Informal Relations and Corruption in the West Balkans Åse B. Grødeland NIBR Argument --- Pro Media ---Prism Research/GfK Bosnia Research Council of Norway Grant No /S30 ( )

Corruption and Terrorism Corruption affecting terrorism both indirectly and directly Indirectly – by affecting factors of importance in terms of recruitment –Strength of government –Quality of life (GDP per capita) –Level of democracy (quality/strength of opposition & civil society) –Level of integration, ethnic and religious minorities –Level of protection, ethnic and religious miniorities Directly – by terrorists to further their cause –Access to territories (border guards) –Weapons/equipment (army/police) –Shelter/food (politicians/ordinary people)

AC Efforts, Post-communist States Internationally driven AC efforts primarily focused on –awareness raising & copying of very similar AC programmes across geographical and cultural borders (1990s) –capacity building – involving a wide range of national and local organisations (2000s). Have resulted in numerous ”products” but not significantly reducing corruption. Why? –vagueness of programs (”Cover everything”) –few points in programs funded by donors –insufficient political commitment to AC reform –primarily addressing institutional behaviour –largely addressing ”manifestations” of corruption rather than the root-causes facilitating them

Alternative Approach to Corruption Investigate the mechanisms that (may) facilitate corruption –Informal practice: the use of contacts and informal networks Post-communist states: informal practice used in response to transition, but its use rooted in national culture and the socialist experience ”Try harder”-hypothesis: informal practice used as a strategy to compensate for real or perceived disadvantages when dealing with the state. Big distance between ”rulers” and ”ruled”  Low institutional trust  Use of informal practice (corruption)  Lack of faith in the ability of the ”rulers” to tackle corruption  Lack of faith in, and commitment to, ”traditional” AC reform? Implications: efforts to contain corruption

Data collection Two projects: Informal Practice & Corruption I (ECE + SEE) & Informal Practice & Corruption II (WB) Focus: politics, public procurement, the judiciary and post- war/conflict reconstruction (WB). Extensive collection of qualitative and quantitative data amongst 9 relevant categories of elites –Structured (open-ended) in-depth interviews ( ) –Quota-based, quantitative surveys (N=600 x 7). Present partial findings from 414 in-depth interviews & 3 quota- based quantitative surveys.

Table 1. Most law-abiding sectors/groups (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Politicians455 Government officials10911 Public procurement officials375 Local business reps10 5 Foreign business reps Judiciary NGOs Media456 Foreign donors17921 Other375 DK123 N=(300)(311)(191) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 2. Most trusted sectors/groups (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Politicians336 Government officials7710 Public procurement officials132 Local business reps9146 Foreign business reps Judiciary NGOs Media769 Foreign donors12516 Other474 DK225 (189)(205)(161) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 3. Whether (COUNTRY) society formal or informal (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Formal Mix Informal Other590 DK431 N=(143)(153)(137) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 4. Use of contacts in (OWN SECTOR)... (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Common Used16914 Uncommon19 28 Never used4715 Other434 DK131 N=(138)(149)(144) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 5. Informal networks in (OWN SECTOR)… (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Active Not active Other463 DK473 N=(134)(146)(135) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 6. Whether contacts & informal networks facilitate corruption in (COUNTRY)… (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Facilitate Do not facilitate586 Other6117 DK113 N=(136)(146)(136) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 7. Whether political will in (COUNTRY) to tackle corruption... (in per cent) SerbiaBos-Herzeg.Macedonia Will No will Other91311 DK736 N=(141)(151)(142) Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Conclusions & Recommendations Informal practice widespread in the WB – perceived to facilitate corruption. Root causes vs. manifestations of corruption: different measures required. Politicians perceived more as the problem than the ”solution”: not law-abiding, not trustworthy, not committed to anti-corruption reform. Strengthen investigative bodies and judiciary (Michael). Work on public mentality & on bridging the gap between the ”rulers” and the ”ruled”: must in be locally-driven, cannot successfully be imposed ”exclusively” from the outside. Implications - terrorism

Q281. Most efficient measure for limiting the negative impact of informal networks Average % Bosnia % Serbia % Macedonia % Strengthen the rule of law Change people’s mentality and values through education Strengthen law-enforcement Strengthen public trust in the state8798 Introduce new and better legislation5654 Enhance the efficiency and independence of the judiciary4435 Strengthen the accountability of politicians and government officials4436 Make government administration more open & transparent4344 Strengthen anti-corruption bodies and anti-corruption3531 Expose the negative aspects of informal networks in the media3332 Prepare for EU membership2222 Introduce codes of ethics and professional codes both in the public and private sectors 1111 Properly regulate political party funding1111 Properly regulate lobbying1210 Better regulation of public procurement1110 Limit the influence of the former nomenklatura through lustration0100