Institute for Cyber Security Extending OpenStack Access Control with Domain Trust World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 1 Bo Tang and Ravi Sandhu.

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Presentation transcript:

Institute for Cyber Security Extending OpenStack Access Control with Domain Trust World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 1 Bo Tang and Ravi Sandhu NSS 2014 © Bo Tang

The Cloud World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 2 © Bo Tang

Moving to the Cloud  Driving force:  Anytime, Anywhere (Centralized infrastructure)  [$$$] -----> [$|$|$] (Shared resources)  Pay-on-the-go (On-demand services)  Scalable and flexible  Resistance: © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 3  Security & Privacy o Data governance o Access control  Other problems o Data Locked-in o Lack Standard APIs

What is OpenStack?  Open source Cloud platform  12,000 individual members  260 supporting organizations  130 countries  Havana Release  Nov Hong Kong Summit  Keystone (IAM)  Identity API v3  Introduction of Domain concept © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 4 Source:

Multi-Tenancy  Multi-tenancy  From Cloud Service Provider (CSP) perspective o A billing customer, isolated with each other o Manages its own users and cloud resources  The owner of a tenant can be o An individual, an organization or a department in an organization, etc.  Domain in OpenStack  Each domain manages its own users and projects World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 5 © Bo Tang

Motivation © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 6

Existing Approaches  Trust  Active Directory Federation Service (AD FS) o Multiple types of federation trust among domains  Cross-account trust in AWS o Unilateral trust with another account or external credentials  Trust in OpenStack o User to user delegation via roles © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 7

Scope and Assumptions  Standardized APIs  Cross-tenant accesses are functionally available  Properly authenticated users  One Cloud Service  Of a kind: IaaS, PaaS or SaaS.  Multi-tenancy collaboration on a single cloud World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 8 © Bo Tang

Core OSAC World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 9 © Bo Tang

Definitions of OSAC  Roles  Globally available  Not owned by domains or projects  Tokens  Credentials issued to authenticated users  Will expire, similar to session concept in RBAC  Services  Examples: Nova, Glance, Neutron  Different services have different policies based on the role-permission assignments © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 10

Administration (AOSAC) World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 11 Cloud Admin Domain A Admin Project A1 Admin Project A2 Admin Domain B Admin Project B1 Admin Project B2 Admin Source: rule:add_user_to_project -> (role:keystone_admin || (role:project_admin && project_id:%(target_project_id)s) || (domain_role:domain_admin && domain_id:%(target_domain_id)s)) rule:add_project_to_domain -> (role:keystone_admin || (domain_role:domain_admin && domain_id:%(target_domain_id)s)) © Bo Tang

Domain-Level Collaboration  Basic scenario  User: u1 from Domain: d1  Project: p2 from Domain: d2  Cross-domain actions  Administrative o Assign u1 to roles in p2  Operational o Allowing u1 to access p2 with the assigned roles  Require proper trust relation between d1 and d2 © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 12

Trust Framework World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 13 © Bo Tang

Domain Trust World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 14 © Bo Tang

Trust Types  Two-party unilateral unidirectional non-transitive  Type-α, requires visibility of the trustee’s user information for the trustor to assign trustee’s users to roles in trustor’s projects, written as “ ⊴ α ”.  Type-β, requires the trustor to expose its user information for the trustee to assign trustor’s users to roles in trustee’s projects, written as “ ⊴ β ”.  Type-γ, requires the trustor to expose its project information for the trustee to assign trustee’s users to roles in trustor’s projects, written as “ ⊴ γ ”. © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 15

OSAC-DT World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 16 © Bo Tang

Constraints & Administration  Constraints  Separation of Duties (SoD) o Mutually exclusive domain list  Minimum Exposure o Limit exposure of project and user to other domains  Cardinality o Limit the number of domains to be trusted  Domain Trust Administration  The trustor manages the trust relation and constraints © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 17

Implementation  Type-γ trust  Trustee manages cross-domain assignments  Implemented as a extension module in Keystone  Experiment Environment  1 unit = 1 CPU/1GB  VMs with 1, 2, 4, 8 units of capability  Devstack deployed in cloud environment  Stand-alone Keystone service  Test with REST API calls through curl commands © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 18

Prototype & Evaluation  Sequential request handling (Queuing)  Domain trust introduces 0.7% authz. Overhead  Scalability changes little with domain trust World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 19 PerformanceScalability © Bo Tang

Related Work  RBAC extensions  Centralized authority is usually required o ROBAC, collaboration not supported o GB-RBAC, group does not own users  Role-Based Delegation models  Delegation chain lacks support of agile entities  Multi-Domain Interoperation  Role-mapping requires PA to be domain-specific  Multi-Tenant Access Control models  MTAS, MT-RBAC, CTTM © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 20

Conclusion & Future Work  Formalized OSAC model  Administrative model (AOSAC)  Trust Framework & Trust Types  Formalized OSAC-DT model  Administrative model (AOSAC-DT) & Constraints  Implementation & Experiments in OpenStack  Acceptable performance & scalability change  Future work  Hierarchical Multi-tenancy model  Attribute-based models  Implementation in future OpenStack World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 21 © Bo Tang

Acknowledgements  Dolph Mathews  PTL of Keystone  Farhan Patwa  Director of ICS  Jaehone Park  Research Associate Profession in ICS © Bo Tang World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 22

Institute for Cyber Security World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 23 © Bo Tang

Institute for Cyber Security World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 24 © Bo Tang