Machine-Learning Assisted Binary Code Analysis N. Rosenblum, X. Zhu, B. Miller Computer Sciences Department University of Wisconsin - Madison {nater,jerryzhu,bart}@cs.wisc.edu K. Hunt National Security Agency huntkc@gmail.com
Supporting Static Binary Analysis Binary Analysis is a Foundational Technique for Many Areas Example Uses Why Analyze Binaries? Malware detection Vulnerability analysis Static and Dynamic Instrumentation Formal verification Source code unavailable e.g., malware Source code is inaccurate Compiler transforms structure Provides most accurate representation Code is found through symbol information and parsing MUCH HARDER without symbols Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Many Binaries are Stripped BINARY Stripped binaries lack symbol & debug information Headers EXAMPLES: Code Segment (functions?) Malicious programs Operating system distributions Commercial software packages Legacy codes Data Segment Standard Approach: Parse from entry point Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Stripped Binaries Exhibit Gaps Code Segment After static parsing, gap regions remain Indirect (pointer-based) control ambiguity Deliberate calls/branch obfuscation Gaps in code segment may not contain code Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Stripped Binaries Exhibit Gaps Code Segment Gap contents may vary .__gmon_start__.libc.so.6.stpcpy.strcpy.__divdi3.printf.stdout.strerror.memmove.getopt_long.re_syntax_options.__ctype_b.getenv.__strtol_internal.getpagesize.re_search_2.memcpy.puts.feof.malloc.optarg.btowc._obstack_newchunk.re_match.__ctype_toupper.__xstat64.abort.strrchr._obstack_begin.calloc.re_set_registers.fprintf. String data Dialog Constants Import names Other strings Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Stripped Binaries Exhibit Gaps Code Segment Gap contents may vary 0x8022346 0x802434b 0x80243ad 0x80403d0 0x80503d0 0x8052140 0x8053142 0x806000b 0x802321a 0x8023332 0x804132a 0x8050ca0 Tables or lists of addresses Jump tables Virtual function tables Data objects Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Stripped Binaries Exhibit Gaps Code Segment Gap contents may vary gap_funcA { . . . } Code unreachable through standard static parsing gap_funcB { . . . Function pointers Virtual methods Obfuscated calls gap_funcC { . . . } Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Stripped Binaries Exhibit Gaps Code Segment Gap contents may vary 7a 01 00 fd a2 b3 74 68 69 73 20 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 20 69 73 20 62 6f 67 75 73 2e 2e 2e But… all of these just look like bytes Every byte in gaps may be the start of a function How can we find code in gaps? Our approach: Use information in known code to model code in gaps Previous work (Vigna et al., 2007) augments parsing with simple instruction frequency information Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Problem reduces to finding function entry points Modeling Binary Code Problem reduces to finding function entry points Task: Classifying every byte in a gap as entry point or non-entry point Two types of features: Content: Idiom features of function entry points Based on instruction sequences Structure: Control flow & conflict features Capture relationship of candidate function entry points Requires joint assignment over all function entry point candidates Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Content-based Features Entry idioms are common patterns at function entry points Idioms are preceding and succeeding instruction sequences with wildcards Candidate For each idiom u, C1 Entry idioms push ebp push ebp|mov esp,ebp push ebp|*|sub esp push ebp|*|mov esp,ebp *|mov_esp,ebp *|sub 0x8,esp *|mov 0x8(ebp),eax PRE nop PRE ret|nop PRE pop ebp|*|nop Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Call Consistency & Overlap Call & conflict features relate candidate FEPs over entire gap Candidates y1 = 1 y3 = -1 y2 = 1 y4 = 1 C1 C2 C3 Don’t be formal: use example subscripts C4 Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Markov Random Field Formalization Joint assignment of yi = {1,-1} for each FEP xi in binary P Unary idiom features fu Weights u trained through logistic regression Binary features fo (overlap), fc (call consistency) Weights o, c large, negative Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Experimental Setup Large set (100’s) of binaries from department Linux servers and Windows workstations Additional binaries compiled with Intel compiler Binaries have full symbol information Model implemented as extensions to Dyninst instrumentation library Strip binary copies and parse to obtain training set Select top idiom features by forward feature selection Perform logistic regression to build idiom model Evaluate model on test data from gap regions in Step 1. Unstripped copies of binaries provide reference set Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Idiom Feature Selection & Training 1. Obtain training data from traditional parse 2. Use Condor HTC to drive forward feature selection on idioms Statically reachable functions … Corpus is hundreds of stripped binaries Features: Feat1 Feat2 Feat3 ... Featk 3. Perform logistic regression on the selected idiom features to obtain model parameters t Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Evaluation Data Sets GNU C Compiler Simple, regular function preamble MS Visual Studio High variation in function entry points Intel C Compiler Most variation in entry points; highly optimized Compiler Programs examined Total Training Examples (pos+neg) Total Test Examples (pos+neg) Actual number of functions in gaps GCC 625 8,412,711 22,806,449 85,870 MS VS 443 8,020,828 11,231,721 70,620 ICC 112 1,364,598 13,169,487 47,841 Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Preliminary Results Comparison of three binary analysis tools: Original Dyninst Scans for common entry preamble IDA Pro Disassembler Scans for common entry preamble List of Library Fingerprints (Windows) Dyninst w/ Model Model replaces entry preamble heuristic Compiler Orig. Dyninst IDA Pro Dyninst w/ Model FP FN GCC 2,833 2,012 14,576 38,074 403 1,860 MS VS 79,320 65,586 9,044 21,491 725 14,143 ICC 3,786 40,195 14,422 26,970 2,337 16,220 Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Classifier Comparisons GCC MSVS ICC Model-based Dyninst extensions outperform vanilla Dyninst and IDA Pro Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Model Component Contributions ICC Test Set Structural information improves classifier accuracy Conflict resolution contributes the most Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
So Far We’ve… Framed stripped binary parsing as a machine learning problem Combined idiom and structural information to consider gap regions as a whole Extended Dyninst with classifier of Function Entry Points in gaps Obtained significant improvement in parsing stripped binaries over existing tools Shown how the HTC approach makes expensive ML techniques tractable for large scale systems Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Future Work: Extensions We’d like precision-recall AUC 1. How? More detailed instruction sequence models (e.g. Hidden Markov Model) Additional information sources (e.g. pointer tables) Caveat: this is where IDA Pro often goes wrong Code provenance First task: identify source compiler (needed to choose appropriate model) Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Future Work: Targets Malicious code Obfuscated code Lots of hand-coded assembly Usually packed (see Kevin Roundy’s talk) Obfuscated code Obfuscation/deobfuscation arms race Signal-based obfuscation is latest salvo Can not trust control flow (e.g. non-returning calls, branch functions, opaque branches) Maybe model block-level structural properties? Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Backup Slides Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis
Tool Performance Comparison Classifier maintains high precision with good recall Model performance highly system-dependent MS Visual Studio & Intel C Compiler FEPs are highly variable Rosenblum, Zhu, Miller, Hunt ML Assisted Binary Code Analysis