Ecological Impacts of Current Quota Systems Rainer Froese.

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Presentation transcript:

Ecological Impacts of Current Quota Systems Rainer Froese

TACs & Quotas TACs are the total allowable catch in a given year from a given stock Quotas are subsets of the TAC, given to countries, companies, boats or individuals ITQs are individual transferable quotas, long-term percentages of the TAC that can be fished, sold or leased

If the TAC is Too High The stock and future catches decrease Mean size of fishes decreases Fishers compete in ‘race to fish’ their quota Fishers have incentives to cheat Fishers spend too much time to catch too few fish Excessive fishing causes damage to the environment

Fisheries Management Basics MSY Cost of fishing € €€€€ MEY F pa ? F lim † EU 2008: 88% of stocks beyond MSY 68% beyond F pa New Technology & Subsidies

Cohort Biomass

Size at First Capture Matters TAC 40,000 t

Size at First Capture Matters Impact on cohort TAC 40,000 t Legal minimum size 35 cm

Froese et al., 2008, Fisheries Research, 92:

12356 Exploitation Rate (F/Z) Yield per Recruit, EC Goal: Less Effort, Same Catch

Froese et al., 2008, Fisheries Research, 92: Less Effort, Same Catch, 7-times Higher Biomass

Yield per Recruit Tool

Ecological Impacts of ITQs Sources: Costello, C., S.D. Gaines and J. Lynham Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321: Branch, T.A How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems? Fish and Fisheries 9:1-19

Demonstrated Benefits of ITQs Precondition: TACs and Size-Structure are OK and fishers trust enforcement in the long term. Under such conditions, the value of ITQs increases with better status of the stock, providing incentives for fishers to push for better management. Then In ‘Derby-fisheries’ where fishing is allowed until a fishery-wide TAC is caught, ITQs end the ‘race for fish’ ITQs are an economic improvement over ‘input-controls’, which deliberately use economic inefficiency to control fishing effort (e.g. limited days at Sea, limitations on boats and gear, etc) If catches (and not landings) are counted against the ITQ, high- grading and other discarding decrease Fishers often assist in data collection and better stock assessment (may even pay for related research) Fishers participate in enforcement

Ecological Effects of ITQs Precondition: TACs and Size-Structure are OK and fishers trust enforcement in the long term. Under such conditions, the value of ITQs increases with better ecological and ‘public’ status of the stock, such as MSC certification, positive listing in Seafood Guides, etc. Most important indirect effects: Correct TAC and target size lead to stock size and structure being closer to ‘natural’, unfished status Reduced effort leads to less by-catch and less habitat damage Additional effects: Fishers have incentives to push for sustainable, ecosystem-based fisheries management

Negative Effects of ITQs Free trading of ITQs may result in socially undesired distribution of fishing rights Fishing pressure on non-ITQ species may increase If ITQ-allocation is based on catch history, fishers have an incentive to overfish If TACs are too high or enforcement is lacking, High-grading and discarding may increase

Conclusions TACs and legal sizes determine status of stocks; if these are unsustainable the stock will collapse, also with ITQs It TAC and size structure are sustainable, ITQs reduce discarding and illegal fishing, improve stewardship and economic efficiency, provide incentives for ecosystem-based management Thank You