

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. SWITCH v1.0—7-17