Danish reflections on Right Based Management Mogens Schou BS RAC 15. january RBM as a way to economic efficiency 2.RBM as a way to sustainability

The role of public management In fisheries policy we don’t just decide on the legal frameworks -we actually manage fisheries. I suggest That public management of fisheries has a more direct influence on the industry’s ability to make money than is the case in most other commercial activities. That public management of fisheries has a more direct influence on the degree of sustainable utilization of the resources than is the case in most other commercial activities We use a lot of effort and money - Do we get the best out of it - or can it be done better

RBM model in Denmark ITQ for pelagic and industrial species. TVQ (transferable vessel quota shares) for demersal fisheries Allocation of rights - based on historic fishery of the individual vessel Restrictions Rights can be withdrawn with 8 years notice Concentration rules “Fisheries Fund”. A part of the quota shares are set aside for the coastal fishery, support of young fishermen etc. Restrictions regarding tradeabilty (GT follows the fishing right)

RBM results in Denmark Immediate reduction of fishing capacity. Increase in earnings – due to rational fishery Fishermen have startet thinking in economic terms: Improving value instead of quantity Investing in optimal production (new vessels) Getting new generations into the fishery Structure - Fewer vessels In the Pelagic and industrial fishery: ”Big is efficient” Demersal: The clever fisherman wins – whether he is small or big. Fewer active harbours - the small ones are doing well

theme paper on banking september 2007

Headlines in the theme paper Fishermen becomes younger and earnings increase New Regulation has induced trading of rights Biggest investment activity ever Fishermen choose private financing instead of the Fisheries Bank Brothers have ordered a new construction at 6 million Euro New Regulation gives better ships Fishermen have an increased interest in investments Vessels are being modernised Incentives to invest have returned The bank believes in the fishery

RBM as a way to sustainable fishery General aspects Overcapacity has been an overwhelming EU concern for 2 decades. With RBM it vanished as dew for the sun Echange of rights can eliminate ”forced” discard in mixed fisheries Uncertain if RBM induces more og less incentive to upgrade (Impsel project suggest a reduction)

RBM and the TAC/quota system RBM ensures a balance between fishing 뤀 ty and fishing possibilities, but fishing possibilities are not the same as TAC/quotas. Fishing possibilities depends on TAC/quotas The abundance of fish Discards/upgrade Control efficiency To take account of “overfishing” TAC/quotas are set at a lower level than would be the case if fishing possibilities equaled TAC/quotas. All fishermen are “paying” equally to cover the gap between the two

Using RBM to obtain “added sustainability” RBM’s defines a specific right for the individual fisherman. Is it possible to define a specific responsibility as well? And can we give the fisherman an incentive to accept that responsibility? Based on statistics: fishermen fishing under given circumstances (large meshed gear, certain areas etc) are given an increase in their right – reflecting a statistically proven relationship between fishing effort and TAC/quota that is better than average Individual documentation: Fishermen that document what they fish, are given an increase in their RBM that reflects their share of the fishing mortality. Or in other words their share of the amount of fish that has been calculated beforehand for “unsuitable purposes”

The perspective of added sustainability TAC’s for cod in ICES areas III and IV in Sum up to tonnes Expected catches of cod in the same areas in Sum up to about tonnes

Annex. Danish experiment 2008 The aim of the experiment is to, obtain total catch registration of all quota restricted stocks in the experimental area for each participating vessels avoid any discards of legal sized fish – possibly of undersized fish too develop a model for obtaining precise biological data in order to improve advice obtain better economic performance of the vessels develop a documentation that meets market demands The experiment, About 5 RBM vessels conduct a normal fishery with the following supplementary conditions: They must perform a total registration of all catches of quota restricted stocks in the experimental area and refrain from any discards of legal sized fish To ensure this, the following monitoring system must be in place: a monitoring system including GPS, cameras, winch or hydraulic sensor (See fishery monitoring at deck layouts of the fishing vessels including calibration of bins an electronic registration system – (enhanced E-logbook) The incentive, Vessel participating in the experiment is given an increase in their RBM that reflects that all catches are accounted for. An edge on the market for sustainable fisheries and a possible certification