Securing Online Transactions with a Trusted Digital Identity Dave Steeves - Security Software Engineer Microsoft’s Security Business & Technology Unit System Protection Products Team © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Outline Goals Rationale Securing Online Transactions Enabling Secure Scenarios  Trusted Digital Identity

Goals 1. Enable customers to securely perform online transactions on an insecure machine, over a hostile internet Bellua Cyber Security Conference Find more secure scenarios which are enabled with a trusted digital identity TIPPI Workshop

Online Bank Fraud in the News “A Miami man blames Bank of America for more than $90,000 stolen in an unauthorized wire transfer to Latvia. Joe Lopez filed a lawsuit on Feb. 7 claiming that Bank of America had not alerted him to malicious code that could -- and indeed had -- infected his computer. A forensic investigation by the U.S. Secret Service revealed that a Trojan called Coreflood, which acts as a keystroke logger, had compromised one of his PCs.”

The Threat of Identity Theft RSA Security chief executive Art Coviello suggested that the effects were already being felt, pointing out that some Australian banks have recently pulled out of planned web services because of security fears. "We are at a confidence crisis. For the first time we run the risk of taking a step backwards and the reason is the threat of identity theft," he said.

Generic Transaction Model

Remember the User

Online Banking with User

Secure Protocol + USER

Threat 1: Phishing

Threat 2: “Man In the Middle”?

Threat 3: Computer is Fully Compromised; aka 0wn3d

Two-Factor Authentication “Protecting Against Phishing by Implementing Strong Two-Factor Authentication”  For example:

Bar is Raised, but High Enough? Does strong authentication add enough security to bank online?

Threat 1*: Phishing

Threat 2*: Man in the Middle by Social Engineering

Threat 3*: Fully Compromised

Focus on Verification Stages

Secure Verification Content Client Server Human-User Server

Today’s Online Banking

Verification Stage

Secure Online Banking

Secure the Receipt

Securing Online Transactions Recap Current Online Transaction Models  Threats Still Exist Solution  One Time Secret per Transaction  Keep Secret Off Untrusted Device Reduces Attack Surface  Attack vectors localized  Hardware Hacking/Physically Present  Tempest Attacks  Break Crypto

Trusted Digital Identity Mini MAC Connectivity through DAC system Enable specific, fine grain scenarios

Scenarios Online Transactions Digital Rights Management Secure, Redundant Storage. Security and System Configurations Paperless Money

Limitations  Size of mobile device interfaces are small  Size of mobile device is small  Horsepower of a mobile device Realistic scenarios  Not real time  Not heavily dependant on performance

Questions for TIPPI Attendees What end-to-end scenarios can we enable or include with a v1 of this idea? What end-to-end scenarios can we enable in the future? Do we need to provide trusted interfaces with Mandatory Access Control (MAC) to achieve a trusted identity? Do we need to ensure the user has the only access to the Identity interfaces?

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