Policy for Market failure Prescriptive/Command and Control Strategies: “Standards”

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Getting More for Four Principles for Comprehensive Emissions Trading Jan Mazurek, Director Center for Innovation and the Environment 2002 Environmental.
Advertisements

Economic Incentive Versus----- Command and Control: Whats the Best Approach for Solving Environmental Problems By Winton Harrington & Richard D.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 16 Stationary-Source Local Air Pollution.
The Economics of Environmental Regulations Pollution Tax and Markets for Transferable Pollution Permits.
1 Chapter 14 Practice Quiz Environmental Economics.
Incentive-Based Strategies: Transferable Discharge Permits Chapter 13.
1 Topic 3.c: Tradable emission permits We have seen that tradable pollution permits compare favorably with other policy instruments we have considered.
Environmental economics Chapter issues what is appropriate level of waste? how to achieve that level (who has to reduce how much?)
THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
U.S. Market for SO2 Allowances
Criteria for Evaluating Environmental Policies
In chapter 10, we look for the answers to these questions:
Pollution Policy with Imperfect Information (Ch. 8)
Pollution Control: Instruments
Climate Change 1. What is climate change? IPCC: A change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability.
Economic Solutions to Environmental Problems: The Market Approach
1 Topic 2: Production Externalities Examples of types of abatement activities analyzed: –Output reduction –Cleaner production involving  VC (ex: input-switching)
Chapter 4 Conventional Solutions to Environmental Problems Command-and-Control Approach © 2007 Thomson Learning/South-Western Callan and Thomas, Environmental.
1 Pollution Control. 2 Outline Topics from lecture: Overview Problem (the problem from section is posted in the handout section of the course website.
ERE10: Instruments of Environmental Policy Criteria, incl. cost-effectiveness Instruments –Institutional –Command and control –Market based A comparison.
 Homework #3 Due Thursday  Quiz #2 Next Thursday Sept. 29th  Homework #4 Due Tuesday Oct. 11  Exam #2 Tuesday Oct. 11  Writing Assignment Due Oct.
Emissions Trading The Economics of Emissions Trading The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions.
Uncertainty, Monitoring & Enforcement Using economic models to help inform which instruments are most effective at controlling pollution.
Regulatory Options & Efficiency What guidance can economics provide about how to regulate polluting industries or firms?
The Economics of Environmental Regulation Public Regulation or the Market.
Chapter 4 Conventional Solutions to Environmental Problems: The Command-and-Control Approach © 2004 Thomson Learning/South-Western.
C. Bordoy UWC Maastricht Market Failure Evaluation of policies to correct externalities.
Improving Air Quality: Controlling Stationary Sources Chapter 13 © 2007 Thomson Learning/South-WesternThomas and Callan, Environmental Economics.
Environmental Economics Class 7. Incentive Based Regulation: Basic Concepts Up to this point, the focus has been on resource allocation. Since the use.
Harcourt, Inc. items and derived items copyright © 2001 by Harcourt, Inc. Environmental Economics.
Chapter 2 Externalities and the Environment McGraw-Hill/Irwin
1 Topic 3.a: Introduction At the end of Topic 2 we identified the efficient level of abatement/emissions. The question of policy is: What policies can.
Permits and the U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP). Acid Rain Caused primarily by SO2 and Nox, which is generated largely by coal fired plants Harmful to trees,
Externalities.
Class 7 Environmental Policy Tools
Air Quality Programs.
Chapter 4 Conventional Solutions to Environmental Problems: Command-and-Control Approach.
Policy for Market failure Prescriptive/Command and Control Strategies: “Standards”
Notes for Chapter 5 ECON Economics of Environmental Quality The exchange of private goods and services will generally result in socially efficient.
Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 17 The Economics of Environmental Protection.
Market Failure Market failure refers to reasons why even a perfectly
Allocation of CO 2 Emission Allowances in RGGI Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, Danny Kahn Resources for the Future Presentation to RGGI Stakeholder Meeting.
Command-and-Control Strategies: The Case of Standards Chapter 11.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 14 Stationary-Source Local Air Pollution.
Sometimes externality problems can’t be solved by private bargaining (transaction costs are too big). Public policy toward externalities. “Command-and-control”
Across the country, countless people have protested, even risking arrest, against the Keystone XL Pipeline. (Credit: modification of image by “NoKXL”/Flickr.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 13 Economics of Pollution Control: An Overview.
Air Quality Management Comparison of Cap-and-Trade, Command-and Control and Rate-Based Programs Dr. Ruben Deza Senior Environmental Engineer Clean Air.
Externalities >> chapter: 17 Krugman/Wells Economics ©2009  Worth Publishers 1 of 32.
Regulatory Options & Efficiency Goal: Generate regulatory tools to fix environmental problems.
Improving Air Quality: Controlling Stationary Sources Chapter 12 © 2004 Thomson Learning/South-Western.
Unit 7 Vote for Pedro!!!. Who should control environmental- quality decision making??? Public sector (government)? Private sector (businesses & individuals)?
© 2013 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
Command And Control Strategies: The Case of Standards Lecture 18.
ExternalitiesExternalities. Overview Externalities –Negative: Action by one party imposes a cost on another party –Positive: Action by one party benefits.
1 Environmental taxation under imperfect competition within electricity auctions with dominant firm Francesco Gullì Università Bocconi, Milano International.
Topic 6 : Incentive Based Strategies
An Intro to the Economics of Climate Policy
A General Model of Pollution Control
Topic 5: Public Policy Instruments
Instrument taxonomy Early environmental policies, such as the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972, relied almost exclusively on the command.
C h a p t e r 3 EXTERNALITIES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
A General Model of Pollution Control
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 3rd ed. Jonathan M
Taxes, Standards and Tradable Permits
Incentive Based Strategies: Transferable Discharge Permits
The Economics of Environmental Quality
Session 7: Public Policy Instruments
Presentation transcript:

Policy for Market failure Prescriptive/Command and Control Strategies: “Standards”

Instrument taxonomy Early environmental policies, such as the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972, relied almost exclusively on the command and control (standards) approach. (Stavins, 1998)

Types of standards 1.Performance standard: a regulation prescribing a maximum allowable pollution level. Two common forms: a)Emissions rate: a never exceed level for a quantity of emissions from a polluter E.g. emissions/year; emissions/(unit of input); emissions/(unit of output) b)Ambient concentration: a never exceed level for a pollutant in the environment E.g. TMDLs (Total Maximum Daily Loads of contaminants in streams and rivers)

Types of standards 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: new electric power plants required to install scrubbers to reduce SO 2 in flue gas (K&O p. 130) catalytic converter required on automobiles to reduce concentrations of emissions 2.Technology based standard: a regulation prescribing specifying the method (sometimes the actual equipment) that firms must use.

EPA Sets Thresholds for Greenhouse Gas Permitting July 2011: Clean Air Act permitting requirements for GHGs will kick in for large facilities all new facilities with GHG emissions of at least 100,000 tpy and modifications at existing facilities that would increase GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tpy permits must demonstrate the use of best available control technologies to minimize GHG emission increases

Summary of conclusions on standards in policy Initially appear simple and straightforward Potential weaknesses: –Lack of short- and long-run cost effectiveness Limited flexibility in achieving goals Weak incentive for innovation –may lock in particular technologies Potential advantages: –monitoring and enforcement costs –avoiding “hotspots”

Basic model of standards Initial emissions, e 1 Impose a standard of a maximum of e* tons/year emitted What area represents the total abatement cost at e*? Total damage? (standard pollution control model) b c

Example: Clean Air Act of 1970 Required that costly scrubbers be used by coal- fired electricity plants even though it would have been cheaper to achieve SO2 reductions by substituting to low sulfur coal. Imposed by senators from eastern states with high sulfur coal. Political feasibility: could not otherwise have passed congress. Hackett, S., Environmental and Natural Resources Economics: Theory, Policy, and the Sustainable Society, 3rd Edition (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 224.

Empirical evidence of standards inefficiency (Stavins, 1998) Survey of 8 empirical studies of air pollution control: –ratio of aggregate costs of the conventional, command-and-control (C&C) approach …OVER… the aggregate costs of least-cost (LC) benchmarks TAC C&C /TAC LC Ranged from: 1.07 for sulfate emissions in the Los Angeles area to 22.0 for hydrocarbon emissions at all domestic DuPont plants

Incentives generated by standards (long-run impacts) Technology innovation –Conceptual model: + demand for abatement tech.  + R&D  + technology innovation  MAC curve falls –Standards: tend to freeze development of technologies which would lead to greater levels of control. Especially technology standards –Little or no financial incentive to exceed control targets (Stavins, 1998) A business that adopts a new technology may be "rewarded" by being held to a higher standard of performance

Use the basic model to examine incentives for innovation Start: MAC 1 … innovation  MAC 2 Questions: Given a mandated standard of e 2 (assume compliance is perfect) –What level of abatement does the firm choose? (Under MAC 1 ? MAC 2 ?) –What is the firm’s TAC (total abatement cost) at this level? –What is the incentive (the benefit to the firm) to innovating? The new (post-innovation) socially efficient level of emissions is e 3, –What happens to R&D incentive if the firm believes the post-innovation standard will be set to e 3 ?

When might standards be preferable? Hotspots: simple market-based instruments may allow for areas of particularly high pollution levels to arise which is problematic for some emissions (e.g. mercury). A certain control technology may be so effective and widely available that mandating it is more effective than regulating “emissions” (e.g. double-hulled oil tankers – may also be a high cost of cleanup and difficulty in recovering damages). Too costly to effectively monitor emissions (e.g. catalytic converters on automobiles).

Standards are often uniform (identical across firms). The central issue in assessing the cost effectiveness of standards –Typically firms will have different MAC functions Uniform standard will not be cost-effective –Could achieve greater reduction at same total cost, or –Could achieve same reduction at reduced total cost Economics of standards: Should standards be uniform?

Cost effective pollution control: Minimizing costs K&O, figure 9.1 What does the area described by c represent?

Arguments… For uniform standards: Lower implementation costs (likely lower than for non- uniform standards) –to get non-uniform standards right, you need the MAC function for every source – a costly information requirement equity (treats everyone alike…which is not necessarily always a fair or equitable approach) –“leveling the economic playing field” Against uniformity: When marginal abatement costs differ among sources –Uniformity is not cost-effective (assuming MAC curves known or “easy” to assess) –Equity and leveling the economic playing field don’t necessarily imply equal standards.