Force Protection Operations

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
C-IED AWARENESS 1 1.
Advertisements

How to Be Obnoxious and Dangerous at the Same Time
Each Panel = 3 x 4.25 Official and Unofficial Travel Be Prepared for the Unexpected Prior to Travel: –Ensure your Level 1 AT Training is current. –OCONUS.
Chapter 8 Driver Education Sharing the Road with Others Page
1. 2 A MOTORCYCLE IS: Agile, Fuel efficient, Provides a sense of freedom, but… NOT VERY SAFE.
Chapter 15 Handling Emergency.
PURPOSE To increase individual soldier understanding of the mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) threat in the former Yugoslavia, and to develop counter.
Military Deployments. Deployment timelines KBR/Civilian employees including “security personnel” is 6 months or 12 months. Air Force was 2 months but.
Structural Vulnerability, Risk Assessment and Land Use Issues for Transportation Infrastructure May 18, 2005 Shay K. Burrows, P.E. Senior Structural Engineer.
Convoy Operations and TTPs Lessons Learned. Threat Unconventional (Irregular) Forces 1-2% of the Population Cannot identify until they attack They want.
CONVOY SAFETY CHAIN TEACHING PACKAGE
1 Warrior Core Tasks. 2 Move (7-8 Tasks) Shoot (16-17 Tasks) Fight (15 Tasks) Communicate (4-5 Tasks) Warrior Core Tasks (IET & Sustainment) Joint Urban.
Use Visual Signaling Techniques
Transportation Tuesday TRANSPORTATION TUESDAY A quick quiz! Find out how much you really know Learning the techniques and finding different ways to deal.
To help reduce you and your families chances of being a victim of terrorist bombing! Haganah Security International Bomb threat.
Military Culture. Basic Training – Military Culture Dr. Will G. Barnes Chaplain, Colonel Army National Guard.
PILOT CAR ESCORT CERTIFICATION JEOPARDY GAME Defensive Driving Breakdowns and Emergency Highway Operations Functions and Duties GA.
CONVOYS.

FORCE PROTECTION WORKING GROUP 16 January 2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY.
Tennessee Baptist Site Security Training Course 4 Copyright Permission obtained from original author Gerald T. Aitken of Maybrook NY
Journey Management Toolbox Talk 2015
Guidelines for Traffic Control at Surface Mines
Chapter 15 1 CHAPTER 15 – EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN CEE 698 – Construction Health and Safety.
Smith Reynolds Airport. 1. Purpose 2. Definitions 3. Vehicle Control Line 4. Vehicle Drive Lanes 5. Foreign Object Debris 6. Basic Rules for Driving in.
SGTM 7: Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Slide 1 SGTM 7: Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness.
Fog and Smoke Crash Response Dangers. Motorist Dangers Obscures: Road Surface (ahead) Lane Markings Traffic Queue (stopped vehicles) Crashed Vehicles.
Rural Roadways Chapter 10. Group Activity ◊Get into three groups (Channahon, Shorewood, Minooka) ◊Which locations involve line-of-sight restrictions?
Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and Recommendations.
Road Ranger / TMC Operator Joint Training Module 111 Module 11 Module 11 System Security.
Section 3: Earthquakes and Society
REACT TO A POSSIBLE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
Safety Hints for Driving in Laos By Christa Weichert.
Convoy Defense: Techniques and Strategies

Safety Information for Soldiers The Dangers Associated with Munitions 1.
Antiterrorism. Learning Topics Introduction Identifying and selecting targets Regions Levels Vigilance Don’t be a target Responding and reporting Detection.
LIVE FIRE PREPARATIONS
VEHICLE SEARCHES AND HAZARDS SSG. CHRIS GESKEY TF 1-114TH INF. BN. SOUTH CAMP, SINAI MFO 47.
By: Amelia Veno. WHAT IS AN IED? An IED is abbreviated in which it actually means Improvised Explosive Devices, once an IED is detonated it can be extremely.
Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST)
Roadway Extrication General Safety. This Section will give the rescuer and understanding of: n Proper use of protective clothing n Protection of both.
Vehicle breakdown and road repair. Emergency equipment required by FMCSRs Fire extinguisher safely secured Fire extinguisher safely secured Spare fuse.
CONVOY SURVIVABILITY. 65 REACT TO CONTACT- MAINTAIN MOVEMENT “On appearance of the enemy during the march, the commander closes up the wagons and continues.
Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) In Attacking Convoys.
I Corps and Fort Lewis CONVOY SAFETY Standard Briefing Package.
Vroom,Vroom.  Insert the key into the ignition. It should be located behind the right side of the steering wheel  make sure that the shifter is in.
Personnel & Equipment Implement Measures To Reduce Your Unit’s Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Acts/Attacks Figure 1.
Intersections.
Operate A Vehicle In A Convoy M-0005 and
83 RD ORD BN CONVOY DEFENSE TECHNIQUES SFC SIERRA.
Safety Signs. Traffic Light Ahead Slow down and prepare to stop.
Breaking Contact B Trp 7-10 CAV 4ID Reference Material
Module 3: Topics 1-3 Vision and Driving Visual Fields Line of Sight/Path of Travel Locating Vehicle Blind Zones.
Terrorist Modus Operandi IRAQ. Key T T Neutral vehicle Neutral person Terrorist vehicle Terrorist - Dicker Terrorist - gunman Hostile gunfire Terrorist.
Presenter’s name Presenter’s title. Contents The current situation Reducing collisions in London [INSERT ORGANISATION NAME]’s policy How we’re helping.
SQUAD AMBUSH A surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target.
Intersections.
Module 3: Topics 1-3 Vision and Driving
CPNZ Patrolling Training Programme
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) (OIF/OEF)
Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) In Attacking Convoys
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) (OIF/OEF)
Unit 1 Emergency Procedures.
Countermine Procedures. Countermine Procedures.
Unit 15 Scene Size-Up.
Non-Movement Area Training
US Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) (OIF/OEF)
Presentation transcript:

Force Protection Operations March OPD React to Unexploded Ordinance Hazards AWT 093-401-5040

Purpose The purpose is to familiarize leaders with force protection tactics, techniques, and procedures which have been successful in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. OPD MARCH 2004

Agenda References Force Protection Operations TTP Summary and Review Conclusion OPD MARCH 2004

References CALL 03-20 FM 4-01.011 FM 7-98 FM 3-21 FM 71-1 FM 3-19.4 OPD MARCH 2004

Force Protection Operations Security Operations Checkpoint Operations Explosive Hazards Convoy Operations React to Unexploded Ordinance Hazards AWT 093-401-5040 OPD MARCH 2004

Explosive Hazards Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that have failed to function as designed UXO and IED that have failed to detonate by design (for example: area denial munitions, land mines, and booby traps) Every soldier on the battlefield, within an operational area, or in a military training area must be able to recognize and react properly to the UXO hazard. OPD MARCH 2004

Explosive Hazards Three steps to take in reacting to UXO/IED Recognize the explosive hazard React to the explosive hazard Report the explosive hazard Three steps: 1 Recognize the hazard—four different categories: 1 dropped—bombs, dispensers, sub-munitions 2 projected—projectiles, mortars, rockets, guided missiles, rifle grenades 3 placed—land mines, booby traps 4 thrown—grenades 2 React to the hazard— immediate actions: don’t move closer to a suspect UXO/IED once it is identified don’t strike, move, or touch a suspect UXO/IED don’t use radios or other electronic devices within 100m of a suspect UXO/IED put on MOPP IV if there are peculiar smells, liquids, or dead animals in the vicinity of the suspect UXO/IED, as chemical agents may be present mark the UXO/IED: similar to a contaminated area use engineer tape, marking ribbon, or UXO marker note the physical characteristics of the suspect UXO/IED and surrounding terrain features to aid future identification evacuate withdraw on same route and watch out for additional hazards evacuate personnel and equipment a safe distance from the area 3 Report the hazard—format will depend on unit SOP, but will include at a minimum: who—unit which discovered UXO/IED what—type of explosive and subgroup where—location description and/or grid when—time the item was discovered OPD MARCH 2004

Explosive Hazards Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Package type Vehicle borne Suicide bomber An IED is a “home-made” explosive device to cause death or injury. They can be produced in varying sizes, functioning methods, containers, and delivery methods. Most IED’s are package type, and metal or lead pipes are most common containers. IED’s have a great variety of fuzing/firing systems, to include: time device, command detonation, booby trap Intended effect of IED’s are also varied upon the intent of the terrorist: high explosive/fragmentation, explosive formed penetrator, shape charge, hoax device, and chemical/biological/radiological Common characteristics—key identification features and indicators of suspected IED’s or the presence of IED’s: exposed wires, cord, or fuze protruding from objects that normally don’t have such attachments; unusual smells, sounds or substances emanating from objects; object seems “out of place” in its surroundings; object or area being noticeably avoided by local populace Vehicle borne IED’s are devices that use a vehicle as the package or container for the explosive device. It has similar characteristics or indicators as package type IED’s, plus other indicators including: an auto that is riding low on it’s springs, even if the auto appears to be empty; explosives can be concealed within the body panels, distributing the weight around the rear end; Suspicious large boxes or satchels, bags or containers in plain view The firing system is sometimes found in the front/engine compartment, and the main explosive usually out of sight in the rear Unusual or overwhelming fuel-type odors Owner/driver cannot be located, or if present, exhibits some kind of suspicious behavior A suicide bomber presents a singularly difficult threat for soldiers; the aim of a suicide bomber is not to commit suicide, but to injure or kill as many soldiers and/or civilians as possible A suicide explosive is delivered via package type attached to or carried by the terrorist or by vehicle. Most frequently they are command detonated by a switch or button. Indicators of suicide bombers are difficult; there is no true profile. They can be male, female, of any age group. There is usually no distinctive or identifiable clothing worn, other than baggy clothes or a coat to conceal the IED package. Clothing may not be appropriate for seasonal climate. Otherwise, will attempt to blend in with populace. Some males have disguised themselves as females. Special considerations: Suicide bomber will detonate the device if they believe that they have been discovered. If a suspect is determined to be a suicide bomber, deadly force is normally the only option. Prepare for and expect an explosion, shoot from as great a distance as possible, from a protected position, if possible. OPD MARCH 2004

Methods of Activation Command activation--by radio, electric leads, pull wire/mechanical strikers. Action by the subject/target--trip wire, pressure device, light sensitive device, electric. Time delay--clock, burning fuse, chemical delay, atmospheric pressure OPD MARCH 2004

Suicide Vest OPD MARCH 2004

Partially Detonated IED

IEDs in OIF/OEF OPD MARCH 2004

Pepsi Can IED

Saddam Poster IED

More IEDs Firing Wire Explosive Charge(s) Blasting Cap Car Alarm w/ Batteries D Cell Batteries Car Alarm D cell Batteries Electric Blasting Cap Car Alarm Firing Wire Explosive Charge Car Alarm D Cell Batteries

IEDs in OIF/OEF

The Basic “No Frills” IED Attack IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) The Basic “No Frills” IED Attack Direction of Traffic Mil/Civ Convoy IED Placed on Shoulder Median Strip Median Strip Median Strip Typical Iraqi 4 lane highway Variation: IED Placed in the Median Strip

The “Broken Down Vehicle” IED Attack IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) The “Broken Down Vehicle” IED Attack Direction of Traffic Stopped fake “Broken Down” vehicle canalizes military traffic into close proximity to IED Median Strip Median Strip Median Strip IED

The “Fiendishly Clever” IED Attack IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) The “Fiendishly Clever” IED Attack Lead vehicle sees fake IED and stops. The convoy stops behind it. Real IEDs on flanks of stopped convoy are then command detonated Direction of Traffic Easily seen Fake IED The Real IEDs Daisy Chained Together Visible Wires Median Strip Median Strip Median Strip

Ambush Technique OPD MARCH 2004 Note straight road surrounded by high ground OPD MARCH 2004

Result of IED/Ambush

Chechnya IED OPD MARCH 2004

Chechnya IED OPD MARCH 2004

Chechnya IED OPD MARCH 2004

Chechnya IED OPD MARCH 2004

OPD MARCH 2004

Chechnya IED OPD MARCH 2004

What Can You do to Mitigate Threat? Keep Alert: Make yourself a “Hard Target” Be Prepared for IED Attack Followed by Ambush Be and Appear Vigilant Personnel Who Look Ready to Fight Back Make Bad Targets Bad Guys Wait for the Next Convoy OPD MARCH 2004

What Can You do to Mitigate Threat? Maintain Convoy Speed when Possible Maintain vehicle dispersion Be Extra Cautious at choke points -Iraqi Vehicle Breakdowns -Bridges, one way roads, traffic jams, sharp turns, etc… If Something Causes the Convoy to Stop, Watch Your Flanks for IEDs (Post Ops) Drive safely but aggressively. Leaders must find balance between maintaining a rapid rate of movement, and not driving at a speed fast enough to increase the risk of injury due to vehicle accident. Keep good separation between vehicles so drivers and crews have time to react to any contact. OPD MARCH 2004

What Can You do to Mitigate Threat? Vests and Helmets Save Lives…Wear Them! Ballistic Glasses Save Eyesight Wear Earplugs-Prevents damage to eardrums Ensure all personnel have on the proper protective gear. This is a leadership check that may very well save the lives of your soldiers. OPD MARCH 2004

What Can You do to Mitigate Threat? Rehearse Actions on Contact for an IED Get Out of the “Kill Zone” Fast Do NOT Approach the IED Soldier was Killed Doing this when the IED was Command Detonated as the Soldier “Inspected” It After an IED detonation get out of the kill zone FAST! There may be other devices attached to the first one by time fuze. Move at least 500m away from the point of detonation. OPD MARCH 2004

Summary The purpose has been to familiarize leaders with force protection tactics, techniques, and procedures which have been successful in Afghanistan and Iraq OPD MARCH 2004

Look Hard, Be Hard “This is about shifting the mindset of soldiers from identifying what they do as a soldier- - ‘I’m a cook, I’m an infantryman, I’m a postal clerk’ - - toward ‘I am a warrior’ when people ask what they do for a living.” BG Benjamin Freakley Commander U.S. Army Infantry Center

Conclusion U.S. soldiers can use the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq to successfully secure fixed sites, deter and prevent terrorist attacks, and save lives. OPD MARCH 2004

QUESTIONS? OPD MARCH 2004