Competition among Multi-Sided Platforms David S. Evans LECG and University College London 7 June nd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law Rome, Italy
2 Multi-Sided Platforms: Powerbrokers In The Global Economy
3 Today’s Discussion The Nature Of Competition The Digital Music Business When Do Multi-Sided Platforms Compete? Search-Based Advertising 4 2 The Catalyst Age 6 What Is A Multi-Sided Platform?
5 The Birth Of The Charge Card Merchants paid 7% fee Cardholders paid small fee roughly equal to the value of the float Profits entirely from the merchant side
6 Catalytic Reaction For Charge Cards 330 restaurants and 42,000 consumers one year later 14 restaurants and 200 consumers to start Card system signed up merchants to accept and consumers to use cards: a three-party system
7 What Makes A Platform Multi-Sided Reduces transactions costs between two or more groups of economic agents ► ► Significant indirect network effects between groups ► ► Uses pricing, design, and openness to optimize positive feedback effects ► ►
When Do Multi-Sided Platforms Compete?
9 How Many Multi-Sided Platforms Compete CauseEffect on Size/Concentration Indirect network effects + Scale economies + Congestion – Platform differentiation – Multi-homing –
10 Core Functions Of Multi-Sided Platforms MatchmakersAudience buildersCost minimizers Objective To facilitate transactions Objective To assemble eyeballs Objective To increase efficiency eBayParis MatchPalm OS Yahoo! PersonalsGoogleWindows Marché BastilleCondé NastSymbian MySpace.comTiVoSony PlayStation Manheim Auto Auction Reed ElsevierXbox OdaibaWall Street JournalSAP enterprise software NASDAQBBCLinux
The Nature Of Competition
12 Side A Platform 0 Side B Side A Platform 1 Side B Side A Side B Platform 3 Side A Side B Platform 2 Side C Single-SidedSymmetric Two-SidedThree-Sided Competition When The Number Of Sides Vary
Search-Based Advertising
14 The Search-Based Advertising Business Share of Search-based Advertising Revenue Share of Searches
15 Search Pages
16 How Bidding Works Price goes up with scale because a platform with more advertisers: has greater likelihood of having advertisers who value a search highly has more competition among advertisers for valuable searches clicks go up with scale—platform has the right ads to deliver to searchers Revenue Per Search (RPS) = Price per click * Clicks per search
The Digital Music Business
18 iTunes-iPod Business Model Music Publishers (Protected music) iTunes iPod Consumers Unprotected Music CDsMP3s
19 Growth In iPod And iTunes Source: Apple Corporation, Form 10K and Annual Reports, various years. Number of iPods shipped (millions)Number of iTunes sold (millions)
The Catalyst Age
21 Three Factors Will Lead To More Catalysts The web is a convenient meeting place It is easy and cheap to communicate Software platforms power many catalysts
22 The Catalyst Age And Competition Policy More dominant firms in sectors as multi-sided platforms form and grow ► ► More dominant firms as high-tech, multi-sided platforms displace low-tech ► ► More consolidations as multi-sided platforms seek demand and cost-scale economies made possible by technology ► ►
23 Thank you! Catalyst Code: The Strategies Behind The World’s Most Dynamic Companies David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee Harvard Business School Press, May Catalyst Code: The Strategies Behind The World’s Most Dynamic Companies David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee Harvard Business School Press, May Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu and Richard Schmalensee MIT Press, 2007 Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu and Richard Schmalensee MIT Press, 2007