Comprehend the Challenger accident Comprehend the Columbia accident The Space Shuttle Program: Challenger and Columbia Accidents

Lesson Overview The Challenger accident The Columbia accident

The Challenger Accident On 28 January 1986 the space shuttle Challenger blew up All seven crew members perished The Rogers Commission released its report on 6 June 1986 The failure of the joint between the two lower parts of the right solid-fuel rocket caused the accident

How Weather’s Effect on the Solid Rocket Boosters Caused the Accident An O-ring is made of a resilient material - one capable of bouncing back to its original shape after being compressed O-ring material wasn’t resilient at low temperatures As scientists prepared Challenger, the temperature hovered around the freezing mark: 32 degrees F

How NASA Management Contributed to the Accident Rogers Commission found failures in communication Conflict between engineering data and management judgments Management structure allowed flight-safety questions to bypass key shuttle managers

Changes NASA Made to Reduce the Possibility of Another Accident NASA redesigned the solid rocket booster: O-rings were replaced NASA reorganized the management structure; also strengthened its support for safety staff Ordered improved communication among managers Strengthened the flight readiness review Committed to “criticality review and hazard analysis” Developed new systems to allow astronauts to escape in the case of another faulty liftoff; improved the orbiter’s landing systems

Columbia Accident On 1 February 2003 Columbia broke up on reentry into Earth’s atmosphere All seven of the crew perished Physical cause of the Columbia disaster was a breach in the thermal protection system A chunk of insulating foam from the pressurized fuel cell hit and structurally damaged the reinforced carbon wing leading edge The damage to the wing ultimately melted the wing’s thin aluminum spar – or structured support

How Damage to the Thermal Protection System Caused the Accident Many times chunks of insulating foam broke off at launch and dinged the thermal protection system NASA had observed it so many times on orbiters that did return safely, they didn’t consider it a serious problem

How NASA Management Contributed to the Accident CAIB faulted NASA for its overly ambitious flight schedule Too many people had responsibility for both sticking to the flight schedule and maintaining safety CAIB also touched on NASA’s organizational culture - the values, norms, and shared experiences of an organization

Changes NASA Made to Reduce the Possibility of Another Accident Efforts to reduce “foam shedding” and strengthen the orbiter’s heat shield Improved inspection routines before launches Improved imaging of the shuttle, both at launch and during orbit Establishment of a Technical Engineering Authority

Marking Period 3 Project As you plan your concept of operations this marking period consider: Design safety Testing regimen and process Contingency Plans: “What if it does not go as planned” Communications and Control: “Who is doing what?”

Comprehend the Challenger accident Comprehend the Columbia accident The Space Shuttle Program: Challenger and Columbia Accidents